Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/171022
Title: | Cyclical Tax Enforcement |
Author: | Durán Cabré, José María Esteller Moré, Alejandro Salvadori, Luca |
Keywords: | Política fiscal Impostos Cicles econòmics Fiscal policy Taxation Business cycles |
Issue Date: | Oct-2020 |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Abstract: | We wonder whether tax enforcement varies along the economic cycle and aim at answering that question from a positive perspective by means of survey data for the Spanish case (1994-2015). According to a fiscal capacity argument, tax enforcement might be stronger in times of crisis (counter‐cyclical), but if the tax administration prioritizes taxpayers' welfare over public revenue, enforcement might be slacker (procyclical). We find tax enforcement is not immune to the state of the economy. In particular, it presents a prevailing counter‐cyclical trend, but in presence of a severe economic crisis it turns out to be procyclical |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12902 |
It is part of: | Economic Inquiry, 2020, vol. 58, num. 4, p. 1874-1893 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/171022 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12902 |
ISSN: | 0095-2583 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) |
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