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Title: Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
Author: Calleja, Pere
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Sudhölter, Peter
Keywords: Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Teoria de jocs
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Game theory
Issue Date: Aug-2020
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences
Abstract: A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally. We show that the set of weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open, which implies that for weight systems close enough to any regular system, the weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM (...)
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It is part of: Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 45, num. 3, p. 1056-1068
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ISSN: 0364-765X
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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