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Title: Institutional Determinants of Military Spending
Author: Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Elias Moreno, Ferran
Keywords: Política militar
Assistència militar
Partits polítics
Despeses públiques
Military policy
Military assistance
Political parties
Public expenditures
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
Series/Report no: [WP E-IR09/22]
Abstract: Drawing on a database for 1988-2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form, electoral rules, concentration of parliamentary parties, and ideology. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas the presence of a plurality voting system will reduce the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods. We present as well evidence regarding the effect of ideology on defense spending.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2009, IR09/22
ISSN: 2014-1254
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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