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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Llerena Garrés, Francesc | - |
dc.contributor.author | Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) | - |
dc.contributor.author | Rafels, Carles | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-12-13T14:56:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-12-13T14:56:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1136-8365 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/48439 | - |
dc.description.abstract | [cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). | - |
dc.description.abstract | [eng] On the domain of balanced multi-sided assignment games (Quint, 1991), the core is characterized as the unique non-empty solution satisfying derived consistency and projection consistency. As a consequence, a new characterization of the core of two-sided assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is provided by using simultaneously the aforementioned consistency axioms. We also characterize the core on the whole domain of multi-sided assignment games in terms of singleness best, individual anti-monotonicity and derived consistency. Again, as a particular case we obtain a new axiomatization for the bilateral case without making use of the non-emptiness axiom. | - |
dc.format.extent | 21 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa | - |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/consistency-and-the-core-of-multi-sided-assignment-markets/ | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia), 2013, E13/296 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-Eco13/296] | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Llerena Garrés, 2013 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ | - |
dc.source | UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] | - |
dc.subject.classification | Teoria de jocs | - |
dc.subject.classification | Presa de decisions (Estadística) | - |
dc.subject.classification | Jocs d'estratègia (Matemàtica) | - |
dc.subject.classification | Assignació de recursos | - |
dc.subject.classification | Matemàtica financera | - |
dc.subject.other | Game theory | - |
dc.subject.other | Statistical decision | - |
dc.subject.other | Games of strategy (Mathematics) | - |
dc.subject.other | Ressource allocation | - |
dc.subject.other | Business mathematics | - |
dc.title | Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | - |
dc.date.updated | 2013-12-13T14:56:55Z | - |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | - |
Appears in Collections: | Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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E13-296_Llerena.pdf | 173.05 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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