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Title: Power distribution in the Basque Parliament using games with externalities
Author: Arévalo-Iglesias, Gonzalo
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
Keywords: Govern parlamentari
Poder executiu
Distribució (Teoria econòmica)
Teoria de jocs
País Basc
Externalitats (Economia)
Cabinet system
Executive power
Distribution (Economic theory)
Game theory
Basque Country
Externalities (Economics)
Issue Date: Sep-2020
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Abstract: In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Basque Parliament since the restoration of the Spanish democracy. The classic simple games do not fit with the particular voting rule that it is used to invest the president of the regional government. In order to model this voting mechanism we incorporate coalitional externalities to the game. We use the extensions of the most popular power indices to games with externalities that have been proposed in the most recent literature. Moreover, we propose a method to estimate the probability of a given coalition based on the ideological positions of its members in a two-dimensional political spectrum.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Theory and Decision, 2020, num. 89, p. 157-178
Related resource:
ISSN: 0040-5833
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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