

MIGRATION AND NORDIC WELFARE STATE?

The dilemma of the welfare state with the increase
of migration population in Sweden and Denmark

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Abstract

This paper investigates the relation between the increase of right-wing regimes in the Nordic welfare state and the radicalization in migration policy in Denmark and Sweden between 1990 and 2018. The purpose is to see the changes in their welfare state and to analyse migration policies which have been strengthened at the time that right-wing parties govern in Denmark and in Sweden. What has been found is that in Denmark the migration issue is more politized that in Sweden and that radicalization of opinions towards immigration are frequent, although in both countries they are tighten the requirement for migration population to enter these countries.

Keywords

Migration · welfare state · Sweden · Denmark · refugees · commodification

Título

¿Migración y estado de bienestar nórdico? El reto del estado de bienestar con el aumento de la población migrante en Suecia y Dinamarca.

Resumen

Este *paper* investiga la relación entre el incremento de voto de partidos de derechas en el estado de bienestar nórdico y la radicalización de la política migratoria en Dinamarca y Suecia, entre 1990 y 2018. El objetivo es ver los cambios que se producen en el estado de bienestar y analizar la evolución de las políticas migratorias que se han radicalizado al tiempo que gobiernan coaliciones de derechas. Los resultados muestran que en Dinamarca la cuestión migratoria ha sido siempre mucho más politizada que en Suecia, aunque en los dos países aumentan las restricciones para entrar en el país.

Palabras clave

Migración · estado del bienestar · Suecia · Dinamarca · refugiados · mercantilización

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1. Introduction

1.1. Justification of the topic

This paper analyses the transformation of Nordic Welfare regimes in the context of the financial crisis and constant increase of migrant population as a result of social phenomena such as the refugees' crisis affecting Europe. To do so, a comparative analysis between Sweden and Denmark will be done studying *How right-wing governments' rise in these countries affecting social democratic welfare state and how is this affecting immigrant population during the period 1990-2018?*

The social context of the financial crises which emerges in 2008, brought growing perception of the welfare state as inefficient lack of adequate levels of life satisfaction and paying a huge amount of taxes was not reflected in services provided by the state anymore.

After overcoming a huge crisis in the 90s, Scandinavian countries seemed to be out of the discussion regarding if their welfare model was inefficient. But since the economic crisis, citizens started to demand a revision of welfare policies since they pay the highest percentage of taxes in the World. In a context in which state-wide regulations are being questioned and market dynamics push for commodification of state policies, showing this process as the easiest way for the state to proceed, Scandinavian welfare states being questioned as the universalist principle, which is the most envied by other models (as the unique requisite to access to social, civic and political rights is to be a citizen), become more closed, avoiding the entrance of foreigners.

Although this is not an exception, it is outstanding between the Nordic countries to limit the universalism characteristic of the social democratic model which has increased with the refugee crisis, especially in Sweden where the number of humanitarian refugees has increased since 2015 (OCDE). This social crisis all Europe is facing may be one of the causes of the decrease in the welfare basis of the Scandinavian countries.

The election of Sweden and Denmark is not a random choice: the main features of both countries and the nature of their parliamentary system allow for interesting comparison. These two countries are specially interesting to explore deeply, in terms of migrant policy, because Sweden has been called as the most generous country in policies for migrants and Denmark has been involved in numerous political scandals for the proposals their political parties has done to restrict the entrance of migrants in the country.

For that, this paper is a comparative study between two Nordic countries (Sweden and Denmark), due to the use of this technique both frameworks need to have common points in which the comparison can be underpinned, in this case the fact that both countries have a similar parliamentary system is essential because migration policies through time in both cases are going to be analysed. Moreover, how coalitions and parliamentary composition has been affecting the construction of these policies is also

going to be studies, for this reason having the same parliamentary composition makes it easier in methodological terms to compare both cases.

As a result, the interest in studying this matter is: on the one hand. to see if the welfare model we all have been looking at, in order to change towards a more equalitarian and with higher standards of well-being, is being commodified and on the other hand, to see if Nordic countries are creating a welfare model with a double path, a conventional state model for the people who has been Swedish or Danish all their life and alternative conditions for those who are immigrants.

2. Theoretical framework

In order to establish the theoretical approaches this paper will be based on, I develop firstly a framework including different authors so we are able to see what has been said on the topic apart from giving us key points from which our hypothesis are going to be based. As a result, the framework constitutes more than a theoretical base but the guiding thread for us to answer the research question.

For this reason, this theoretical framework begins with a brief summary of the history of welfare states. As North (1990) states, the origin of the institutions explains a huge number of features that these same institutions maintain nowadays. In this sense, once the background of welfare state is settled, the importance of coalitions in the construction of the institutions needs to be also taken into account following Esping-Andersen's theory (1990) to explain how welfare state were designed.

After this general approach to three main models of welfare state a more specific section will be developed in the analysis explaining the main features of the welfare state in Denmark and Sweden, after that, the concerns of the population together with the evolution of the parliamentary system and the study of the coalition between 1990-2015 will be settled down to end up with, how the evolution of the parliamentary system matches with the changes in political discourses affecting migration policy.

The aim of studying the points described before has to do with the hypothesis that are planned to be answered. There are two main hypothesis, the first one is that political terms with high number of seats at the Parliament corresponding to right-centre parties increase migrants' restrictions.

Resulting from this first hypothesis, Denmark will increase restrictions to enter the country creating a double path of rights: one for Danish people and the other one for migrant population, whereas Sweden will keep on receiving a high number of migrants but reducing its number protecting the principle of universalism its welfare state has.

The second hypothesis is that Nordic welfare states' cuts in welfare policies coincide with historical moments in which a higher percentage of migrant population comes to the country.

2.1. Emergence of Welfare State

Before focusing on the point regarding this paper -the Nordic welfare state we need to describe how welfare states were settled up because as said by North (1990): *<<institutions are the rules of the game>>*¹, and there is a path dependence between the context in which they were constructed and how they operate now. This can give us hints on how the welfare states are, nowadays.

During 1880 in Scandinavia, salaries were the main source for people in order to survive; thereby labour force was converted into a good linked to the law of supply and demand of the labour market. Since the market was self-regulated, labour started to be divested

¹ North, Douglass C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

from policy. This social and economic context is where welfare states started to emerge even if this long-term project was truncated with the Second World War.

In this context, at the end of the 19th century, spent was increasing (Germany 5% of the GDP or Sweden 3% of GDP was spent in social policies) as a result of the increase in the social policies from the state providing social insurance to their population as a mechanism of social control so that revolution and social conflict could be avoided (Engels, 1845 cited in Engels, 1979)². Generally speaking, the welfare state represents a change in terms of providing the individual with social, civic and political rights but the design of the 19th century has similar aims as the poverty policies provided from the state since that moment, such as the Poor Laws in England³

After the Second World War, we can talk about a Keynesian Welfare state constructed as an amalgam of social contracts including public sanitary system, universal education system, pensions and social services (which also means housing policies). This embryonic stage of welfare state encloses the Marshall Plan and Breton Woods' Agreement along with the creation of a new fiscal policy which implies the responsibility of the state of taking care of their citizens in exchange of taxes paid according to what you have and what you produce.

Indeed, the construction of the welfare states after the War was conditioned, in a certain way, by the strength of the working class, because the political parties with higher support of this social class had strong influence in the design of the welfare states. Moreover, coalitions also played a main role when talking about the consolidation of the welfare state because as said by Manow (2009): *<<where the left was strong, the welfare state became generous and encompassing, where the left was weak, the welfare state remained residual>>*. Because of that, as said by Esping-Andersen: *<<the history of political class coalition [is] the most decisive cause of welfare state variations>>* (1, 1993).

Esping-Andersen (1990) defined the welfare states as *<< [...] key institutions in structuring classes and in maintaining social order>>*, in concordance with him, Parkin (1978) did already define the welfare states as a way of organizing society politically so that social conflict is transformed into a competition among social classes to fight for a certain social status. Esping-Andersen labelled three ideal types taking into account not just the geographical context, but the sizes of labour supply, the division between work and leisure, the gender division of labour and the proportion of public-private sector of employment.

These three ideal types, are also described considering the way they have been modified during time as said by Mingione (2005) through three different axes: the first one has to do with the centrality the nuclear family has on the state *<<with married parents, functioning as an institution for redistributing resources, rights, and duties>>* (2005, 69) next, the importance of familiar stability regarding the economic welfare assuring:

² Engels, F. (1979). *La situación de la clase obrera en Inglaterra*. Jucar: Gijón.

³ Lindert, Peter (2011), *"La ayuda a los pobres antes de 1880"* y *"La interpretación de las interrogantes sobre la ayuda a los pobres en los primeros años"*, caps. III y IV de *El ascenso del sector público. El crecimiento económico y el gasto social del siglo XVIII al presente*, México, FCE, Vol, I, pp. 59-122.

<<permanent employee labour contracts>> (2005, 65) and guarantying employees they can join trade unions freely; last but not least, the combination of these two ways of changing along with the degree of regulation of the state is the third way of modifying the welfare state's design:

The regulatory monopoly of the nation-state, committed to expanding form of protection (welfare state) complementary to the balance between breadwinner and nuclear family and essential to developing high-productivity systems based on large organizations and economies of scale, as well as engaged in promoting social homogeneity and keeping local, regional, and particularistic divergences under control (2005, 70).

Overall, these three main changes constitute the axis under which the three ideal types Esping-Andersen's englobed in began to take shape, even if every specific country has its own defining features. According to that, Esping-Andersen (1990) labelled these three models as conservative, liberal and social democratic models.

2.2. Categorization by Esping-Andersen

As said before, the three models of the welfare state labelled by Esping-Andersen in 1990 have different characteristics that need to be mentioned, as the aim of this paper is to see how Scandinavian welfare state has evolved and if so towards which model has change: liberal or conservative? Moreover, has the Scandinavian model feature of the Mediterranean model?

2.2.1. Liberal Model

The liberal welfare model was described by Esping-Andersen (1990) as the most commodified of the models, constantly associated with poor relief that maintains class division based on income (Van Voorhis, 3, 2002) and where the labour market is self-regulated, so the unique task of the state is to intervene in case of big failure because the market works as an emancipatory mechanism for the individual in charge of stimulating self-confidence for the worker and incentives to work hard, too.

As the market is set to be natural and the best way of organizing economically society, the welfare state has been usually called a *marginal or residual* welfare state which provides only with the basic needs to their population in order to avoid poverty and moral corruption, but no more than this. Consequentially, social exclusion is an individuals' fault, not a systemic dysfunction and the institutions that finally look after people with special necessities or vulnerable social groups are the family or the church.

For this reason, liberal states have never been against social charity and did accept trade unions as worker's right because it was easier to negotiate labour conditions collectively since social assistance depends in this model on the labour positions a citizen -as a worker- as in the labour market (Mingione, 2005).

What should be highlighted when talking about the liberal welfare model is that any country is exempt of having liberal characteristics in their models, also in countries such

as New Zealand or Scandinavia we can find liberal crumbs during the first years of their welfare states, especially in their social assistance model.

2.2.2. *Conservative model*

The conservative or corporative model as it is called too was ruled by the conservative elites in continental Europe who found in the construction of the welfare state the opportunity to maintain the tradition within their society assuring its authority and privileges. As a result, the principle from which the model was set up is: social integration, conservation of the vertical social stratification of the society and constrain socialism.

Furthermore, social assistance was under church's control and operate to guarantee social rights for those citizens following the Cristian dogma. Due to that, the state worked as a figure of authority directly link with the catholic faith, in which the welfare state has the aim of solving the *social question* by giving social rights but also by implementing employment programs in order to avoid poverty as well as maintaining the figure of the traditional social now in the working place.

To sum up, in all the European countries, the conservative model was the one in charge of the commodification of the labour force and was implemented in all Europe due to the fear of the socialist forces because the democratic movements where rising up in strength and so they power and privileges could be protected. Moreover, having commodified workers permitted the state to offer the minimum benefits because the associations and trade unions where breaking up while the welfare state was emerging.

2.2.2.1. *Mediterranean model*

As a sub-model within the conservative mode, Esping-Andersen (2002) reformulated a model called *Mediterranean model* including those Mediterranean countries with special socio-cultural conditions that made their welfare model, even if not a unique model, a subgroup of the conservative model. This Mediterranean model includes Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy the aim to do so is to highlight their special social policy different among the other models, although others still consider that Mediterranean countries should have their own model in the welfare state worlds.

It is said that this model is constructed by family, that is to say that the role of the family constitutes the distinguished element of this welfare state. For that, this model needs to be understood as an amalgam of the joint activity among the state, the market and the family or household. As a result of the importance of the institution of the family, authors such as Moreno (2003)⁴ says this model should consider the work that it is done at home, even if it is not regulated by the market, not even remunerated it should be taken into consideration when talking about the degree of de/commodification of the welfare state. As a consequence, Esping-Andersen (2002), re-theorized his model adding this sub-group of the conservative model as saying that he did not take seriously enough the role of the family in the Mediterranean countries.

⁴ Moreno (2003). Bienestar mediterráneo y 'supermujeres'. pp.3-5

Moreno (2003), continue explaining that family is considered to be a pillar in the model because it is in charge of the well-being⁵ of the individual. Therefore, it is considered essential not necessarily in economic terms but in social and individual ones, for that, it has been defined as a network of *micro solidarity* among South European countries. Thanks to the family and its network of solidarity, is that Mediterranean welfare countries have been able to withstand the populations' welfare significantly: when the government was not able to deal with dependency among older people or kinder gardens for children, family together with non-profit organizations started to adopt the role of the state by providing these services to the community.

2.2.3. *The Social democratic model*

The principles of the Nordic welfare state are the dominant role of the state and the public sector: services are provided from the central and local governments with the aim of providing extended rights to all citizens and residents. A second principle is the progressive distribution of wealth through taxes assuring the egalitarian distribution of income, finally the full employment has always been the main concern of Nordic governments, to have active labour market programs as said by Kuhnle (2004).

After the First World War, Scandinavian countries started to combine conservative reformism with socialist measures to cope with human misery caused by the war. By introducing socialist measures, it also changes political parties ideology from a classist vision of the world to give support the middle classes' interests so they could open the scope and increase the amount of people voting them in elections.

In contrast to other models, the social democratic regime is linked to middle-class universalism and social equality. Before the Second World War, social rights were basic with modest levels of subsidy limited to cover only human needs.

The aim of the social democratic welfare state was to avoid poverty by reformulating the social policies in two areas: expand social rights beyond the minimum, for instance allowing workers to be paid while they are doing *healing work* and increasing subsidies: having a subsidy has not been equivalence to decreasing life welfare.

The social democratic welfare emerges as an answer to the commodification of the labour force which perpetuates the social stratification and the worker's alienation, apart from the market's dependence. For this reason, *decommodification* was always the claim of the working-class social movements, they fought to have social assistance even if they were unemployed. Although the first social movements were created by professional trade unions, the same ones adopted during the years a model of social assistance.

Above all, the aims under which this welfare state model were settled are: a) emancipation of the individual, b) to improve the quality of the social rights and make them accessible for everyone under the unique requisite of being a citizen; then they state clearly that both the dependence of the family and morality will not be relevant in

⁵ Including life satisfaction

a social democratic society, because as it is said by Esping-Andersen: <<*the welfare state was a long-distance project*>> (1993, 15-23).

To conclude, to measure not only which countries are part of the social democratic model but to analyse if their changes in time have been marginal or radical Lindbom (2001, 179) uses three indicators: first, he indicates that expenditure should be revised specifically on *means-tested benefits* relative to other social expenditures, then to analyse the importance of private pensions relative to total pensions and finally, private health expenditure relative to total health expenditure. These indicators should be taken into consideration when considering changes between Denmark and Sweden.

2.2.3.1. Scandinavian particularities: the importance of coalitions in the construction of Nordic welfare states

According to Rubio (2016), what makes Scandinavian countries notably interesting is that they have achieved the task of reducing social inequalities and fight against poverty. At the same time, they have the highest social expenditures that has been countered with constant grows in their GDP and full employment.

But there are five particularities that should also be taken into account that are followed by all Scandinavian countries. Firstly, the cultural homogeneity of their society which has also been transmitted to the political parties until some years ago; apart from the reduced dimensions of all Nordic countries which makes easier assuming social control from the government's point of view⁶, in this point Kuhnle (6, 2004) does also agrees on, when saying that: *the coexistence between the state and the people has been unusually peaceful in the Scandinavian area.*

Another issue that makes Scandinavian countries particular are the diffusion of the Lutheran faith among these countries, the Lutheran church shows to Nordic citizens than quality of life is better than the best car or the biggest car even though the Church was never meant to control education or even health as it happened in other European countries such as Spain or England, the State adopt the role of providing population these services from the very beginning. As a result of the absence of empowerees of the Lutheran church, there is no mayor political party strongly linked to any religious or ethnic group with success in the North (Kuhle, 61, 2004).

The third particularity of these group of countries has to do with the *green-red* coalition (Esping-Andersen, 1993): the alliance between farmers and industrial workers is the greatest achievement of the Nordic welfare state because from the beginning the working class was composed not just by farmers but workers of the new fabrics of the

⁶ As already said by Montesquieu in 1750 "*El espíritu de las leyes*". *Libro II: de las leyes que se derivan directamente de la naturaleza del gobierno. Capítulo I: de la naturaleza de los tres diversos gobiernos*"

urban areas. This dual character of the working class formed by proletariat and industrial workers is the reason why the social democratic welfare state is, nowadays.

Following Esping-Andersen (1990), to understand the nature of the social democratic regimes is useful to see the social composition at an early industrialized stage. When industrialization was slightly filtering society changing its producing system, most of the Scandinavian population were rural, not just they live in the countryside but they tend to work in agriculture. This was especially relevant in Scandinavia because collided with the expansion of the suffrage of the country, at that point, political parties understood that the mayor part of their electorate, if they want to win electors (as establishes in all Scandinavian's Constitutions they need a high percentage of the population voting for their political propose), were mostly rural class.

Meanwhile, rural classes understood and act in consequence to the power they had: for this reason, it is said by Esping-Andersen that rural classes were decisive for the design of the social democratic welfare state.

Moreover, in countries such as Sweden, the agriculture was the main resource for years for people to survive but the sector was not too wealthy and was dependent of the state's subsidies. Due to that, the aim of the state was to maintain the bulk of the population and the best process to do so was to have a "green-red" coalition to maintain prices of primary products stable in order to survive.

With that, is now understandable that the Scandinavian model had the aim to have a de-commodified state within a society in which citizens could quit their jobs when they feel is necessary, being sure their welfare will not decrease, thanks to the services provided by the central government, for example health insurance, subsidy for time off work, pension or maternity leaves, among others.

In addition to Esping-Andersen's theory, Manow (2009) did also point out that this explanation was particularly relevant where the economy was ruled by familiar agriculture, where small organizations but highly intense productions in terms of capital took place. Not just the labour situation, but the political context played a decisive role in this type of coalitions: where farmers were politically well-organized (as happen in Scandinavian countries) the capacity of rural classes to negotiate their social conditions and to discuss political agreement for the coming up emergence of the welfare state was extremely dominant. This idea can be easily seen when Manow (2009) says:

Social democracy very rarely was able to achieve an electoral majority on its own.

Almost always remained dependent on partners who would join them in their political struggle for more social justice and equality, for workers' better living conditions and for the decommodification of labour (2009, 102)

Continuing with this idea, the fourth particularity of the Scandinavian countries Rubio (2016) refers to is the cohesion of the labour movement in which there was no significant fissures assuring an <<...*ascendance of the working class into the polity through a relatively easy and tranquil process*>> (Kuhnle, 2004, 61). Moreover, the labour movement was a popular movement where social democratic parties were strongly enhanced and with high degree of unionisation.

Illustrative examples of the early rise of social democratic and agrarian parties in policy are the Social democratic party of Sweden which govern in majority the country for the first time in 1920, or the countries of Finland and Denmark who were already ruled either unique social democratic parties or red coalitions by the 30's, even at the beginning of the Second World War, this kind of parties remain at the strongest political groups, except from Denmark defined by Churchill as "*Hitler's Tame Canary*"⁷

The last important feature when explaining how important were the coalitions in the design of the Scandinavian welfare state has to do with the cohesion of trade unions. Thanks to the strength of trade unions, agreements on salaries were always the result of negotiations between both parts. Furthermore, the cooperation between central government and trade unions was particularly relevant because made possible social policies to assure jobs to everyone, trade unions accepted governments' aims and they both agree in having subsidies for unemployed people (Rubio, 2016).

To conclude, farmers and industrial workers are the cause of the special design the Scandinavian countries have in their welfare states. The emergence of the universalist principle which makes this type of welfare state so unique and envied it is impossible to explain without the agreement of a working class composed by citizens from both rural and urban areas, who worked together to assure a social democratic welfare state that provides them adequate goods and services under the condition of being a citizen.

For this reason, it should never be forgotten that: <<the history of political class coalition [is] the most decisive cause of welfare state variations>> (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1) among countries, and that how "red" and/or "green" were their coalitions at the moment they emerged, how was their middle class and how has change through time are essential to understand how welfare states are now.

2.3. The welfare state of Denmark and Sweden

Prior to defining the features of the two welfare states, there are common characteristics of Nordic welfare policy-making that can be summarized in four points (Kuhnle, 2004). The first one is that there is a "*widespread political consensus*" among political leaders

⁷ When Germany invade Denmark with nearly resistance from Danish people on April 9th, 1940.

and their electors, about upholding public responsibilities for welfare provision. Although the reluctances towards the benefits of the welfare state have always been there, with the economic crisis seem to sharply increase, due to the high cost of maintenance. Despite that, Lindbom (2001) explained that the crisis during the 90's did not mean a reduction of welfare state services even if it was the first opportunity for private initiatives to enter a system mainly formed by the state institutions since the emergence of the welfare state.

However, the erosion between political parties is also present in Scandinavia, now there is a gap between social policies promoted by right and left parties. At the end, the intensification of the difference on the social policies has also a direct consequence on how the system is working and how effective policies are implemented in society, apart from the fact that the political cohesion the population appreciate from their political leader may also be affected.

Together with the first point, there is also a neoliberal wave as a consequence of economic crisis (2008) growing all around which has also rekindled the debate of a less regulated state that sets that even though the welfare policies should continue being part of the model, the private initiative should also have the door open to participate in the labour market without the strict intervention of the government.

Moreover, a strong welfare populism is splitting old parties into new smaller parties both from the right and left spectrum with clear and distinct concerning. On the one hand, left parties are pro increasing welfare policies guarantying the universalist postulate of the social democratic model, on the other hand right parties want to take a chance on tax reduction not worrying too much in social security, their aims are to increase individual responsibility to secure an agreement between private insurance and the state ensuring social well-being, but also to increase public spending in pensions and health, so that continue sustaining public services.

For this reason, Lindbom (2001) looks at the fat between public and private expenditure in both pensions as an indicator to measure social democracy⁸

In all Scandinavian countries the major part of the public-sector growth has been caused by the expansion of the social services (Kuhnle, 2004) and the social democratic welfare policy has success in its aim to expanded equality trough nonmarket mechanisms within the confines of a capitalist economy (Scruggs & Allan, 2008, 5). From the late 1970 onwards, the welfare services including health care and education has been over the 50% of the governmental budget because almost all services are public services that have been in constant expansion since the past three decades in Scandinavia (Kuhnle, 2004).

⁸ see 2.2.3. The social democratic model.

3. Research question

The research question that this paper has the aim to solve is: *How right-wing governments' rise in these countries affecting social democratic welfare state and how is this affecting immigrant population during the period 1990-2018?*

This paper has the aim to give an accurate answer to the question regarding the rise of right-wing parties, its radicalization and how this is affecting an increasing migrant population since 1990.

Even if the rise of right parties is a continuum across Europe, it is especially interesting to see how will affect Scandinavian's welfare state this political inflexion and how will their policies vary in order to fit into a different way of governing. What would probably imply commodification of the state and can easily lead into a reduction of the taxes and with it a decrease of welfare policies. In brief, could mean the end of Scandinavian citizens as the ones paying higher taxes of the world meanwhile, that their welfare state benefits started to be reduced.

In addition to the explanation said before regarding the research question, the main objectives of the paper which are originated from the initial approach of the paper are the following ones: firstly, to see is the increase in the number of voters of the right parties have consequences on the Nordic welfare state, precisely in migration terms; not only to see the consequences but to analyse if, as a result of migration inflows the welfare state strengthens its requirements, jeopardizing the universalism principle under which social democratic model is sustained.

4. Methodology

Following the research question set above: *How right-wing governments' rise in these countries affecting social democratic welfare state and how is this affecting immigrant population during the period 1990-2018?* The methodology of this research paper has the aim of giving answer to this question, so that of studying welfare state, migrant population and government of Sweden and Denmark during the period 1990-2018.

To do so, the methodology is summarized in the table below with the steps followed to do so:

Table 1. Methodological approach used

	Dimension	Explanation
Empirical-Analytical approach (literature review)	Welfare states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revision of Esping-Andersen's theory of Welfare States (1990) and briefly summarize the main features of each type. • Define which type of welfare state does Sweden and Denmark's welfare states fits in according to Esping-Andersen's theory • Explanation of construction of welfare states plus definition of specific features of Sweden and Denmark's welfare states, according to what is said by North (1990)
	Social concerns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See which the main concerns of population in both countries are: through variables defined in different surveys²
Interpretative approach (study why, how changes take place)	Parliamentary system ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analyse of changes in parliamentary system, reason to change from bicameralism to unicameralism, detect which political parties are favoured with these changes
	Electoral vote ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Study the evolution of electoral vote and the coalition formed during terms from 1990-2015
	Discourses of migration policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Archival research on the official documents regarding asylum, residence permits and citizenship • Examine the discourses of political parties towards migration issues along the period 1990-2018 in order to analyse how migration policies are radicalized as right-wing parties govern the country, with the support of newspaper's articles, too.

Note: exploratory review does also take place to contextualize the topic although the aim is the interpretative one¹ Social surveys consulted are the World Values Survey (WVS), the European Social Survey (ESS), Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Eurobarometer, EUMC, EU for Fundamental Rights².

Source: own work.

5. Analyse

5.1. Comparing contexts: the welfare state in Sweden and Denmark

5.1.1. Swedish's welfare state

Sweden has not been in a war since 1814, when the Swedish-Norwegian war took place resulting with the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway. This war which lasted on October 1905 represented the Norwegian constitutional monarchy and involved the separation of both countries in two kingdoms which will never share monarch and policies anymore. Meanwhile, universal suffrage was introduced (1909) although it was not until 1921 that women were capable of voting. The end of the nineteenth century was highlighted by the emergence of strong popular movements promoting free churches, emancipation of the women and the strongest labour movements, but all that was truncated by the upcoming First World War.

During the First World War (1914-1918), Sweden decided not to ally with anyone, worrying only for maintaining peace and assuring security by promoting a strong national defence, which they keep on doing nowadays. Two years after the 1st WW the country joined the League of Nations and later on the United Nations (1946) showing their compromise with the rest of Europe in promoting a peaceful future.

Later on, in the Second World War, a government formed by four coalition ruled the country and it was not after the War when social democratic governments started to rule Sweden and it was, in 1974 when the *Riksdag*⁹ decided that all public powers were going to be chosen by citizens, in a country where everyone should have the same rights and free enough to know how their representatives exercise their power and how budget is expended, through free elections.

After that, the first of January 1995 they decided to join the European Union although in the referendum of 2003 the majority of Swedish people decided not to join the euro, even if Sweden has presidency of the European Union twice in 2001 and in 2009. Today, there are over seven million people capable of voting in the country in which last election was on September 2014.

The country of Sweden is now divided in three major regions: a region in the south called *Götaland* (including Gothenburg and Malmö) where the highest number of citizens live, *Svealand* the middle region of Sweden and *Norrland* in the North where nearly anyone lives due to extreme weather conditions. At a regional level, Sweden is divided in twenty counties which at a local level are represented by two hundred ninety municipalities in charge of facilitating public services to the population such as housing, roads, water supply and waste-water processing, schools, public welfare, elderly care and childcare.

All that, taking into account that Swedish government can stay in the power with or without coalition as long as their opposition has not more than the 50% of the seats at the Parliament.

What is said above it is stipulated in the Swedish Constitution made by the Instrument of Government, the Act of Succession, Freedom of Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression. To clarify that, in the Instrument of Government it is

⁹ Parliament of Sweden

explained how the country should be governed, the democratic rights and how public power is to be divided: so that the government will be constituted by the Parliament's support and the king is dismissed of all political powers and it is just a symbolic figure since 1974.

It follows that the *Act of Succession* (1979) where it was decided that female could also succeed to the throne opening the possibility to the Princess Victoria to become the next head of the state. Likewise, the *Riksdag* also announced through the Act of Succession that the royal family is obligated to profess Protestant faith supporting the Church of Sweden and that prince or princess must have the government agreement to marry anyone or to become regent of another country. Equally, the Swedish Laws also include the *Freedom of Press Act* which gives the right to express freely, in the same way, the *Fundamental Law of Freedom of Expression* which is from 1991 emerged with the aim of protecting freedom of expressions in new ways of communicating such as mass media.

From the construction of Sweden's welfare state, we can extract that the country has clear enough that governmental budget comes from taxes, that this money is spent on public services and in the maintenance of the structure of welfare, so that cutting down taxes is not an option (Freeman & Topel & Swedenbo, 1997).

To continue with this idea, security and defence policies are their main aim since the last term in office. As said in the *Statement of Government Policy* last September, 2017 done by the Government of Sweden, they want to keep on participating in European projects to promote a guarantee sustainable peace assuring the neutralization of the nuclear threat from North Korea, dealing with the humanitarian crisis caused by the war of Syria and the climate change, but without being part of any military alliance while they continue being part of the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, Sweden is willing to keep on sharing responsibilities with the European Union ensuring the peace through the Brexit process believing in the project of a strong and united Europe as Beck (2012) describes it in the last part of this book.

Not only security policies but also environmental policies are part of their worries, especially in the Nordic parts of the Earth the climate change is showing its effects faster and Scandinavian governments are specially worried about it due to their extreme weather that if vary their flora and fauna can easily be modified. With the Progressive Climate Act, they have double their budget to protect both environment and climate and with the aim of fulfilling the Paris' Agreement and fostering the use of electric cars and encouraging people to use solar cells. Moreover, groundwater resources need to be surveyed, drinking water protected and seas and oceans preserved so that plastic does not destroy the marine reserves. Sweden wants to take a change on growing in bio-based economy through natural conservation, stimulating tourism and health care industry while increasing food production and so that create new jobs: *30% of the agricultural land will be organically managed by 2030* (Government of Sweden, 2017, 5).

The aim of the government in Sweden is to give employment to two hundred thousand citizens narrowing the gap between rural and urban areas by connecting them with public services and promoting cultural participation, including children opportunities in art and music, theatres and opera and they think is the best way to make democracy stronger and to finish with centralisation.

Continuing with the idea of connecting areas, within the mobility they plan to invest in railways and roads maintenance and they have a national transport infrastructure plan by 2029 following their motto: *Sweden's economic strength must benefit everyone, throughout the country* (Government of Sweden, 2017, 6).

Now if we focus in the labour market, the Government of Sweden thinks on increasing investments specially in industry to encourage the relocating in the country. In that sense, they expect to decrease the unemployment until they reach less than the 6% of unemployed population, what should imply growing of real wages and rising up the exports: *the government's export strategy is helping Swedish companies to secure business throughout the Worlds. Sweden will be pioneer for free and fair trade* (2017,10). As a result, this Nordic country is facing two challenges: on the one hand they need to improve worker's skills because: *employers have difficulties finding people with the right skills* (2017, 8). On the other hand, they need to solve the problem immigrants are facing when finding a job, they have the aim of reducing the time an immigrant has to spend until they find a job by educating and training them, giving parental benefits and teaching Swedish at the time they encourage immigrant women to join in the labour market.

Finally, welfare policies including education system, family policies and health care are going to be protected underscoring in different points: in education they make emphasis in increasing the number of professor, ending with school segregation and including aesthetic subjects; in health care they pretend to speed rehabilitations, erase barriers for people with disabilities, promoting reproductive health among women and assuring good working conditions for the Swedish's active population. When talking about family policies they highlight the importance of protecting children's rights at the time that having children do not obstacle parents (specially mothers) to be part of the labour market, linked with this idea they want to protect elder people by respecting their financial security, increasing housing and health subsidies and decreasing taxes for people older than sixty-five: *this is not an act of kindness it is our moral responsibility* (2017, 14). Above all, they pretend to keep expanding the welfare system because the population is growing especially due to the increase of immigrant population, with that births per year are increasing too and so it has to enhance the welfare state providing a greater number of public services, as a consequence creating more jobs in the public sphere.

As can be seen security policies are the main point discussed by the Swedish Government, their welfare state is specially concern about criminality, polarisation and extremism and to prevent it their *Delegation against Segregation* is in charge of working in vulnerable areas giving resources to the schools in those places and fostering the *Million Homes Programme*¹⁰. Further, to fight against organised crime it's their goal so that the biggest investment in Swedish police is going to be made by enhancing the police career and financing the Riksdag with SEK 750¹¹ extra millions different security

¹⁰ Project that had the aim of constructing one million places to live in all around Sweden between 1965 and 1975 due to the aim of creating and renovating Swedish surroundings and housing conditions. Now the Swedish government wants to renovate this project guaranteeing environmental and social changes.

¹¹ 71 million euros (1 SEK = 0,095 EUR)

forces¹² while they fight against terrorism through the Swedish Security services but making sure to combat racism by protecting religious beliefs and minor groups as well as assuring welfare to transgender people and keep on protecting the freedom of speech.

5.1.2. Danish's welfare state

At the end of the 19th century, the city of Copenhagen experiments a fast growth, economically based in manufacture industry including formation of labour unions and the emergence of a relevant political party in the country *Social Democratic Party*, transport and public services, as well as many private organizations, and non-profit housing sector.

Later on, in the 50's welfare institutions emerged in order to increase citizen's living conditions. Meanwhile, during 1960 social demands increase while tax base decrease and rivalry between left and right parties block initiatives one another. The decrease in tax bases correlate with the rising up of social costs and demands of public benefits. From the 70's on, the decentralization of policy both at national and regional level took place taking very few initiatives from the central government at the time that manufacture industry closes and a huge number of workers became unemployed and pressure on social benefits were higher: with it, many adults were excluded from the labour market and a less generous welfare state emerged during the 80's. Central government transference competences to local governments generating a less public involvement while fostering higher investment on the labour market, because local budget was directed by central government.

Since the oil crisis (1973-74) and with the stagflation in the 70's from now, job loss has been a continuum in the country with a constant deficit growing, producing bankruptcy caused by five key factors as explained by Thor (2017, cited in Cucca & Ranci, 2017).

First of all, the deindustrialization caused by the oil crisis taking place between 1973 and 1974 increasing the unemployment due to the division of the industrial development. The second key factor is suburbanization rural areas lost more than one third of the population in forty years: mainly young and well-educated families that move to the centre of Copenhagen.

The third factor has to do with the availability of land because even if land was free it was not a developed area so that, suburban service activities, business services needed to be relocated (especially finance and banking) as well as, facilitating car access to this areas, was a problem itself because this factor is linked to housing and property market (the fourth factor) as middle class leave the city and its poor quality houses (large stock of old, small dwelling lacking modern facilities), and a market dominated and strictly regulated by rental housing.

To end up with, the metropolitan council and their unable actuation to facing problems are the fifth factor to bankruptcy, as a consequence a special Keynesianism especially in suburban districts began to take place, rising up public-private ownership but, also the development of the new city annex (Ørestad) including hospitals, public transport...

¹² Including SOS Alarm, Swedish Customs service, Swedish security service, Swedish prosecution authority, Swedish economic crime authority and Swedish prison.

The background of the Danish context explained at a certain point how is now Denmark's welfare state, as used in the description of the Swedish's welfare state, government main actions defining the features are the following ones:

Since 1909, any political party has had the majority of the support in the Danish parliament (with 179 seats called *Folketing*); from the 28th of November 2016 the government is a coalition of the *Liberal Party* together with the *Liberal Alliance* and the *Conservative Party* in which the prime minister is the representant of the *Liberal Party* (Lars Lokke). Similar to the Swedish constitution, the *Constitutional Act* in Denmark from the 1849 has the aim to assure human rights as well as, guarantying freedom of both expression and assembly. Since 1973, Denmark has been a member of the European Union.

Denmark is now the result of all the territories lost by wars and agreement among other Scandinavian countries during history, as a reduced territory is today the country works as a united society with higher social cohesion than other Nordic countries. The historical failures Denmark has been through converted them in a society who loves what they have and are not ambitious anymore, what at the time has create a population with fear of extreme changes: *hvad udad tabes, skal indad vindes*¹³ (Booth, 2017, 36). For that, even if the Danish welfare state did not start until 1961 the levels of trust were already higher before.

The trust within the Danish people has been attributed to the Vikings background who used to claim "we are all the king" but what is true is that the welfare state was the most innovative change during the post war period and created a place where to know that neither sex, age, money, familiar background or religious belief gives you different opportunities or security network to anyone (Booth, 2017, 71).

Nowadays, Denmark has a constitutional monarchy in which a monarch acts as the council of the state. The *Folketing* as the parliament is called, is unicameral as stablishes the Constitution of the 1953 where the prime minister is elected every four years through elections in which last 2016 the 87% of the population voted in, and also where the female succession to the throne was assure.

Following the patterns of all Scandinavian countries, citizens have equal rights to social security, just for being citizens in a population with a growth rate of the 0,4%, also assuring health and education for free through taxes controlled and organised by the state which has make possible a country with a life expectancy at birth of 78.8 years (OECD, 2016) and a high production in a country where a workers works less hours a year (1410 hours per worker, OECD 2016) than the average countries of the OECD (1763 hours per worker, 2016). In order to achieve this record numbers and to sustain their welfare state, between the twenty-six and the twenty-nine per cent of the GDP is spend it in public institutions, per year.

¹³ "what was lost outside, will be found inside" [trad.] in Booth, 2017.

5.2. Political, parliamentary system and coalitions

Sweden and Denmark have a unicameralist parliamentary system, contrary to other countries such as Spain in which parliament is formed by a lower house of the parliament and the upper house or upper chamber, these two Scandinavian countries have a parliament with a single chamber which permits a decrease in the State's expenditure, a faster legislative process and a parliament with more cohesiveness and sense of the responsibility since is the unique chamber. This kind of parliamentary systems are useful in small territories with a small number of citizens that shares a homogeneous background.

In Sweden the parliament, called the Riksdag makes the decisions and the Government is in charge of implementing them. The Riksdag is also in charge of appointing the Prime Minister and this one will be the one to choose the ministers who will make up the Government. As said, the Government has the aim of implementing the decisions taken by the Riksdag while formulating new laws, even if the approval of the law is a debt of the parliament (Swedish Institute, 2018).

To keep it simple, the Riksdag has five main functions: deciding and passing laws, adopt public budget, controlling the government, working in the responsibilities the country has with the European Union and developing foreign policy.

But Sweden, did not always had a unicameral parliament, since 1971 they had a bicameral system which work long time. But when conflicts between the upper and the lower house in the parliament started to emerged, for ideological reasons making them work in opposite directions and blocking any political process they decided to abolish one of the chambers and convert their parliament in a unicameralist one. Even though, the process started after the Second World War, it was not until 1967 that the Parliament vote to become a unicameralist system (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1998).

From 1971 on, the chamber has 349 members and in 1974, Sweden declare their new Constitution. Later on, in 1994, the electoral period was change from three years to four, so that, now Swedish citizens votes for general elections every four years (Sveridges Riksdag, 2016).

As a result of all this historical process, now the Riksdag consists in 349 mandates or seats in electoral terms, where 310 of these seats correspond to permanent seats and 39 seats are said to be equalization mandates. The first group of mandates, the permanent ones are based on the number of votes each political part receive during the general elections, for that the number of seats a political party has in the Riksdag represents proportionally the number of votes received, the country does that using

what establishes their electoral law with a method called the balanced output method, as said by the Swedish Institute (2014). The 39 seats left are chosen so that they guarantee that the distribution across the whole country is as proportional as the number of votes receive because in the first group of seats a political party could obtain the major number of votes in a certain constituency¹⁴ in Sweden but not all over the country.

To have political representation at the parliament, a political party in Sweden must obtain more than the 4% of the electoral vote, that was a rule made to <<prevent very small parties from getting in>> (Swedish Institute, 2014).

Nowadays, the Riksdag is represented by 349 representatives of eight different political parties: Social democrats (with 113 seats), Moderate party (84 seats), Sweden democrats (49 seats), centre party (with 22 seats), liberal party (with 19 seats), green party (25 seats), left party (21 seats) and Christian democrats (16 seats), which later on are going to be analysed.

When talking about the parliamentary system of Denmark, the Danish parliament is called Folketinget and it works in a similar way as the one explained in Sweden. The Folketinget, is in charge of the legislative power of the country and it is the one and only who can exercise this power.

The main functions of the Danish's parliament are to approve the public budget, to ensure the government does their work the right way (for that they usually ask the government for auditions or meeting in which the Parliament may ask the government to justify their actions or how they spend the public money. They do so in order to avoid scandals or corruption within the government).

Apart from that, the Folketinget does also has two committees which they are responsible of which are the Finance Committee, that deals with the finance bills and the *European Affairs Committee* in charge of issues related with the European Union. With this committee they make sure that any minister cannot approve any policy regarding the European Union without the consensus of the Committee (Dragsted, 2014, trad.)

The same way as Sweden, Denmark has not always had a bicameral parliament. So that, Denmark introduces unicameralism on 1953 erasing the upper chamber from their parliamentary system, the reason to do so was that as Denmark was increasing their

¹⁴ Sweden has 29 constituencies which are made according to the territorial division of the country, but in the case of Stockholm, Skåne Country and Västr Götaland they have more than a single constituency due to the higher percentage of the population living there. Usually, a single constituency is equivalent to ten or twelve seats in the Riksdag, but they vary according to the amount of population, for instance people living in Stockholm decides upon 39 members of the Parliament with their vote.

levels of democracy the two houses at the Parliament seems to develop an identical function which was not necessary to have in such a small country as Denmark is. As a result, for functional reasons they decided to abolish one of the chambers and became a unicameral parliament (Damgaard, 2004).

This historical process has finally created a Folketinget which is unicameral, with a negative parliamentarism that permits a huge number of political parties to have a political representation in the parliament. That is to say that, it is a negative parliamentarism because the government does not need to have the major support of the Parliament to form government, the same way that a party who did not obtain the higher percentage of votes can make up a government with coalition with other political parties with representation at the Folketinget.

Moreover, the parliament is a multi-party system because political parties do only need to obtain more than the 2% of the votes in order to have a seat in the Parliament, although since 2001 the political representation at the parliament is charge of eight political parties (Folketinget, 2014), even though it should be highlighted that this rules has permitted the representation of even ten political parties in the parliament, what it seems to be the reason why a higher number of citizens each year participates in elections (Damgaard, 2004).

Nowadays, the Danish Parliament has 179 members that are selected democratically in elections every four years that govern under the Constitution of 1953 which state the negative parliamentarism, explained before. From these 179 members, 175 seats are chosen from the electoral results of Denmark, two are selected from the results of Greenland and other two in Faroe Islands.

Despite both countries, Denmark and Sweden are constitutional monarchies, it has been quite a long time since the monarchy it is only in charge of symbolic event and issues related with the dissolution of the courts.

The useful thing about their political system for this paper is to see how easy or difficult is to be party of the system, that is to say which are the conditions for a political party to have parliamentary representation. The two countries that are being studies, have in their system a division of executive, judicial and legislative power, in which the Parliament is in charge of the legislative one.

Not only in the division of powers but their parliamentary composition is in both cases unicameralist, although the reasons are different. As said before, in Sweden the reason to convert the parliament in unicameralist (in 1971) was to end with the conflict

between the upper and the lower chamber, while in Denmark the reason to abolish the upper house (in 1953) was that both chambers were performing the same role.

Nevertheless, the distinctive feature between both systems is that in Sweden a political party needs the 4% of the votes in elections to have political representation what has permitted the concentration of the power to historical parties during a long time, meanwhile has retained the heterogeneity among the population which links with the idea the country had when erasing the upper chamber of the parliament, to avoid conflict. Besides that, the Swedish model chooses 39 members of the 349 which composes the Parliament following proportional criteria so that the representation of the population is well seen at the Riksdag.

Instead, in Denmark a political party only needs to have the two per cent of the electoral vote to have a representation on the Parliament what caused electoral results with more than ten political parties with a Parliamentary representation. As a result, the government is usually an amalgam of small parties that share common ideology but differ in different details one another assuring that every citizen will find the political party where their ideology fits in, at the same time that they guarantee the increase year by year of the electoral participation in Danish elections, due to the same reason, the plurality of the political parties at the feeling their voice as citizens will have a representation at the Folketinget.

5.3. Evolution of the political system since the 1990s

5.3.1. Elections and policy agenda

The electoral periods that are going to be analysed at this point of the paper are a first period including the years between 1990 and 2000 and a second period that includes the electoral elections before 2008 until the last elections done in the country.

The cut-off point of these two periods are not hazardous but they have a relation with the socio-historical context of the countries. First of all, during the 90's the crisis the Nordic countries suffered colliding with the War in Balkans is highly remarkable of the history of the Scandinavian countries, more if we take into account the migratory policy we are studying.

The second period represents a more complex situation since the main event is not only the economic crisis but all the social phenomena going on since the beginning of the century which includes globalization, of course an economic and political crisis and also the late refugee crisis which will change political results and with it, welfare policies, too.

The table 2 shows the electoral results in Sweden for general elections from 1991 until 2014, where all the political parties are represented with an acronym specified in the note of the table. Apart from the percentage each party obtain during the elections, there is also the number of seats obtained at the Parliament between parenthesis and in the last column the voter turnout of each elections.

Table 2. Sweden general elections results and seats at the Riksdag (1991-2014)

	PERIOD 1 (1991-2002)											Participation
	(s)	(m)	(c)	(fp)	(kd)	(nwd)	(vp)	(mp)	(ovr)	(fem)	(swd)	
1991	37,71% (138)	21,92% (80)	8,5% (31)	9,13% (33)	7,14% (26)	6,8% (25)	4,51% (16)	3,38%	7,71%			86,73%
1994	45,25% (161)	22,38% (80)	7,65% (27)	7,19% (26)	4,07% (15)	1,2%	6,17% (22)	5,02% (18)	2,26%			86,82%
1998	36,4% (131)	22,91% (82)	5,13% (18)	4,72% (17)	11,75% (42)	0,2%	12,0% (43)	4,50% (16)	2,61%			81,38%
2002	39,85% (144)	15,26% (55)	6,19% (22)	13,39% (48)	9,15% (33)	0,04%	8,39% (30)	4,65% (17)	3,12%			80,11%
	PERIOD 2											
2006	34,99% (130)	26,23% (97)	7,88% (29)	7,54% (28)	6,59% (24)		5,85% (22)	5,24% (19)	5,67%			81,99%
2010	30,66% (112)	30,05% (107)	6,56% (23)	7,06% (24)	5,6% (19)		5,6% (19)	7,34% (25)	1,43%	0,4%	5,7% (20)	84,63%
2014	31,01% (113)	23,33% (84)	6,11% (22)	5,42% (19)	4,57% (16)		5,72% (21)	6,89% (25)	0,97%	3,12%	12,86% (49)	85,81%

Note: social democrats (s), moderate party (m), centre party (c), liberal party (fp), Christian democrats (kd), new democracy (nwd), left party (vp), green party (mp), other parties (ovr), feminist party (fem), Sweden democrats (swd). In parenthesis the number of seats each political party obtain at the parliament during the elections.

Source: own work from the data of the EPERN (European Parties Elections and Referendum Networks), the Swedish National Election Studies and the EED (European Election Database).

As seen in the table above, in 1991's elections social democrats did clearly won elections with nearly the 38% of the population voting them and 138 seats needing only 37 seats more to have majority at the Riksdag. Even though social democrats did not govern the country during this legislature since a centre-right coalition was made up between moderate party (80 seats), conservative party (31), liberal party (33) and Christian democrats (26 seats) governing during this term as a minority alliance due to the fact that, the left-wing coalition (formed by the social democrats, the left party and the green party) did only have 154 seats while the centre-right collation had 170 seats.

During next elections in Sweden (1994), the last government was strongly punished by the constituency, with the moderate party as an exception remaining the same in terms of seats while slightly increases in percentage of votes (from the 21,92% of the votes obtained in 1991's elections to 22,38% obtained in 1994). The centre-left govern during this term without forming coalition but remaining alone since social democrats obtained 161 seats, enough to govern in minority in their own.

While the centre-right alliance included again the moderate party with the same number of seats, the conservative (27 seats, four less than in 1991), the liberal party with seven seats less than in the past elections: 26 in total; plus, the Christian democrats party

which experience the highest lost obtaining 15 seats, eleven less than on 1991's elections.

Finally, the left-wing coalition formed by the left party (22 seats with the 6,17% of the votes) and the green party which obtained 18 seats after three years without parliamentary representation, did not made an alliance with social democrats as in 1991, but remained as a separate coalition with 40 seats.

As described, during the term between 1994 and 1998 in Sweden they had a centre-left coalition with 161 governing with minority, a left-wing coalition with 40 seats and a centre-right coalition with 148 seats. It is also relevant to comment that in 1996 the prime minister Carlsson retried and another member of the social democrats' party which at the time was the minister of finances (Person) occupied his place.

At that time, the deficit in the Swedish country was growing and to low down that 13% of deficit, Persson decided to cut on welfare services finishing the term with a 2,6% of the deficit. But, as a consequence of that, unemployment also rises and in next elections social democrat party was highly crack down by the population losing 30 seats at the Riksdag and the ten per cent of the votes.

From what has been explained, in the elections of 1998, the alliance between the left (43 seats, 21 more than in 1994), green party who loses two seats and social democrats remains and they govern during this term in Sweden with 190 seats at the Swedish's parliament.

The alliance between the left and the green party ends and the left party (with 43 seats) remains independent, while the green party with 4,5% of the votes nearly half a point less than the term before made coalition with the social democrats creating the centre-left coalition with 147 seats.

Again, the centre-right coalition remains united and govern the country with 159 seats in the Riksdag, including the moderate party with 82 seats (nearly the 23% of the votes), the Christian democrats which won 27 seats comparing with last elections, counting at that moment with 42 seats and being the fourth most voted party, and the centre (18 seats) and liberal party (17 seats) whom together they lost 18 seats during this election that probably went to the Christian democrats. With all, again this elections as the ones in 1991, where governed by the centre-right alliance forecasting the bipartidism between the social democrats and the moderate party, although the right seems to keep on needing from the alliance with other parties with similar political ideology.

Finishing with this first period of electoral results, the leader of the social democrats' party continues being the prime minister in what was his third consecutive legislation.

He governed with a minority government together with the green party in their usual centre-left coalition gaining 161 seats from the 349 seats the Riksdag has (144 seats from the largest voted party, social democrats and 17 seats from the green party).

Although the left party had 30 seats in 2002's elections they did not govern together with the centre-left coalition but remain alone in the Swedish Parliament. Apart from that, the centre-right coalition was again formed by the moderate party with 55 seats, the liberal party with 48 seats, the Christian democrats party which loses eleven of its seats (gaining 33 seats in this elections) and the centre party with 22 seats. With that, the centre-right coalition represented during this term 158 seats at the Riksdag, only three seats less than the governing coalition.

In 2002's elections several important things went on, first of all the bipartidism continues with the social democrat party governing again, even though they did it with a minority government and with a coalition which did not have a huge advantage in comparison with the centre-right coalition.

Besides that, the moderate party was the political party with worth results, losing twenty-seven of their seats at the parliament whose votes probably went to the conservative and the liberal party which won four and thirty-one seats respectively. Regarding the electoral participation of this elections, was the lowest of this first period registered in Sweden with an 80,11% whereas in 1991, the participation of the Swedish citizens in the elections was of the 86,73%

To briefly summarize the electoral results of this first period in Sweden (1991-2002), there are two main coalitions that explained Swedish governments in this first period, the centre-right bloc which has remain stable during time always doing alliance with the same political parties, including: moderate, centre, liberal and Christian democrats' party; and a second centre-left alliance which has always been spearheaded by the social democrats who have governed together with the green party and left party, even though this coalition usually occurs when the social democrats are not able to govern in their own, if not, governing with minority is regular in Sweden.

Given the above it can also be concluded that the two main parties who historically had ruled Sweden have been strongly punished by the electoral vote, even if they have continue governing during this first period with the coalition of other political parties in both the centre-right and the centre-left coalition. Especially, the centre-left coalition have decrease in votes year by year following patterns other European countries have suffered, too.

The results of 2006's elections symbolize a breaking point in the government social democrats had been ruling since 1994 at the same time that fifty thousand hundred Swedish citizens became first-time voters. With that, the participation increases 1,9% from the last elections.

Although the social democrats continue being the most voted political party they lost 14 seats at the parliament and the moderate party leading the alliance between centre-right parties with 97 seats, together with the centre party with 29 seats, the liberal party (28 seats) and the Christian democrats (24 seats), creating their typical coalition that for the first time obtained more than half of the seats at the Riksdag, 178 seats becoming a government with a majority alliance.

In front of the centre-left coalition which obtained 171 seats and was also typically composed by social democrats, left party who won two seats but remains as usual when refereeing to the number of votes, comprising the 46% of the electoral vote of the country.

Four years later, in the elections of 2010, *the alliance* (before called centre-right coalition) lost their majority but kept on governing with 173 seats at the Riksdag: even if the moderate party won ten seats during these elections, the other parties conforming the coalition all lost some of their seats, the one who lost the higher number of seats was the liberal party who loses percentage of votes since the elections of 2002.

Apart from that, the red-green alliance (before called centre-left coalition) lost 14 seats in total if we take into account the coalition between the same political parties four years before. During this election, green party won six seats but social democrats lost eighteen seats as well as left party who lost three seats.

The innovative thing about 2010's elections is that two new political parties were created, the feminist party which obtained only the 0,4% of the votes without being able to have parliamentary representation, and the Swedish democrats which was the revelation of the election since they obtain the 5,7% of the votes which meant having twenty seats at the Riksdag and remaining independent when referring to coalitions.

To end up with the electoral results of this second period, in 2014 Sweden's elections faced the highest participation in terms of number of people voting since 1994. The centre-left coalition splits again into two as the left part with 21 seats decide not to give support to the coalition if they were not part of the government, leaving the centre-left coalition with a total of 138 seats, 113 from the social democrats and twenty-five from the green party.

In general, the left parties remained nearly the same in terms of percentage of vote and only increase in one seats in the social democrat's case and two in the green's party. The consequence of these two factors (the split of the coalition and not increasing the number of votes for the left parties), made *the alliance* of the right parties to govern Sweden since this year, 2018, when Sweden will go on elections again.

So that, *the alliance* is now governing Sweden with a representation of 141 seats at the Riksdag, 32 seats less than last time right parties ally with each other, formed by the moderate party who lost 23 seats but still obtained 84 seats, the centre party with twenty-two seats, the liberal party with 19 seats and the Christian democrats with 16 seats. Apart from that, the two new parties already introduced in 2010 increase in percentage of vote, the feminist party obtain the three per cent more and the Sweden democrats won 29 seats more, being the clear winner of the elections in terms of increasing their number of seats at the Parliament, 49 in total but still decided to remain independent this time.

From this second electoral period it can be concluded that there is a general decrease in the number of votes for the two political parties that historically have been the most voted: social democrats and moderate party since both loses the 3% of the votes during this period. That is a continuum along Europe whom with the economic crisis loses trust to the old political parties and transfer their votes to new political parties such as the feminist party gaining the 3% of the votes and even more the Swedish democrats party which only the first time they had parliamentary representation they obtain the 6% of the votes and double their results in next elections, in 2014.

The second period in Sweden is also marked by the grow of the participation in the elections since 1994, with a huge amount of the population being first-time voters which had keep on punishing social democrats in elections as well as other centre-right parties. Related to this last idea, both historical coalitions have lost representation at the Parliament that had started to be slightly transferred to other minor political parties.

Especially in the centre-left coalition because the alliance does not remain as stable as *the alliance* does, causing in election such as the ones in 2014 that the *green-red* alliance was not able to govern due to the fact that the centre-right alliance remains strong and steady during time and keep on making coalition, while the Swedish democrats party continue making themselves strong.

The following table (table 2), represents the results in Denmark's elections following the same format that in the country of Sweden. The table is also separate in two periods regarding the electoral years of Denmark, since the electoral years in Sweden and Denmark are not the same ones, terms change. Moreover, in Denmark there is one extra

year since their last elections took place in 2015 and in Sweden next elections will take place at the end of this year, 2018.

Apart from the percentage of vote obtained by each political part through the years, you can also find the number of seats obtained at the Danish parliament, the Folketinget, in parenthesis and the percentage of population that vote in each term is located in the last column. Finally, since the full name of the political parties are not written in the table, it is possible to find them in the note of the same one.

Table 3. Denmark general elections results and seats at the Folketinget (1990-2015)

	PERIOD 1 (1990-2001)														participation	
	(sd)	(c)	(v)	(st)	(pg)	(cd)	(rl)	(ch)	(rg)	(ind)	(d)	(dr)	(m)	(nw)		(a)
1990	37,4 % (69)	16,0% (30)	15,8% (29)	8,3% (15)	6,4% (12)	5,1% (9)	3,5% (7)	2,3% (4)								82,84%
1994	34,6% (62)	15,0% (27)	23,3% (42)	7,3% (13)	6,4% (11)	2,8% (5)	4,6% (8)	1,9% (6)	3,1% (1)	1,0%						84,25%
1998	35,9% (63)	8,9% (16)	24,0% (42)	7,6% (13)	2,4% (4)	4,3% (8)	3,9% (7)	2,5% (4)	2,7% (5)	0,1% (1)	7,4% (13)	0,3%				84,94%
2001	29,1% (52)	9,1% (16)	31,2% (56)	6,4% (12)	0,5%	1,8%	5,2% (9)	2,3% (4)	2,4% (4)	-	12,0% (22)					87,15%
	PERIOD 2 (2005-2015)															
2005	25,8% (47)	10,3% (18)	29,0% (52)	5,99% (11)		1,0%	9,2% (17)	1,7% (6)	3,4% (6)	-	13,3% (24)	0,3%				84,54%
2007	25,47% (45)	10,4% (18)	26,3% (46)	13,0% (23)			5,1% (9)	0,9% (4)	2,17% (4)	-	13,8% (25)		2,81% (5)			86,59%
2011	24,86% (44)	4,9% (8)	26,7% (47)	9,2% (16)			9,5% (17)	0,8% (12)	6,7% (12)	0,1% (1)	12,3% (22)					87,74%
2015	26,3% (47)	3,4% (6)	19,5% (34)	4,2% (7)			4,6% (8)	0,8% (14)	7,8% (14)	0,1% (1)	21,1% (37)		7,5% (13)	4,8% (9)		85,89%

Note: social democratic party (sd), conservative people's party (c), liberal party (v), socialist people's party (st), progress party (pg), centre democrats (cd), radical liberal party/ Danish social liberal party (rl), Christian people's party (ch), red-green alliance (rg), independents/ candidates without party (ind), Danish people's party (d), democratic renewal (dr), minority party (m), new alliance/liberal alliance (nw), the alternative (a). In parenthesis the number of seats each political party obtain at the parliament during the elections.

Source: own work from the data of Folketinget (2007-2015) and IPU PARLINE (1990-2005)

Period one in Danish's electoral results goes from 1990 to 2001 in which we can see that the number of political parties with representation at the Folketinget where larger during 1994-1998 but started decreasing at the end of this first period. What did not decrease was the participation of the constituency which rises up nearly five points from 1990 to 2001.

1990 was a usual electoral year compared to one before since Poul Schlüter (general secretary of the conservative party) continue governing for his fourth consecutive term after joining forces with the liberal party, even if the social democratic party (sd) obtain strong results in percentage of vote (37,4 per cent of the votes). Nevertheless, his government was truncated in 1993 due to the Tamil case¹⁵ in which the prime minister

¹⁵ In 1993 the liberal-conservative government was accused for being consciously responsible of not taking into account the cases of families of Tamil for their reunification. As a result, there was an impeachment against the minister of justice responsible for the Tamil case (Alastair & Oakley, 1998, 649).

was charged of violating refugees' rights, with that the social democratic party begins a government that will only last half a year before next elections took place in 1994.

Besides what it may be thought taking into consideration the scandal in the last government, the conservative party did lose the one per cent of the votes and three seats in total, whereas the liberal party gain 13 seats while the larger parties lost votes in both cases, social democratic party was the most damaged losing seven seats at the Riksdag followed by the conservative party (-3 seats) and the centre democrats (-4 seats).

Above all, in 1994 social democratic party was the winner of the election with nearly the 35% of citizens' votes, governing in a minority alliance together with the Danish social liberal party (rl) and the centre democrats, meanwhile the Christian people's party moved out of the Parliament after losing their four seats as not even the two per cent of the population voted them.

After this political period ruled by the social democratic party, in 1998's elections they were awarded with an extra seat. Being again the winners of elections with the 36% of the votes and governing for another term Denmark. From this elections it should be highlighted that the red-green (rg) party whose first elections where on 1994, this year loses one seat while the Danish people's party obtained the 7,4% of the votes, 13 seats in total that did lost the conservative party (lost eleven seats), the Danish social liberal party (lost one) and the red-green alliance.

Apart from that, the democratic renewal (dr) did also presented to elections this year for the first time but without success obtaining only the 0,3% of the votes, similar to the independence (ind) who lost the seat they won on previous elections.

The participation in Danish election keep growing since 1990 when the 82% of the population voted until 2011 when 87,15% of the population did so. During this popular elections, the liberal party won the elections for the first time (with the 31% of the votes and 6 seats) in this first period displaying the social democratic party that lost eleven seats and obtain a result in which less than the thirty per cent of the population vote them.

At the same time, the Danish's people party obtain 22 seats (nine more than in 1998), while the progress party loses its representation at the parliament (0,5% of the votes) as well as the centre democrats does so for the first time. During this term not only this two parties lost their seats, but the progress party disappear from the political scene of Denmark.

2001's elections imply a change in the leadership of Danish's governments, for the first time social democratic party was not the one obtaining the larger number of seats and the liberal party (v) together with the conservative party and with the Danish's people party's support government in a minority alliance in a term where the right parties were clearly winner in contrast with left parties.

Trough all, this first period socially convulse is characterized by a constant lost in number of votes from the social democratic party (from the 37,4% of the votes in the elections of 1990 to the 29,1% of the votes in 2001) in detriment of the left party who won 27 seats during the whole period.

Moreover, the progress party equal as the centre democrats party and the independents disappear from the political map of the Folketinget, while the Christian people's party disappear from the government on 1994 but re-appears during the next election with the minimum percentage of votes required to have parliamentary representation, the two per cent. At the same time the red-green alliance which appears in 1994's election keeps on losing seats year by year and during the next term Danish people's party strongly barged in the political scenarios of Denmark, increasing their number of seats from 13 (in 1998) to 22 seats in last elections.

The second electoral period that goes between 2005 and last elections in Denmark in 2015, shows how things changed in Denmark with the regeneration of the social democratic party, the spectacular decrease in number of seats of the conservative party as well as the decrease of the liberal party in favour of the rise of the Danish people's party during the whole period. Also, the introduction of new political parties with low support such as the minority party in 2005 and other emerging parties with support in 2007's elections like the New Alliance (nw, also called Liberal Alliance) or The Alternative (a) in the last elections (2015).

2005 started with general elections defined by the grow in percentage of votes of the red-green alliance while the two bigger political parties keep on losing votes. That is to say that while the liberal party lose four votes and the social democratic loses five, the red-green won eight; although the liberal party kept on being the winner of the elections in percentage of votes ruling again the country for the next four years.

The liberal party in coalition with the conservative party govern Denmark during this term with the political support of the Danish People's Party who supported the govern in tightening immigrants' requirements to become part of the country.

During the general elections of 2007, a member of the Folketinget that was at the time of the Conservative Party left the political party and founded the New alliance (nw)

which in this first elections won five seats declaring themselves as a party that wanted to reunited the idea of democracy and Islam.

Just a year before the economic crisis the government was composed by the left party governing for the third time in a row, with six seats less than before and in coalition with the democratic party that obtain almost the 14% of the votes and the conservative party who go on having eighteen seats at the Danish's parliament.

Apart from that, social democratic party as well as, red-green alliance kept on losing percentage of votes what let left parties without the possibility to be part of the government while the right coalition obtain a total of 89 seats at the Folketinget needing only one more seat to have the majority in the government.

The economic crisis caused that in the general elections of 2011 the conservative party loses ten seats, followed by the liberal party who lost one and the Danish people's party who lost three. Not only that but the left parties did also lost votes during this term: the social democratic party lost one seat and the socialist people's party seven, even though the red-green alliance won eight votes and the new alliance keeps on growing with four seats more at the parliament.

This term is specially characterized by the grow of the radical liberal party which started this second period with 17 seats and recover them during the elections of 2011 after they lost eight of these seats on 2007. The history of this political party is representative of the situation of the country because their results are a continues roller coaster as in last elections they lost again nine of their seats.

So that, during the last elections, it seems that the social democratic party started to regain the seats lost having again the results obtained before the economic crisis. Although in the elections of 2011 the social democratic party did already govern the country in a minority government together with the social liberal party and the socialist people's party with the parliamentary support of the red-green alliance, in 2015 they keep on governing the country.

During this last term, a new political party appear with parliamentary representation called The Alternative which emerged from the Social Liberal Party representing now one extra green-party of the country and obtaining nine seats which nearly represent the five per cent of the population voting them. If we also take into consideration the red-green alliance, together they represent 23 seats at the Parliament.

5.3.2. Social problems preserved by population

Main issues concerning Swedish and Danish population seems not to be so different from the rest of European countries according to the Eurobarometer (2011), in which

both countries selected the economic situation (42% in Denmark, 40% in Sweden) and the unemployment (42% in Denmark and 37% in Sweden) in first and second place. Even though, Sweden selected as third issue the climate change (25% of the population) whereas, in Denmark they choose immigration (21%).

On the one hand, if we take a look at the climate concerns in Sweden, we can see that nearly the 70% of the population thinks that it is important (40%) or very important (31,8%) to take care of nature and the environment (ESS, round 7, 2014). Moreover, the environmental problem has been concerning Swedish population since 1996 when the population did already say that the intervention of the government was necessary to solve environmental issues (55,5% as said by the WVS, Wave 3), in 1999 the 69,4% of the population continue thinking that environment should be protected and that nature and human being should coexist (94,1% say so, as said by the WVS, Wave 4).

Moreover, continuing with the development of the environmental issue, in 2006 (WVS, Wave 5, 2006) the 32,1% of the population mentioned the environmental pollution to be “the most serious problem of the country”, even on top of discrimination for reason of gender which was mentioned by the 28,6% of citizens¹⁶

Finally, nowadays, the 62,9% of the population keeps on thinking that protecting the environment should be their main aim even if that means reducing economic growth; even more, nearly the 40% of Swedish citizens have given money to an ecological organization¹⁷

On the other hand, in Denmark when taking into consideration their immigration’s concerns we can also see that: neighbourhood disorder highly correlates (0,770) with *insecurity because of several nationalities living in the same neighbourhood* (van Deuzen & Hulvej & Christensen & Hensen & Christensen & Hansen & Lund & Dich, 2016). In a similar way, according to the European Social Survey [ESS, round 7, 2014] for Danish citizens, immigration makes country’s crime problems worse since more than the 60% of the Danish people selected on of the categories between two and five (in a scale zero to ten, where zero mean crime problems are worse due to immigration and ten is, immigration makes it better, see annex 7.2 for detailed results of each category).

As a result of a survey done by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia in the 2006, Denmark’s population has always had a worth opinion from immigrants compared to Swedish people and not only for the immigrant population living in the country but for the ones that are going to come in the future. The statistics

¹⁶ From a sample of 1206 Question V168. Which of these problems do you consider the most serious one in your own country?

¹⁷ Question V82. During the past two years have you given money to an ecological organization?

of the European Union for Fundamental Rights (2007) can illustrate that since the percentage average of incidents reporting racist or ethnic violence did not stop growing between 2000 and 2006, more than a 70,9% of incidents took place in Denmark in six years of difference.

To sum up, social concerns among both Danish and Swedish's population have been changing over the time, but the truth is that environmental issues in Sweden and immigration in Denmark has been constant in questionnaires and survey of people's opinion. Although in Denmark the immigration issue was already on the table since 1984 and in Sweden it was not until 1990 when immigration was putted on the policy agenda, the migration issue seems to be a situation which needs to be solve out in both countries.

5.4. Migration in policy discourses and practices

From 1990 on, Policies in the Nordic countries are described as less generous in terms of welfare state. The general explanation of that has to do with shorten benefits' periods that cause the reduction of social security and welfare policies, even though there is a stronger emphasis in policies that implies rehabilitation, activation and education training (Kuhnle, 2004) but in any case, migration policies.

Eurostat (2018) says the cause of migration *is influenced by a combination of economic, environmental, political and social factors, either in a migrant's country of origin or the country of destination*. In the case of Sweden and Denmark that is not an exception, migrant population came to Scandinavian countries first due to the Balkans' War, then because of the good living and working conditions offered by the Nordic countries at the beginning of the economic crisis and after that, in 2015 during the refugees' crisis a huge number of Syrian citizens started demanding for the citizenship, mainly in Sweden.

But, in some countries where the welfare state is highly developed, solidarity seems to have a double path according to the kind of people: on the one hand, elderly, sick and disable people and on the other hand, unemployed and immigrant population (Van Oorschot, 2016).

Moreover, In Sweden and Denmark, it has been shown that the migration issue is forecasted by political parties more than by the population. That is to say, that migration policy is often used as a way to achieve a greater number of votes in next elections and rarely included in the political agenda as a consequence of population's demands (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008).


For this reason, this analysis will complement the information given when analysing the political changes with the different implementations in migration policies of this governments, once they won elections. The interesting thing about that is to see how migration is used in strategic moments of history in both Scandinavian countries to justify certain welfare state's cuts or to make people understand that closing frontiers

to the rest of the World is the best thing the government can do to assure the maintenance of their expensive welfare's model.

In order to do so, both social policies and changes in the residence permit for refugees and migration policies are going to be explained so the hypothesis can be dismissed or confirmed. As a result, the difference Sweden and Denmark puts when implementing migration policies between immigration and refugees needs to be highly taken into account as they should be treated similar way and not having differentiated paths in the requirements for being part of the country.

First of all, we need to take a look at the graph below, where the total number of migrants have been recorded during the period 1990-2015 paying special relevance to the years where the new general government was voted.

Graph 1. Percentage of migrant population (per electoral year) in Sweden and Denmark (1990-2015)



Source: own elaboration from the data of the OECD (1990-2013) Statistics and Wolrdbank (2014-2015)

As seen in both countries, the percentage of migrant population has increase from the 90s until now, in cyclic periods that are usually determine by wars taking place in non-Western countries, condionate too by the kind of measures on migration governments apply, that is why, the electoral years are presented in the graph.

In both countries, the percentage of immigrant population during the 21st century has been growing as a result of the refugee's crisis; this matches with the fact that in Sweden and Denmark right parties have obtained their best results in recent elections as seen,

mainly in Danish people's party in Denmark (2015) and in Sweden the Sweden democrats (2010-2014).

The graph above shows the percentage of migrant population according to the total population of both Sweden and Denmark during the period studied: from 1990 to 2015. The percentage of migrant population has had a different evolution in both countries what can also be explained by the changes in the electoral votes of the countries.

To begin with, Sweden has always had larger percentage of migrant population than Denmark. By 1991 the Balkan's war brought growing flows of refugees to Sweden. Nevertheless, the percentage of it decrease in 1995 as many obtained Swedish nationality.

By contrast, in Denmark the migrant population did not start sharply rising until 1994 and it was after the Tamil case so that migrants in the countries before that were coming from the war taking place in Sri Lanka and after that from the Balkan's War.

Between 1997 and 2004 migrant population remain mostly stable in both countries but as a consequence of Iraq's War in 2003, in which Danish troops were participating together with the United States, the percentage of migrant population increase remarkably, especially in Sweden, where migrant population shifts from 5,7 per cent of overall population in 2003 to 8,9 per cent one year later.

The war in Syria is the turning point of the increase of the population in Sweden from 2014 (10,94% migrant population) to 2015 (11,62% of migrant population). Refugees coming from Syria and other countries involved in the war are not an exception in Swedish's case, but it happens the same in Denmark, where the migrant population grows from 6,4% in 2012 up to 10,05% in 2015, even though the percentage of migrant population keeps on being higher in Sweden than in Denmark.

To know the causes of the different situations taking place in Sweden and Denmark, departing from the information provided in previous sections. I will develop a deep analyse of migration policy discourses and practices of both countries.

5.4.1. Sweden: The death of the most generous nation on Earth¹⁸?

Traditionally, Sweden has had a higher number of foreign individuals than other Nordic countries. For instance, during the Iraq's war, Sweden took more refugees than any other country including United Kingdom or United States, this phenomenon may be explained -among other things- as a result of the privilege conditions they had in the country

¹⁸ Traub (2016). *The Death of the Most Generous Nation on Earth*. Foreign Policy-The Global Magazine of News and Ideas. Retrieved from: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/10/the-death-of-the-most-generous-nation-on-earth-sweden-syria-refugee-europe/>

following the main principle of universalism of the social democratic welfare states: *having access to rights and entitlements on a par with Swedish nationals* (Borevi, 2002 cited in Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008).

At the beginning of 1990 this was seen as an exclusion for foreign-born residents and its descendants apart from forecasting stigmatization, by the population of Sweden. Although Sweden Democrats' political party kept on defeating for immigrants' right-wing while rights parties used migration as a political issue to attract more voter in next political elections.

Moreover, political parties expressing radical policies against migrant population have been severely punished in elections. To put an example, New Democracy, a Swedish political party that in 1991's elections obtained 25 seats at the Riksdag did only obtain 1,2 per cent of the votes in the following elections after proposing strengthening conditions to obtain the Swedish nationality through the assessment of language skills.

The war of the Balkans clashed with the time Sweden was recovering from their economic crisis of 1990. Again, the economic situation was used as a way to make immigrants' conditions tighter with the argument that maintaining immigrants implies a higher cost for their welfare state.

Usually, immigration coming to Sweden are unskilled migration highly dependent from the State's subsidies and with lower education level what implies more difficulties when joining in the labour market since unskilled jobs in Sweden are limited: *the question of whether to restrict asylum and refugee migration was a key element in the election campaign as well as in the political debate in 1994* (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008).

After that in 1997, politics of integration were created in the country by the hand of the *Swedish Integration Board (SIB)* who was in charge of assuring immigration have a good impact on Swedish population. At that time, Social Democrats lost 30 seats while Christian Democrats highly increase in power obtaining nearly the twelve per cent of the votes (42 seats).

But, in the elections of 2002 the conservative party puts this measure on the table and accepted what needs to be understood in a context in which a high number of migrants obtained the Swedish citizenship, also a social context of worries for multiculturalism what creates a *symptomatic [scenarios] of how immigration and integration have gone from being a general welfare state concern, characterized by cross-party consensus, to being an issue used as a way of distinguishing and profiling parties* (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008).

For this reason, in 2002 elections migration was finally the main point of the policy agenda. The ideology of the party Sweden Democrats and the popularity they started to have at the time can explain why the immigration issue became a focus point in Sweden's policy, let's see how that happened:

Sweden democrats developed from the fascist Sweden's Party in 1988. They are Eurosceptic and anti-immigrants, compared for some authors such as Heinze (2017) with the Danish people's party in Denmark.

Sweden democrats did not form part of the government due to their radical proposals towards migrant population. Moreover, their program of 2002 was based on ethno-nationalism and xenophobia; in 2010's elections the political party won twenty seats and during the next elections (2014) they had 49 seats. During this same term, they had already moderated their ideas and in this election some centre-right politicians started to be more receptive towards cooperating with the political party.

Probably this has also to do with the fact that economic issues are now the main concern of Swedish policy while immigration has never been as politicized as it is in Denmark. Although, there is a common element: while they promote universalist welfare policies, they increase the requirements for migrants to enter the country and to obtain the citizenship, that is to get access to such policies.

Since 2006's elections the migratory issue lost visibility rising down in the policy agenda, for instance in the manifesto of Social Democrats which proposes measures to increase job creation and did not say anything about immigration, or other parties such as the Conservative party whose suggestion to cope with immigration was the integration of the collective labour market. Even if this last idea was supported by the moderate party none of the political parties decided to unify their ideas to boost a common solution.

Moreover, in Sweden the immigration question has been used as a way to create an alliance between political parties with similar ideas, but besides that it has not been the main issue for their political action.

Furthermore, the use of immigration in policy discourses explains recent changes in policies related to migrant population. This is especially true for refugees as Sweden was one of the countries receiving the highest number of refugees coming from Syria.

Finally, in November 2015 under the minority alliance of right parties there were 160,000 applications for asylum, from which 35,000 were from minors, of these minors 90% are boys between thirteen and eighteen years old. The asylum in Sweden

implies broader benefits even though they changed the Act in 2014 and change the residence permit from being permanent to temporary (Jenkins, 2015).

Despite that, refugees in Sweden receive maintenance free housing, health and dental care plus, free education from kindle to twenty years old. The changes on the Act done by the government who is now governing Sweden, did so under the reasoning that over 5% of the population were migrant population and the 2% were refugees coming from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea and Somalia what implies a social cost which endangered the social democratic welfare state.

However, in Sweden not everyone sees migrant population the same way, furthermore migrant population can also be seen as a long-term solution to rejuvenate the ageing population of Sweden (Ekberg, 2011). This alternative is based on the fact that foreign population coming to Sweden are people in age of working or young population -mainly boys- whose possibilities to be well integrated in the Swedish society are higher.

For this reason, integration is crucial to determine whereas the population will have positive or negative effects. According to Ekberg (2011) there are two important factors that could help immigration to have a positive impact in Sweden's society: first, if there exist a huge difference in age between native and immigrants the integration of this last one will be more difficult and the second factor has to do with the difference in the working conditions between Swedish and immigrants.

This second factor, should be carefully taken into consideration since if migrant population do not have similar opportunities as the ones native has they will highly depend more on subsidies such as the unemployment ones, and their contribution to the public sector will be lower, what can be the cause of increasing tensions between both social groups, which is the first step to forecast racism among the country, although it should not be forgotten that young new coming population could be a major determinant of contribution to the public sector if giving them the facilities and equal working conditions.

The *Sweden's Migration and Asylum Policy* (Ministry of Justice, 2018) needs to be analysed to see how asylum is regulated in the country in a legislative period governed by the right-centre coalition. When reading the act, the aim of the Ministry of Justice of the country is to facilitate mobility across the border of the country.

Sweden's Alliance Act regulates asylum in Sweden. Until 2015, there were three types of asylum in the country: refugees, person deemed in need of subsidiary protection and individuals in need of other protection. From that moment on, they eliminated the third

type: the one included people who need protection due to external or internal military conflict because of tensions in a country.

But just some paragraphs below, it is explained that the Government has decided to introduce temporary border in order to control the number of refugees entering the country and that the government have taken measure to *reduce the number of people seeking asylum in Sweden* (2018,1). What can also be since in different articles of newspapers such as Kingsley (2015a)¹⁹ or Kingsley (2015b)²⁰

This is the result of the blame of Sweden to the European Union for being the country who receive the highest number of refugees in Europe: since 2017, 2800 people who apply for asylum in Italy or Greece were reallocated in Sweden (2018, 2), even more the number of people resettled in Sweden has increase from 1990 in 2016 to 3400 in 2017; as of 2018 the number will be 5000.

In a similar way as will be seen in Denmark, family reunification has been also restricted and residence permits have been shortened for three years. Although since 2017, young people are able to stay in the country until they end the upper secondary school. But the situation for minors is also more difficult than before as from 2015 on the number of young people received in Sweden will be limited and also, because if the government does not see any reason why they should protect them they will be quickly returned to their countries.

To sum up, it is curious the fact that the Ministry of Justice in Sweden accepts receiving a higher number of migrant population as asked by the European Union, but they are clearly putting restrictions and are making strict the conditions to enter the country.

As well that it should be also highlight how in this same act, they clearly stand out that Sweden is the 6th country in the World giving the highest amount of money to organizations in charge of helping refugees as if that were enough make their population though they have done enough for the cause.

5.4.2. Migration policies Denmark: The World's higher taxes country

The inflows of migrant population to Denmark are not different to the ones that took place in other Scandinavian countries. The difference remains in the logic behind Denmark integration policies for foreign population. In summary, from 1973 on

¹⁹ Kingsley, P. (2015). Sweden introduces border checks as refugees crisis grows. The Guardian. Stockholm. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/12/refugee-crisis-sweden-introduces-border-checks>

²⁰ Kingsley, P. (2015). Sweden calls on army to help manage refugee crisis. The Guardian. Stockholm. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/10/sweden-calls-on-army-to-help-manage-refugee-crisis>

Denmark started to receive population from non-Western countries as a result of wars. First, they had mainly a rise on the number of migrant population for family reunification and asylum. This phenomenon was catalysed by internal conflicts in countries of the Middle East also during the 80s and 90s, which made the population grow until 2009 when 6 per cent of the population were immigrants of non-Western countries.

In Denmark the category of refugee was defined in 1951 when the country signs the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (The United Nations Refugee Agency, 1951). It is considered a refugee a person who:

Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country (...) as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (1951, art. 1)

What makes migration inflows especially delicate in Denmark is that, the aim of migration policies in the country is not focused on forecasting multiculturalism and integrating new ways of seeing life or opposite cultural patterns. Moreover, most part of the population have seen the rise of migrant population as a problem in terms of integration (Lykketoft, 2009). Contrary to that, the aim of migration policies in Denmark is to maintain as exact as possible the status quo of the country promoting a homogeneous society with equal ways of behaving.

The increase of the migrant population comes along with the growth of the population in the country. At the beginning of the first period studied (1990), when the conservative party was governing, in Denmark the migrant population represents a small amount of their inhabitants (2,9%). During this term, the *Tamil case* took place and the government was involved in a scandal regarding the violation of immigrant's rights as some of the members of the government deny family reunification to refugees coming from Sri Lanka, at that time the percentage of migrant population was growing fast what implies a huge impact for Danish citizens.

As a result, the prime minister was forced to resign and during the last year of the term, social democrats ruled Denmark until 1994. During this period 56,7 per cent of the population accepted the Maastricht Treaty and the country became part of the European Union, what meant obeying and following European principle.

If we take into account the Balkans war, it is not difficult to see how in 1994 migrant population in Denmark started to sharply grow while social democrats keep on governing the country, what permits refugees to enter the country in safer conditions. In the following years, refugees coming from the Balkan region kept on arriving asking for protection and at the end of the decade they represented the 14% of the foreign population (Bonifazi & Conti & Mamolo, 2006).

In 1998 when the migrant population was stabilized Danish's citizens highly criticised their government due to "liberal immigration laws" (Lykketoft, 2009, 26) which again include family reunification, this time for Muslim countries. People was concerned about how all the newcomers would adapt to their habits although these worries were covered by a strong economic grow occurring at the time in Denmark (the strongest one since the Second World War) which makes political parties to foster welfare policies and at

the same time to create narrower requirements and conditions for a migrant to stay in the country.

During the last years of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st a huge amount of institutions regarding the management of migrant population were created, although they have been abolished during these last years. Now, the institutions in charge of guaranteeing rights to migrants are the Danish Institute for Human Rights and the Board for Equal Treatment.

This transition from the mechanisms done to protect migrant population in 1998 to the erasure of these institutions during the first years of this century has to do with an important change of the political scenarios in the country. Firstly, in 1998 the government was composed by left parties whilst the red-green alliance increases in number of seats at the Folketinget, although the Danish People's Party gained 13 seats during their first elections. But in 2001 things started to change politically when the Danish People's Party (an anti-immigrant party) obtained 22 seats and the social democrats, for the first time in Denmark's history did not obtain the highest number of votes.

Besides that, in 2000 the government did also introduce 78 regulations to limit immigration entering the country²¹ and did also do so with the aim of accelerating integration of the foreign population already living in Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark).

And in 2002, under the term of the Liberal Party (started in 2001) the Folketinget approves a controversial asylum law, introducing the strictest asylum rules among the European Union. During the next term (2004) the defence minister resigned after being involved in a breach of official secrets regarding Denmark's Intelligence on Iraq when they alleged possession of weapons prior to the invasion of the United States in Iraq in which the Danish troops participated.

Changes in the number of institutions in charge of taking care of migrant people and strengthening the measures that guarantee they are well integrated in society does also indicate a lack of concern on this sector of the population that is accompanied by stronger requirements and measures when asking for residence permits, asylum and especially in citizenship procedure.

Moreover, as dual citizenship is not allowed in Denmark, migrant population who want Danish citizenship needs to dissociate themselves from their nationality which also implies huge impacts in terms of identity (Jensen & Schmidt & Torslev & Vitus & Weibel, 2010). The aim of the migration policy in Denmark is to have an active migrant population, active too in the labour market that makes an effort to integrate in their society (according to what it is said by the *Integration Act* which will be explained later on in this same point).

From 2005 on, migrant population has been constantly increasing and specially during recent years as a result of the refugees' crisis whose individuals come particularly from Syria. Resulting from this humanitarian crisis, the migrant population accounts for 10

²¹ AFP The Local in Denmark. (2014). Denmark tightens asylum laws citing Syrian influx. The Local Dk. Denmark. Retrieved from <https://www.thelocal.dk/20140919/denmark-tightens-asylum-laws-citing-syrian-influx>

per cent (2015) being the uppermost the country has ever had. Simultaneously, the number of votes for the red bloc has grown again even though all political parties have gradually radicalized their measures against migrants during the years to attract a major scope of the population.

The increase in the percentage of migrant population as well as the rise of political parties which are openly developing xenophobic speeches are also reflected in the upward trend of racist crime taking place in Denmark since 2006²²

For cases like the one said before, the EUIAFR has categorized Denmark in a group of countries where sanctions against racism are not severe, even frequent, together with other European countries such as Belgium or Austria. At that time, migration scandals did again splash the Danish politics and in 2007 the Danish's troops (470 ground troops) abandoned Iraq and the government headed by Anders Fogh Rasmussen called for early elections at the end of this year.

The increase of political power of the Danish people's party in conjunction with the laws of Denmark towards migration can clearly make a difference for newcomers, what illustrates in the best way that, is the *Integration Act*.

The Integration Act is the evidence that although the aim of Denmark is to promote equality, this equality among citizens is going to be conceded to those individuals whom, coming from another country integrates well in their society, what means having the capacity to shape their habits so they can be part of the homogeneous Danish mass: had done an effort. As a result, the Integration Act talks about equality in terms of similarities with other Danish citizens.

That is to say that, the effort for being socially integrate means that every individual needs to be responsible of himself, these facts remain clearly to the principals of the liberal model of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990) more than the Scandinavian one as the failure of the migrant is their responsibility and not a default of the system.

Apart from that, the effort of integration also means participating in the religion followed in the country what implies an enormous handicap, again in terms of identity and habits. Finally, the last point of this "effort of integration" which is clearly though to homogenize the new coming population *imparts to the individual foreigners an understanding of the fundamental values and norms of Danish Society* (Integration Act, Art.1).

Ideas coming from the Integration Act can also be found in the approach some political parties in Denmark such as the progress party or the Danish people's party does. Especially in the Danish people's party who has been defined since their beginning as an anti-tax party with a strong anti-immigration profile broadly accepted among the political sphere as a current political party.

The acceptance of their anti-immigration profile in the Danish country is explained by their political path: on the one hand, at the end of the 1990's after the increase of the

²² During this year as recorded by the *European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights*, 98 complaints were received by specialized bodies from which only five were confirmed as being racist crime and just four of them were sanctioned to pay a bill that goes between DKK 1000—3000 (which in euros are between 134 and four hundred euros).

migrant population due to the Balkans war, most political parties radicalize their opinion among migrants and go against multiculturalism forecasting only welfare policies and abandoning migrant policies.

Taking advantage of this last fact, the Danish people's party was able to radicalize even more their opinions promoting anti-Islam policies without being excluded from the political spotlight.

On the other hand, since 2001 the Danish people's party, have been the third political force in election but never winning or being the rulers of the Denmark. Besides that, <<*This new government [of 2001] made a number of significant changes in Danish immigration policies. Welfare benefits for immigrants were cut and achieving family reunification became much more difficult*>> (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008, 623)

What could be seen as a disadvantageous situation, in Danish people's party's case has been used to win legitimation among the population while they support the right-centre government being part of the modification of migration policies from 2001 to 2011, this fact has also allowed them to maintain radical migration policy's ideas.

Things changed in last elections, 2015, when this political party was the most voted among the right-wing parties of Denmark with the 21% of the votes followed -in this blue block of political parties- by the Liberal party voted by the 19,5% of the population. This does also match with the fact that *at the beginning of the new millennium, the Danes were the most immigration-critical population among the Nordic States* (2017, 9).

To end up with the relation that links the rise of anti-immigrant's parties with the increase of the restrictions on migration policy, it is necessary to say that in 2013 Denmark was the 7th country receiving the higher number of refugees among OECD countries (OECD, 2015). The Folketinget is now in charge of deciding every year how many refugees the country is going to accept under the program *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reallocation* program.

Fitting with the rise of the Danish people's party in Denmark, in 2015 they proposed to change family reunification, the law that so many scandals has caused to different governments in Denmark all over the period studies (1990-2015) and also due to the huge amount of application the Danish Immigrants Service receive (over 32000), so that migrants would have to wait at least three years until family reunification could be requested.

Moreover, from this year on, a lowest budget will be addressed to asylum seekers and migrants will have to pay for housing. These measures were adopted after they receive in 2015, 18000 asylum applications from which 1700 were from minors travelling alone, even though only half of this applications where accepted and receive five years of permitted residence.

From 2016 on, the permitted residence was changed from five to three years and the acceptance of a refugee is analysed one by one trough the refugee's potential for integration in the Danish society plus and interview done by the Danish Immigration Service.

6. Conclusions

Following the main features social democratic welfare state have according to what Esping-Andersen said back in 1990 we can settle that both countries, Denmark and Sweden, still maintain the social democratic model. To begin with, the role of the state keeps on being essential to understand both systems, there are separation of powers to guarantee justice and the state is the main provider of subsidies and services to the citizens. Moreover, important decisions are decided at the parliament (the Riksdag in Sweden and the Folketinget in Denmark).

The main difference is that in the Swedish case governmental concerns are focused on maintaining their country secure and closely participating with the European Union, whereas the Danish's government is more focused on migration policies and on the debate around allowing private enterprises to offer certain public services or not. For this reason, although both countries fix in a social democratic welfare state, Denmark could easily transfer some of their features towards a more liberal model because there is also a sense of responsibility given to the individual, especially to the migrant in which if they fail in the process of integration is not the system's fault but the own debt of the person.

Nevertheless, commodification is an issue that has been not enough studied during this paper to firmly determine if the welfare states of both countries are being commodified or not. It is true that during the paper there are some evidence of that and several times it has been explained that during historical periods of economic recession, opening the state to private services has been a usual practice. Besides that, other sphere of one and the other country should be analysed to confirm so, for instance the health system and the pensions and the increase or decrease in social expenditure of the state.

Apart from that, in both countries the principle of universalism remains to all citizens of the countries even though it does not happen the same way when an individual is part of the migrant population. In Sweden all citizens have the right to access subsidies and services offered by the state, the same that it happens in Denmark. But what is getting tougher is to obtain the citizenship, especially in Denmark where the Danish Immigration Service evaluates if a person will be capable enough to integrate in their society and is useful for the country, following the Integration Act of Denmark.

Another characteristic of the social democratic model is to make sure income is progressively redistributed and equality is part of the society. Sweden has always been compromised with equality among gender in the same way Denmark does, however when talking about migrants the government encourage women from other countries to join their labour market in the Swedish case but not in Denmark where migration

policies has not the aim to help multicultural people to be part of their society but to follow Danish patterns in order to assure the own integration.

When talking about the parliamentary system both countries have a unicameral system: the one in Sweden is composed for 349 seats where to obtain the majority a political party or coalition has to gain 175 seats during elections, whereas in Denmark they have a smaller parliament with 179 seats what means that to obtain a majority 80 seats are needed. Denmark and Sweden have both requirements that political parties need to achieve to obtain political representation at their respective parliament: within Denmark, a political party needs to have at least the two per cent of the votes to obtain seats at the parliament with that, the country wants to assure variety of opinions at the Folketinget and this is one of the reasons why nearly none of the governments Denmark has since having unicameralism has been composed by a unique party either by a majority coalition.

Opposite to that system, what is necessary to have representation at the Riksdag of Sweden is to obtain at least the four per cent of the votes. This measure, assure that the vote will be less spread it among political parties, that ideologies are not going to be extremely different and this system does also facilitate larger parties to obtain an upper number of seats at the parliament.

The difference on the electoral results among both countries does also has to do with the electoral law the countries have. In Denmark, as in Spain the law is based on the *D'Hondt method* but in Sweden they use the *Saint-Laguë method* which gives more preference to larger parties specially when obtaining seats at the Parliament and more if we take into account that Sweden modified the original method.

Undoubtedly, the electoral laws and the restrictions to have parliamentary representation have an impact on the number of political parties a country has. That explains why Sweden has a lower number of political parties than Denmark, although in both of them we can talk about a blue coalition and a red coalition.

On the one hand, Swedish right-wing parties including the centre party, liberal party, moderate party, Christian democrats and the most radical one, Sweden democrats, compose Swedish's blue coalition. In opposition to these, the red coalition based on alliances between left parties we can found social democrats, green party, the left party and the recent addition of the feminist party.

In Denmark, blue coalition consists on the conservative party, liberal party, centre democrats, Christian people's party, liberal alliance and the most radical one in terms of migrant policy: Danish people's party. Contrary to that, the red coalition is shaped by

social democratic party, socialist people's party, Danish social liberal party, red-green alliance and the new party called, the alliance.

In both cases, blue coalition is stronger than red coalition. In Sweden the alliance between right-wing parties has always worked the same way among the political parties' despite not agreeing always in the same points. But, in left-wing parties' things has not worked the same way since the left party has not always allied with greens and social democrats, only when it was necessary to form government.

In Denmark the political scenario is more radicalized to right-wing parties than in Sweden, as the Danish people's party, a political party that is openly anti-immigration, has been normally accepted in Danish society, whereas. In Sweden, Sweden democrats were excluded from any governmental decision for being too radical. Nevertheless since the population start voting them two terms ago and they start obtaining seats things are slightly changing right-wing large parties such as the liberal party have assumed some of their restrictive ideas.

Finally, the radicalization of political parties in both countries, especially in Denmark as well as the increase of the commodification of the state and the decrease of universalism in their models has consequences on migration policies from which we can extract several conclusions. First of all, Sweden will always have a higher number of migrant population than Denmark not only because it is a richer country, but also because, despite recent strengthening of entrance conditions, they are far from the restrictive Danish laws.

In second place, in Denmark migration and asylum have always been used in politics to obtain more votes. That is to say that in Denmark the political results in elections depends on parties' political positions on migration during the campaign. Here we find a pattern in both countries between wars in other parts of the World and the use of migration in political discourses. As we have seen this is the case with the period of post Balkans War (1990), in the war of Sri Lanka (1993), the Iraq's War (2004) and the Syrian War (2014).

Besides, there is a correlation between increase of migrant population and vote to right-wing parties which have historically use the migration issue to make cuts in the welfare system.

Finally, a third reason for the radicalization of migration policies and the votes, especially in Denmark is that when a political party does a speech in which the context is racist, mass media uses this as a way of justifying that they can be racist too. Throughout this process is how the migration issue is included again in the policy agenda and has always

happened with the help of right-wing parties, which allying with radical right-wing parties have governed Denmark radicalizing migration policies.

For these reasons, we can conclude that the radical right-wing parties have always been stronger in Denmark than in Sweden: even if Denmark has had several social democratic governments, the most part of the seats at the Folketinget has always been from the bourgeois and from the right-wing parties, what has not happened in Sweden even if things seems to be changing with the presence of radical right-wing parties.

Trough the Danish governments, the country has drawn a line between “them” (immigrants and refugees) and “us” (Danish citizens) stratifying the society in two big social classes depending on your place of birth. Moreover, migrants’ effort to integrate in Danish society has been rewarded with permanent residence permits while not overcoming the Integration Act implies a penalization and high pressures to return to the country of origin.

To conclude, to what extent these changes will affect the Scandinavian Welfare states in a consistent way is a matter for future research, since the new radical right-wing parties are about to start gaining seats now at the Parliament and their ideas will probably be part of next term in both Denmark and Sweden. Moreover, new data regarding the percentage of migrant population of these countries will be available in a few years and the study of the effects of the Syrian War could be deeply analysed.

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8. Annex

8.1. Immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better

		IM5 Immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better			
		Frecuencia	Porcentaje	Porcentaje válido	Porcentaje acumulado
Válido	0 Crime problems made worse	109	7,3	7,4	7,4
	1 1	93	6,2	6,3	13,7
	2 2	197	13,1	13,3	27,0
	3 3	256	17,0	17,3	44,4
	4 4	220	14,6	14,9	59,3
	5 5	421	28,0	28,5	87,8
	6 6	48	3,2	3,3	91,1
	7 7	58	3,9	3,9	95,0
	8 8	55	3,7	3,7	98,7
	9 9	14	,9	,9	99,7
	10 Crime problems made better	5	,3	,3	100,0
	Total	1476	98,3	100,0	
Perdidos	88 Don't know	23	1,5		
	99 No answer	3	,2		
	Total	26	1,7		
Total		1502	100,0		

Source: ESS Round 7 (2014) Denmark.