Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/173338
Title: Vertical differentiation and airline alliances: The effect of antitrust immunity
Author: Fageda, Xavier, 1975-
Flores-Fillol, Ricardo
Lin, Ming Hsin
Keywords: Transport aeri
Cooperació empresarial
Competència econòmica
Oligopolis
Commercial aeronautics
Enterprise cooperation
Competition
Oligopolies
Issue Date: 1-Mar-2020
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Abstract: This paper explores the impact of granting antitrust immunity (ATI) to airline alliances in a novel and realistic framework characterized by vertically-differentiated air services. Our theoretical model suggests that non-ATI alliances result in higher quality services at higher fares, whereas granting ATI produces the opposite effect. Using data on the transatlantic market over the period 2010-2017, our theoretical findings on service quality are empirically confirmed. We also relate our theoretical predictions on fares to the empirical results in Brueckner and Singer (2019). Our results indicate that alliances (ATI and non-ATI) concentrate a higher proportion of frequencies on high-quality routings, although airport congestion could mitigate this effect.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2020.103517
It is part of: Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2020, vol. 81, num. 103517
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/173338
Related resource: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2020.103517
ISSN: 0166-0462
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)

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