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Title: Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Games with Externalities
Author: Alonso-Meijide, José Mª
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria, 1962-
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Teoria de l'estimació
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Presa de decisions (Estadística)
Game theory
Estimation theory
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Statistical decision
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco15/328]
Abstract: We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main novelty of our generalization is a monotonicity property that we define for games in partition function form. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on these kind of coalitions. We provide methods based on the multilinear extension of the game to compute the indices. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the current Parliament of Andalusia.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2015, E15/328
ISSN: 1136-8365
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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