Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/179058
Title: | Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems |
Author: | Brink, René van den Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier |
Keywords: | Economia matemàtica Mercat financer Equilibri (Economia) Mathematical economics Financial market Equilibrium (Economics) |
Issue Date: | Jul-2021 |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Abstract: | In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched with the same seller. Using Owen's derived consistency, the two optimal rules are characterized among all allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with a variable population, without explicitly requiring stability. |
Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105277 |
It is part of: | Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 195, num. 105277, p. 1-27 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/179058 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105277 |
ISSN: | 0022-0531 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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Document embargat fins el 31-7-2024
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