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Title: Insights into the nucleolus of the assignment game
Author: Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
Rafels, Carles
Ybern, Neus
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Assignació de recursos
Matemàtica financera
Models matemàtics
Estudis de viabilitat
Game theory
Ressource allocation
Business mathematics
Mathematical models
Feasibility studies
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco15/333]
Abstract: We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus form a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element, which is always a valuation. -see p.43, Topkis, 1998-. We give an explicit form of this valuation matrix. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected, and we construct minimal elements of this family. We also analyze the conditions to ensure that a given vector is the nucleolus of some assignment game.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2015, E15/333
ISSN: 1136-8365
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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