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Title: Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?
Author: Jiménez González, Juan Luis
Perdiguero, Jordi
Keywords: Mercat
Control de preus
Competència econòmica
Price control
Issue Date: 2011
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
Series/Report no: [WP E-IR11/20]
Abstract: Cartel detection is one of the most basic and most complicated tasks of competition authorities. In recent years, however, variance filters have provided a fairly simple tool for rejecting the existence of price-fixing, with the added advantage that the methodology requires only a low volume of data. In this paper we analyze two aspects of variance filters: 1- the relationship established between market structure and price rigidity, and 2- the use of different benchmarks for implementing the filters. This paper addresses these two issues by applying a variance filter to a gasoline retail market characterized by a set of unique features. Our results confirm the positive relationship between monopolies and price rigidity, and the variance filter's ability to detect non-competitive behavior when an appropriate benchmark is used. Our findings should serve to promote the implementation of this methodology among competition authorities, albeit in the awareness that a more exhaustive complementary analysis is required.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2011, IR11/20
ISSN: 2014-1254
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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