Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/63548
Title: Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term Contracts
Author: Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Fageda, Xavier, 1975-
Keywords: Concessions administratives
Autopistes
Política de transports
Infraestructures (Transport)
Privatització
Control de gestió
Concessions
Express highways
Transportation and state
Transportation buildings
Privatization
Management audit
Issue Date: 2007
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
Abstract: Recent theoretical developments on concession contracts for long term infrastructure projects under uncertain demand show the benefits of allowing for flexible term contracts rather than fixing a rigid term. This study presents a simulation to compare both alternatives by using real data from the oldest Spanish toll motorway. For this purpose, we analyze how well the flexible term would have performed instead of the fixed length actually established. Our results show a huge reduction of the term of concession that would have dramatically decreased the firm’s benefits and the user’s overpayment due to the internalization of an unexpected traffic increase.
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2007, IR07/006
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/63548
ISSN: 2014-1254
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
IR07-006_Albalate-Bel.pdf315.39 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons