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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Boffa, Federico | - |
dc.contributor.author | Cavalcanti, Francisco | - |
dc.contributor.author | Piolatto, Amedeo | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-01-24T23:07:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-01-24T23:07:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/182602 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Central politicians channel resources to sub-national entities for political gains. We show formally that the central politicians' allocation decision has two drivers: political alignment (between central and local politicians) and the level of local political accountability. However, drivers count one at a time: alignment matters before local elections, while local political accountability matters before central elections. We then perform a test of our model using Brazilian data, which corroborates our results. Furthermore, we show and explain why political accountability becomes a curse: better educated districts receive fewer transfers in equilibrium | ca |
dc.format.extent | 50 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://ieb.ub.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Doc2021-07.pdf | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2021/07 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IEB21/07] | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Boffa et al., 2021 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Federalisme | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Eleccions | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Sociologia política | - |
dc.subject.classification | Brasil | cat |
dc.subject.other | Federal government | eng |
dc.subject.other | Elections | eng |
dc.subject.other | Political sociology | - |
dc.subject.other | Brazil | eng |
dc.title | Ignorance is bliss: voter education and alignment in distributive politics | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB21-07_Boffa+Cavalcanti+Piolatto.pdf | 1.37 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License