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Title: Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term Contracts
Author: Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Fageda, Xavier, 1975-
Keywords: Concessions administratives
Política de transports
Infraestructures (Transport)
Control de gestió
Express highways
Transportation and state
Transportation buildings
Management audit
Issue Date: 2007
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
Series/Report no: [WP E-IR07/06]
Abstract: Recent theoretical developments on concession contracts for long term infrastructure projects under uncertain demand show the benefits of allowing for flexible term contracts rather than fixing a rigid term. This study presents a simulation to compare both alternatives by using real data from the oldest Spanish toll motorway. For this purpose, we analyze how well the flexible term would have performed instead of the fixed length actually established. Our results show a huge reduction of the term of concession that would have dramatically decreased the firm’s benefits and the user’s overpayment due to the internalization of an unexpected traffic increase.
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2007, IR07/06
ISSN: 2014-1254
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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