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Title: The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities [WP]
Author: Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
Tejada, Oriol
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Teoria de l'estimació
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Presa de decisions (Estadística)
Ciències socials
Game theory
Estimation theory
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Statistical decision
Social sciences
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco14/302]
Abstract: [eng] We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to amalgamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meaningful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are closed.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2014, E14/302
ISSN: 1136-8365
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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