Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/68834| Title: | Insights into the nucleolus of the assignment game |
| Author: | Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier Rafels, Carles Ybern, Neus |
| Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Matemàtica financera Models matemàtics Estudis de viabilitat Game theory Ressource allocation Business mathematics Mathematical models Feasibility studies |
| Issue Date: | 2015 |
| Publisher: | Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa |
| Series/Report no: | [WP E-Eco15/333] |
| Abstract: | We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus form a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element, which is always a valuation. -see p.43, Topkis, 1998-. We give an explicit form of this valuation matrix. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected, and we construct minimal elements of this family. We also analyze the conditions to ensure that a given vector is the nucleolus of some assignment game. |
| Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/333WEB.pdf |
| It is part of: | UB Economics – Working Papers, 2015, E15/333 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/68834 |
| ISSN: | 1136-8365 |
| Appears in Collections: | UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| E15-333_MartinezAlbeniz_InsightsNucleolus.pdf | 411.59 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons License
