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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Atay, Ata | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-06-19T07:10:34Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-06-19T07:10:34Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2017-05-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0167-6377 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 3 p. | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier B.V. | - |
| dc.relation.isformatof | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001 | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Operations Research Letters, 2017, vol. 45, num. 3, p. 217-219 | - |
| dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001 | - |
| dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017 | - |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | - |
| dc.source | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) | - |
| dc.subject.classification | Teoria de jocs | - |
| dc.subject.classification | Assignació de recursos | - |
| dc.subject.classification | Àlgebres de Von Neumann | - |
| dc.subject.classification | Problema de Neumann | - |
| dc.subject.other | Game theory | - |
| dc.subject.other | Resource allocation | - |
| dc.subject.other | Von Neumann algebras | - |
| dc.subject.other | Neumann problem | - |
| dc.title | An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game | - |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | - |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | - |
| dc.identifier.idgrec | 716842 | - |
| dc.date.updated | 2023-06-19T07:10:34Z | - |
| dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 716842.pdf | 305.74 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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