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Title: Deception as cooperation
Author: Martinez Merino, Manuel Jesus
Keywords: Teoria de la informació
Information theory
Issue Date: 17-Jul-2019
Publisher: Elsevier
Abstract: I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.
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It is part of: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2019, vol. 77, p. 101184
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ISSN: 1369-8486
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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