Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/58504
Title: If you want me to stay, pay
Author: Claeys, Peter Gunther
Martire, Federico
Keywords: Política fiscal
Deute públic
Anàlisi d'impacte econòmic
Federalisme
Descentralització administrativa
Vall d'Aosta (Itàlia : Regió)
Fiscal policy
Public debt
Economic impact analysis
Federalism
Decentralization in government
Issue Date: 2011
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
Abstract: Devolution of political power is constantly on the political agenda in both Italy and Spain. Fiscal policy in these countries has granted specific privileges to some regions. Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste,(VdA) and País Vasco-Euskadi (PV) have an extensive say over spending decisions, and receive nearly all regional tax revenues. Although both VdA and PV are among the richest regions in each country, both are net beneficiaries of the fiscal equalisation system. This preferential treatment is the outcome of a fiscal system with limits on taxing power and debt issuance, and is meant as a compensation for the lack of autonomy. It so prevents calls for more fiscal autonomy, or even outright secession. The economic effects of this asymmetric federalism are negative Although partial equalisation reduces excessive redistribution built in the fiscal equalisation system, more autonomy could pay off with more efficient government. Asymmetric federalism moreover creates a political impasse in the negotiation of a more efficient tax system and financing arrangement.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2011/201101.pdf
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2011, IR11/001
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/58504
ISSN: 2014-1254
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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