

The EU at the UN First Committee



-Master's Thesis-

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ABBREVIATIONS

BTWC: Biological Weapons Convention
CFSP: Common Foreign Security Policy
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
EDC: European Defence Community
EEAS: European External Action Service
EEC: European Economic Community
EoV: Explanation of vote
EPC: European Political Cooperation
EU: European Union
FAC: Foreign Action Committee
C.1 : First Committee
HR: Human Rights
MMSS: Member States
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PSC: Political and Security Committee
UN: United Nations
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNODA: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNSC: United Nations Security Council

1. INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) is an International Organisation of integration. When acting in the international arena, the EU becomes a single big power representing the 27 Member States (MMSS). However, the EU does not have a common single voice in Foreign Policy. Security is a crucial sector for all States. Therefore, they do not want to share these competencies with the Union.

The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the Treaty of the European Union (TUE) and the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFUE). The TUE, in article 27.2¹ exposes that the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall represent the EU in talks with third states, in international organisations and international conferences. In article 34² of the TUE, it is reflected that the MMSS shall coordinate their actions in international organisations. This article has been present since 1957 even though it has evolved in the different reforming treaties. Since its creation, the EU has desired acting with a single voice in the different International Organisations. Nonetheless, the Treaty of Lisbon increased the High Representative's power and functions and created the European Diplomatic Body. That is why there is the belief that this Treaty changed the EU's behaviour in the international organisations and the MMSS approach on Foreign Affairs.

Yet, the EU is aware of its role in the world and that they need to engage to be more powerful. International Security is not an exception. The principal problem here is that the EU States have opposite views in the arena. There are the Nuclear States like France and the United Kingdom and the Neutral States as Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden.

International Organisations are focusing on International Security. There are the United Nations, the NATO and the EU itself also has two programs (CFSP and CSDP). Nonetheless, not all the MMSS take part in all the mentioned programs. The United Nations is the only security and defence international organisation where all the European Union Member States are present. The EU in the TUE exposes clearly that the United Nations are an important forum for them. Then, they are willing to be part and engage in talks with it. However, they must do it through its MMSS.

This is why this analysis will focus on the EU's MMSS action and behaviour in the United Nations. The UN is enormous and different areas work on International Security as the Security Council, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) or the United Nations General Assembly, institution in which drafts is going to focus. This has different Committees and the study will concentrate on the First which is the responsibility for the Disarmament and International Security.

¹ The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences.

² Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union's positions in such forums. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall organise this coordination.

In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the Union's positions.

The UNGA has been the selected institution because many studies have studied the European Union action, through its Member States, in its different periods. Most of the mentioned papers centre themselves on the voting pattern in the plenary³ and its working groups⁴. These investigations conduce to focus mostly on the committees where the EU's voting is more homogenous as the Third that focuses on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural affairs⁵. These tend to just mention the First Committee (C.1) as the exception of the homogeneity. Since the Disarmament Committee is a new space of research. The lack of information on the topic will force this analysis to start from the basis. There are no studies who have only examined the C.1 or how the EU has acted in the International Security and Disarmament Committee.

Therefore, this research focuses on a long-time study gap, the European Union MMSS action on the United Nations General Assembly's C.1 . Also, it is important to remark that the majority of the studies mentioned are old. They were written on the 90s or the early 21st century and adjusted mostly on the period between the 1970s and the 1990s⁶.

Hence, this study intends to fill this gap and it will try to find the logic on this Committee. It will explain the different actors who take part in the process and which of those are the most important. Also, it will comprehend the literature that analysed the voting pattern to actualize the data and to detect the differences between topics and years.

Besides, this paper will also explain why voting homogeneity is lower in this area than in the others. Moreover, it will try to identify to which extend the different Member States act as a sovereign State or as an EU member.

Further, it will analyse if the changes and the new actors introduced in the actualizations of the Treaty on the European Union made any difference on the hegemony or in the process to coordinate the MMSS action on Committee.

The UN has had more than 70 sessions. However, the analysis will just follow a short period of time. To be able to examine the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, the analysis will focus on the period 2008-2018 to visualize what happened before and after the treaty was effective.

As a brief, this study wants to put light on the EU's action on the United Nations General Assembly First Committee and the process with which the EU tries to construct the coordination exposed in the art. 34 (TUE) and to which extend the Member States follow this article. This is why the research question of this study is: *Has the EU acted with a single voice in the United Nations General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) since the Lisbon Treaty?*

³ LUIF, P. *EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly*, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003, pp.1-75

⁴ YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. "EU Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly, 1990-2002: The EU's Europeanising Tendencies." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* vol. 16, 2005, pp. 193-207

⁵ SMITH, K "EU member states at the UN: a case of Europeanisation arrested?", LSE Research Online, 2016, pp. 1-28

⁶ LUIF, P. *opt.cite, note.3*

YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. *opt.cite, note.4*

From the question, there are some hypothesis deduced. These hypotheses are the followings:

- The EU Member States have increased their cohesion in the First Committee since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect.
- It is impossible that the EU is going to act with a single voice because of the Nuclear States and the Neutral states.
- The OTAN membership has a tremendous influence on the voting pattern.

This study will firstly analyse the literature to see the main scholar researches in the field. Next, the methodological explanation where there is an explanation of the main data used and the different methods that are used to extract and understand the information. The data analysis will follow the chronological process with which the EU constructs the single voice and define the different participants. Also, this part will comprehend the vote and the main priorities and proposals of the EU. Finally, there will be conclusions which will also focus on the new lines of research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 European Foreign Policy

The European foreign policy has been an important area since the early '50s. It was not part of the Treaties of Rome due to the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC). The EDC was a project started in the 1950s that was meant to create the European Army and a military alliance between its members. It was supposed to be a parallel organisation to the EEC. The design contained the same organs exposed in the Treaty of Rome although it already constitutionalized the Heads of State meetings⁷. This organisation failed because France did not ratify its Treaty. Anyway, the European Economic Community started to connect whit Third states and to have a foreign presence through other areas. The ECC build bilateral economic agreements, represented its MMSS at the GATT Rounds and contributed to economic and development aid⁸. Therefore, it can affirm that the EU's first international arena was the economic one.

Unity in other international organisations has been a written agreement since the Rome Treaty⁹. Over the different modifications of the TFUE, this attitude has not changed. This definition has been enriched by new processes and mechanisms with which the common positions are arranged more effectively in the enlarging union.

It was in 1973, the Copenhagen Report established the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC created the regular meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Member States. These reunions aimed to coordinate the EU foreign actions. The EPC established the

⁷ GLOCKNER, I AND RITTBERGER, B. *Designing the European Union. From Paris to Lisbon, Chapter The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Defense Community (EDC) Treaties*, Palgrave Mcmillan, New York, 2012, 1-308, p.16-23

⁸ BINDI, F. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union Assessing Europe's Role in the World, Chapter European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 2010, pp. 13-48, p.14

⁹ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p. 16

creation of different organs as the "Group of Correspondents" and the working groups who oversaw preparing the meetings¹⁰. The first working groups created were focused on:

- the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
- the Middle East
- the Mediterranean
- Asia

This also established that the different ambassadors on the EEC would consult each other. At the end of 1973, the EPC adopted the "Declaration on European Identity" where they exposed the role the EU had to play in the world. One of the elements they specified was their plan to progressively determine common positions in the sphere of foreign policy¹¹.

In the beginning, they used to disagree on the Middle East until the Six-Day War when they reaffirmed Palestine's right to self-determination¹². At the end of the '80s the European Single Act, which was the first review of the treaties was approved and supposed the strengthening of the cooperation on foreign affairs.

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed. There, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created. The CFSP was an inter-governmental "pillar". The CFSP allowed the EU to start the talks on defence that had previously been impossible and unthinkable. Before it was signed, the European Council released the Lisbon Report where they introduced the principal geographic areas and topics the EU had to work on¹³. These regions were:

- Eastern Europe (including Eurasia)
- The Balkans
- Maghreb and the Middle East
- Transatlantic relations (the United States and Canada)
- The North-South dimension (Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia) and Japan.
- The CSCE process and the policy of disarmament and arms control in
- Europe, including confidence-building measures
- Nuclear and non-proliferation issues
- The economic aspect of security
- Control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and control of arms exports.

At the late '90s, the EU started the construction of the European Security and Defence Identity. This project let the EU to act on some occasions in collaboration with NATO¹⁴.

¹⁰ BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.19

¹¹ BINDI, F. opt. cite. note , p.19

¹² BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.21

¹³ BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.27-28

¹⁴ BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.29

The Amsterdam Treaty created the High Representative of the CFSP. He had to coordinate the new Policy Unite regarding Foreign Affairs. The High Representative also published different reports stating which were the EU priorities and its opportunities¹⁵.

In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon was effective. In this Treaty, the Rome and the Maastricht Treaties were modified. The European Exterior Action Service was established. This is an institution where functionary and diplomats from the different states are in charge of:

- The coordination of the CFSP and the new CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) programs
- Preparing the different meetings led by the High Representative)¹⁶
- Representing the EU in International Organisations and International events
- Ambassadors on the European Commission Delegations and the European Union Representations

The Foreign Policy has become more centred in Brussels over time. This process of centralization of the policy decision on the EU capital is called *Brusselization*. This concept was developed by Allen in 1998. He defined it as “a gradual transfer in the name of consistency, of foreign policy authority away from the national capitals to Brussels”¹⁷.

2.2. United Nations

The European Union is not a United Nations (UN) member. The United Nations is an International Organisation formed by States. Therefore, the EU, as an International Organisation, cannot be a member of the UN.

However, it can act at the UN directly and indirectly in the UN. Directly, the EU mostly acts as an economic supporter. It is a major donor to the United Nations development projects, and it is also an interlocutor of the UN due to its commitment to create a global forum and to promote multilateralism¹⁸. Due to the success of the bilateral dialogue between the two Organisations, 26 UN agencies have offices in Brussels¹⁹.

The EU is an observant member of the whole United Nations Organization. It has also been able to be included on the speaking list in the sessions and work of the General Assembly as well as in its committees and working groups since 2011. This was brought about after the approval of Resolution 65/275. Since this moment, the EU Delegation has substituted the rotating presidencies in the coordination of the UNGA topics and has spoken in the name of the 27 or 28 member states in the Assembly since. However, the EU is not the only observer who

¹⁵ BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.35

¹⁶ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, *The Lisbon Treaty: a brief guide*, Delegation of the European Union to India [online], 2010, pp.1-15 p.9. Available in:
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_lisbon_treaty_guide_22_04_2010.pdf

¹⁷ LARIVÉ, M.H.A, *Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity*, Routledge, New York, 2016, pp. 320, p.40.

¹⁸ YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. op.cite, note.4, p.206

¹⁹ OECD, *OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews OECD Development Assistance Peer Reviews: European Union 2012, 2013*, OECD Publishing, p.1-120, p.59

can speak; the Holy Site and Palestine also have this right²⁰. The EU has voting power in some UN organizations like the FAO²¹ and it is a party in more than 50 conventions or multilateral agreements where it normally is the only non-state participant²². Some of the conventions where the EU is a party include the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa; the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime²³.

As Hanna Ojanen argued, the EU is one of the biggest political influences without being a member of the Organization. As mentioned, since 2011, the European Commission addresses the UNGA in behalf of the EU²⁴. Trying to study this influence, there has been an academic debate on the role of the EU at the Security Council. However, the UNGA has not been as analysed and it is a very interesting political arena to study the EU²⁵ because the UNGA is the institution where many decisions are decided. Some of their competences and most important goals are²⁶:

- International Law codification
- Approves resolutions as the Sustainable Development Goals.
- Appoints the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General following the Security Council's recommendations
- Makes recommendations and suggestions on peace maintenance if the Security Council is not discussing it
- Following the Uniting for Peace resolution they can take action if there are cases of threat to the peace or an act of aggression and the Security Council has failed to act because of the negative vote of a permanent member.

Indirectly, the EU politically acts under its Member States in the main institutions- the UNGA and the UNSC. The EU MMSS represent the EU and its interest. There, under a twisted and long coordination process, the States share their common positions and act as a block. This block is important for two main causes:

²⁰ EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Relations Between the European Union and the United Nations, September 2011, [online] Consulted 4th May 2019, Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124604.pdf

²¹ OJANEN, H. "The EU and the UN: a shared future" Helsinki, FIIA Report 13/2006, *The Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, 2006, pp. 1-52, p. 11

²² OECD, *opt.cite* note. 18, p.59

²³ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Treaties Office Database [online] Consulted 4th May 2019, Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByType.do?id=2>

²⁴ EUROPEAN COUNCIL, EU at the UN General Assembly, Brussels, 6th March 2020. [online] Consulted in 5th March 2020, Available: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/unga/>

²⁵ OJANEN, H. *opt.cite*. note 21, p8

²⁶ UNITED NATIONS, Functions and powers of the General Assembly, [online] Consulted 1st May 2020, Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>

1. The first cause is the globe voting blocks in which the UNGA is divided. Following this division, the EU member states are in 3 of the 5 blocks²⁷:
 - WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHER GROUP: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
 - EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP: BULGARIA, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
 - ASIAN GROUP: Cyprus

The global influence and power that the system gives to the EU are enormous and the EU does take advantage of it by being overrepresented in the different institutions and hence, having more power than if considered as a unique group would have²⁸. The groups are relevant in the distribution of the seats on bodies and other delegated institutions. Therefore, at having members on different groups the EU can see itself overrepresented in somebodies due to this regional distribution.²⁹

2. The second one is that the EU single voice does not only affect the 27 or 28 MMSS. There usually is an average of 15 countries who tend to align to the EU action. These countries are the EFTA countries as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein, the European microstate of Andorra and the enlargement candidates as Albania, Montenegro or Turkey.³⁰

2.3 The EU at the UN

The studies that have focused on the EU's action at the UNGA observed and explained the evolution of voting unity with the different changes that the EU internal legislation has undergone regarding the position of Member States on other International Organizations³¹.

In the 50s and 60s, there was unity upon Human Rights and Israel, and this was explicit on the UNGA because the MMSS voted the same on the resolutions related to those topics. In the 70s the pattern was reinforced because it raised upon a 60% of unity on the voting. This homogeneity continued to the 80s and in the early 90s, it was reduced to 50%. In 1992, the single voice resumed, and it went to the 80s average percentage. Notwithstanding, as the authors exposed, security issues showed a smaller cohesion. Sadly, the literature does not share the percentage of the C.1 individually, they expose the results as the outcome of all the UNGA votes in the 6 Committees and the Plenary. Consequently, there is no information on to which extent did the 1st Committee represent a decrease in the single voice construction.

²⁷ DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. "Actors and Mechanisms of EU coordination at the UN" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 14, 2009, pp. 405-430, p. 411

LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p.7

²⁸ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3

²⁹ PERMANENT MISSION OF SWITZERLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS. *The GA Handbook A practical guide to the United Nations General Assembly*, 2017, pp. 138, p. 62, available: https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/mission-new-york/en/documents/UN_GA_Final.pdf

³⁰ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p. 52

³¹ OJANEN, H. opt. cite. note 21

³¹ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3

³¹ YOUNG, H. AND REES, N. opt. cite. note 4


The process developed to produce the single voice is unclear despite knowing all the different actors who take part in the process³². As Anne Degrand-Guillaud defined, internal coordination is kept hidden behind a closed door³³. Even though she produced an extremely detailed study on how the coordination was developed and gave the EU some lines to follow in the revision on the process, that was written at the same time to Lisbon Treaty was being formulated.

Scholars³⁴ have also put the accent on the prevalent role that the EU Council presidency has on the single voice construction and the known-how relation between the EU delegation and the national embassies. Sadly, most of the studies are more than 10 years old and their results can only be considered as a guideline to study and analyse the current EU consensus construction. That is why when explaining the process found in the literature, the descriptions will be exposed in the past tenses.

The coordination, before the Lisbon Treaty, was produced both in New York (NY) and Brussels³⁵. In Brussels, there was permanent coordination between the European Commission, the Committees and the working groups, the COREPER, the Council Secretariat and the Council. In New York meetings were held in the second semester, that is when the UNGA plenaries are held (they start in September). In NY, the EU Presidency had the leading voice and it was who reunited and promoted the policies. In the coordination also participated the EU Commission- who is a UNGA observer-, the EU Delegation, the 28 states representants, the representation of the European Communities (2009 text) and the Council office on NY³⁶.

State representants held a dual position, they informed the EU Presidency of its State position and they informed their State of the EU common position. The NY process is defined in the figure 1.

FIGURE 1



Source: Extracted from Actors and Mechanisms of EU coordination at the UN p.420

³² The Commission, the Council, the Member States, the Member States embassies at the UN in NY, the EEAS and depending on the Committee some Commissions

³³ DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. opt. cite. note 27, p.405

³⁴ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p.13

³⁴ YOUNG, H. AND REES, N. opt. cite. note 4, p.206


³⁵ DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. opt. cite. note 27, p.407

³⁵ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p.13-15

³⁶ DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. opt. cite. note 27

On security issues, there was also the Political and Security Committee (PSC) who helped define the policies, exercised control and provided strategic control of the CFSP. The PSC assisted the construction of the EU opinion as a complementary actor to the COREPER and its working groups³⁷. It is important to mention that the PSC changed its role in the Lisbon Treaty. The pre-Lisbon formation of the First Committee common position can be seen in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2



Source: Extracted from Actors and Mechanisms of EU coordination at the UN p.417

It is very relevant that the EU has a delegation at the UN. This is not a normal international office of the EU abroad because these are normally European Commission Delegations and the NY one is not managed by the Commission; it is the representation of the European Union as a whole. The fact that when the EU Office at the UN opened in 1974 and it was already settled to represent the whole spectrum of European Institutions and interests³⁸ reinforces the importance of the UN. It is in these arenas where the post-modern diplomacy of the EU is visible as a whole. The post-modern diplomacy is defined by the cooperation between the actors to develop agreements and common understanding with bilateral action³⁹.

One of the main gaps in literature is the role of the new reinforced High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR-FASP) and the European Exterior Action Service (EEAS)⁴⁰ on the decision-making structure.

The only recent study that developed this gap was published in 2016 and focused on the EU action on the 3rd Committee that is the Human Rights Committee of the UNGA. The analysis done by Karen Smith gave the Human Rights Commission in Brussels the main role in creating the common position and therefore, suggested a *Brusselization*⁴¹ on the making of

³⁷ DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A opt. cite. note 27, p.415-416

³⁸ COMMELLI, M. Y MATARAZZO, R “Rehashed Commission Delegations or Real Embassies? EU Delegations Post-Lisbon”, IAI Working Papers, vol 11, 2011, pp. 1-13, p.10-11

³⁹ BÁTORA, J. Y HOCKING, B “Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union: Towards “post-modern” patterns?”, Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, Discussion papers on diplomacy, 2008, pp.1-28, p. 22-23

⁴⁰ DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A opt. cite. note 27, p. 411

⁴¹ SMITH, K. opt. cite note 5, p.4

the single voice. It follows and accounts the statements released on HR by the EU on the UN and as the EU as an actor. Smith concludes that the Lisbon procedural changes had not had a very important impact on the HR Committee⁴².

The United Nations has different Committees in which they centre in different topics. The different Committees are: 1st, Disarmament and International Security; 2nd, Economical and Financial; 3rd, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural; 4th, Special Political and Decolonisation; 5th, Administrative and Budgetary and 6th, Legal.

This study is set to study the security of the EU common position on the First Committee. This Committee was created in 1945 and as the UN describes it, the 1st Committee:

“[...] deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments”⁴³

Scholars⁴⁴ have agreed that the security policy and foreign affairs subjects were an exception in all the aspects. The Foreign Policy and International Security are not EU competences⁴⁵. This is an area where states coordinate and coordinate. It is a supranational arena where States have the last word on the decisions and where they do not need to agree or commit. This is what makes the EU single voice construction in the UN First Committee more difficult than in other areas. However, it is still an uncertain area to study because not many studies have focused to understand the EU foreign policy on the UN⁴⁶ and as Degrand-Guillaud exposed, there is no transparency on the decision-making process.

In this Committee, there is a definite decrease in the single voice percentage. 7 States usually act opposite the EU standards that are France and the United Kingdom (nuclear countries and Security Council permanent members) and Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden (neutral countries)⁴⁷.

The study of the C.1 of the UNGA supposes to study the common position on the less institutionalized area of the EU, the Foreign Policy. It is considered that analysing the EU's

⁴² SMITH, K. opt. cite note 5, p.21

⁴³ UNITED NATIONS, Disarmament and International Security (First Committee), New York, Consulted March 10th 2020, Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/index.shtml>

⁴⁴ DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. opt. cite. note 27

⁴⁴ OJANEN, H. opt. cites. note 21

⁴⁴ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3

⁴⁴ YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. opt. cite. note 4, p.206

⁴⁵ EU-LEX, *Division of competences within the European Union*, Brussels, last update 2016, Consulted February 10th 2020, available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Aai0020>

⁴⁶ JORGANSEN, K.E Y LAATIKAINEN, K. “The European Union and the United Nations”

⁴⁷ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p.31

⁴⁷ YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. opt. cite. note 4, p.198-199

behaviour in this area will enrich the European Union multilateral literature and will give some ideas on how the EU sees itself in the international security and defence arena.

3. METHODOLOGY

A mixt analysis with a dual approach through qualitative and quantitative data will be conducted to complement each other to develop a strong response to the thesis hypothesis. The process by which quantitative data becomes qualitative is called *qualitizing* and it is made to extract more information from the quantitative data⁴⁸. This method has been chosen due to the strength that it gives to the results and it helps go further into the analysis due to the complementation of the data available to study.

Therefore, the data analysis will be structured following the chronological approach concerning the process of the EU single voice construction entails. That is, starting from the qualitative methodology looking for the EU's main topics and understanding the actors involved. Afterwards, looking to the quantitative data as the UN First Assembly and the results of the votes derived. Later on, understanding the actions and the motivations that make the EU Member States follow or divert from the EU's proposal.

The quantitative data collection will be extracted from the UN First Assembly Reports. In this analysis, will be considered the voting reports data from 2008 to 2018. This will only focus on the Member States action. This is why Croatia's votes will be observed since 2013 that is the year when it became a member. This information will be used in two parallel studies.

The first one will consist of the voting analysis. This part will follow the voting approach mentioned in the literature review. The percentage will be used to compare the different year results because it is the best mechanism to compare the information. The unanimity in favour, against and the abstention will be considered. In the numeric analysis, this is going to be translated to the following code:

- in favour: 2
- abstention: 1
- against 0

The codification permits identifying the unanimity when it is reached. It can be seen when the sum of all the 27 or 28 MMSS votes in the policies are 0, 27 or 46 from 2008 to 2012 and from 2013 when the sum is 0, 28 or 48. This change is produced by the accession of Croatia to the Union. In the annexe, 10 tables, from table 22 to table 32, show the codification for each year. The observed policies in the tables and the ones considered in the analysis are not the only drafts that were brought to the UNGA First Committee session. However, these were the ones which vote was requested and recorded.

⁴⁸ SANDELOWSKI, M, "Focus on Research Methods Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Sampling, Data Collection, and Analysis Techniques in Mixed-Method Studies", Chapel Hill, Research in Nursing & Health 2000, 23, 246–255

The second use of the quantitative data is going to respond to see if there are patterns on the votes. This means that the voting results are going to analyse State by State to see if there are states who vote together through the years or if there are years where there seems to be more unanimity than others. Therefore, we are going to analyse the country's votes to find identical patterns.

Finally, complementing this mentioned approach there is also going to be a time comparison to see if there are thematic voting patterns as was suggested in the literature. On the literature, there was found an agreement between scholars that showed that the EU had one voice since the 50s regarding Palestine and the Middle East⁴⁹.

The first qualitative method that is going to be used to complete the results of the quantitative data is the Statements⁵⁰, explanation of vote (EoV) released by the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations - New York. These Statements are going to give information about the motivation behind the vote released by the European States. Therefore, this will be the first contextualization of the quantitative data and will provide some of the clues regarding the one voice construction.

Furthermore, there is going to be a comparison between the voting data with the sponsorships⁵¹ the different EU countries did on different proposes to see which are the common priorities from the states and the EU. Hence, it is going to be contemplated as to how many states and through how many years the policies have been sponsored and to see if there is continuity on the sponsoring.

There is going to be an analysis of the Opening Discourse⁵² made by the Council Presidency at the First Committee where the European Union general ideas on Disarmament and International Security are exposed. The motivation on this part is to compare the issues mentioned with the results to see into which extend the EU has reached to fulfil the one voice in its main issues.

Finally, the interviews are the last qualitative data analysed. These will be realised to understand the one voice construction and to identify who are the actors who take part in the process. Besides, the interviews will also serve as a contextualization of the previous data and will provide more detail into their interpretation. Moreover, the interviews will also be used to identify the external factors that affect the states to facilitate or difficult the one voice construction on the C.1 of the United Nations General Assembly.

An Ambassadors or high-level bureaucrats of Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations in New York, a high-level officer of the Spanish Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation Ministry and an employee of the Spanish Permanent Representation to the European Union will be interviewed. The interviewed people will remain anonymous, that

⁴⁹ LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p. 27

⁴⁹ BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.21

⁵⁰ EU Statements on First Committee issues are available in different webs; therefore, statements and explanation of the vote are going to be taken from two sources. The first one is a web called "Reaching Critical Will" and the second one is the Commission web in the EU at the UN.

⁵¹ This data is also going to be extracted from the Reaching Critical Will data sources and from the UNODA web page. Also, some data has been extracted from the UN Documents and from the UN Digital Library.

⁵² This Statements have been extracted from Reaching Critical Will (2008-2016) and from the EU Delegation in NY web page.

is why they will be referred to as “interviewed 1”, “interviewed 2” and “interviewed 3” in the order mentioned above due to confidentiality and informal questioning.

To finish the data analysis, there is going to be a comparison of all the mentioned data:

- Sponsorships
- Voting reports
- Explanation of Vote

to have a final overview of the evolution and central topics and interest for the EU and analyse and understand which are the difficulties to the homogeneity.

The draft code is the codification selected to classify the different proposals because this code is the one that follows the proposal since it is sponsored until it is approved. This code is:

A/C.1/number of general assembly/L.number

The A refers to the General Assembly, the C.1 to the First Committee, the number of the general assembly to identify the Session (the Sessions from the 63rd to the 73rd are the ones analysed in this paper) and finally the L. code that is an L. with a number that codifies the years' drafts.


4. DATA ANALYSYS: PROCESS CONSTRUCTION.

The process of the policies in a first overlook could be described as 1. Setting the EU priorities; 2. Proposals sponsorships and setting individual priorities; 3. EU meetings in NY; 4. EU opening discourse and main priorities exposed; 5. Voting and 6 Explanation of the vote.

4.1. Brussels, setting the EU priorities

All the United Nations decisions process start in Brussels. As it has been explained by "interviewed 2" who works on the Spanish Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation Ministry, the Brussels process follows the following structure:

FIGURE 3



Source: own construction

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Exterior Action Service (EEAS) are the ones starting the process and the ones who sent the proposals to be analysed. The competent working groups are the ones who start the UN proposals study. The study passes to the Coreper II, which is composed of the 27 or 28 State Representatives to the European Union. After the Coreper II has studied the proposal, this goes to the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). In the FAC, the Foreign Affairs Ministers decide the position the EU has on the different proposal and, they sent them to the New York Representation. There is the option to move this debate to the European Council if the FAC demands it. It normally happens if the debate collapses in the FAC or if the topic is too controversial. In the European Council, the 27 or 28 Head of State analyse the proposals.

Concurrently, in the Political and Security Council (PSC) the debate is addressed. This Committee controls the CFSP and the CSDP. The PSC has other responsibilities, but those are not relevant to the analysis so, there are not mentioned⁵³.

In the PSC, Committee led by the High Representative, the EEAS, and the Ambassadors to the PSC reunite twice a week to monitor and recommend policies and approaches to the situations relating the CFSP and the CSDP which are the supranational competences the EU coordinates.


“Interviewed 3” who works on the Spanish Permanent Representation to the European Union, described the role of the PSC at the United Nations proposals. The PSC does not take part in all the processes or plans. It just acts in the projects related to the most strategic or the yearly priorities for the EU. It is the PSC who, as already mentioned, sets the priority and the strategy and focuses the main areas in which the EU must act or be part. Therefore, the PSC analyses the proposals and sets the specific priorities for the annual UNGA and the Ministerial Meetings at NY.

Moreover, the EU proposals are analysed and strategically decided at the PSC. These sponsorships are sent to the Candidate States who generally join them. An illustration of this is multilateralism that, explained by “interviewed 3”, multilateralism was the 2019 strategic priority and, they released documents and other work deeply on and strengthen the

⁵³ EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Political Security Committee, 2019, [online] available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/political-security-committee/>

multilateralism in all the areas where it can be applied. To summarise, it can be seen that the EU in Brussels sets the priorities and the main proposals. They are produced both in the PSC, in the Coreper II and FAC. In Figure 4 there is illustrated the Brussels process.

FIGURE 4



Source: own construction

4.2.Sponsoring

Probably, even though it is not clear, before moving the debate to New York, the MMSS must decide which draft proposals they are going to sponsor. This part of the study will focus on the analysis of the different drafts sponsored and which are the ones promoted by the EEMM and their continuity. Is important to do this investigation, because this will be interesting to compare the sponsorships with the EU Statements and with the vote results.

Moreover, the number of policies and their theme will show the main interest of the EU. Also, it is important to recall the fact that the European Union and its MMSS do not back drafts on its own. There are probably will to be more countries sponsoring the proposals that are not going to be analysed because they are not the Member States.

In the annexe, there are the tables showing the different supported drafts. It is clear when looking at tables 9 to 19 that the States who tend to sponsor more policies are Austria and Ireland. Also, Poland, Italy and Sweden, as well as the Austria and Ireland are the States who tend to promote more policies alone, or at least without any other MMSS.

Looking at those tables it can be seen that the nations do not always furtherance the same draft in all the Sessions. There might be changes that can be justified or not. There are years where Greece has not backed any policy as in 2012 or Malta in 2012 and 2013. So, it does not appear as there is any strong time pattern in sponsoring a proposal. It seems like it depends on the countries interest that year or in the modifications done to the text.

In the footnotes of tables 9 to 19 are the names of the draft's the L. code refers to. In grey, there are highlighted the policies that reached the sponsorship of all the MMSS that it is the same as saying that it acquired the EU sponsoring. In the following table, there is a compilation of the different drafts all the EU States have supported.

TABLE 1

2008	The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation Transparency in armaments
2009	Transparency in armaments
2010	Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures
2011	Transparency in armaments Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Compliance with non-proliferation
2014	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
2015	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
2018	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty The Arms Trade Treaty

Source: own construction


4.3. New York meetings: looking for the homogenisation

“Interviewed 1” who works on the Spanish Representation to the United Nations in New York explained the functioning of the process in NY. The information they gave is completed by the explanation given by “interviewed 3” from the Brussels perspective.

Once in NY, the work is centred at the EU delegation at the United Nations. There is where all the work is prepared. As has already been mentioned, the EU is not a member of the United Nation. Therefore, it acts through their member states. These speeches can be general statements on a proposal, vote explanations or intention of the vote as well as the opening speech at the General Assembly.

There the meetings are daily. The Delegation and its workers focus on trying to homogenise the different positions – a term used by some of the interviewed. Diplomats exposed that the EU Delegation has a secondary objective that is the promotion of the information-sharing between the Member States. Figure 5 shows the New York process. It is not clear when they do the meetings, but it is believed that the coordination meetings take place during the discussion of the proposals. As mentioned by "interviewed 3", these meetings in NY is daily. That is why the EU speech in the opening Assembly and the meetings are parallel in the figure.

FIGURE 5



Source: own construction

There are meetings at the EU Delegations where the different Ambassadors who oversee the C.1 participate and try to reach understandings in different topics or at least share their opinions on the various proposals. As was mentioned in the literature analysis and observed for many scholars, there are never general agreements between all the members and in all the topics. There are the ministerial meetings, where the Foreign Affairs ministers reunite with the High Representative. They can reunite with non-EU Foreign Ministers to tackle important topics that are discussed at the UNGA.

Whenever there is a strong agreement, the EU Delegation publishes a statement and reads it at the Assembly. These documents explain the main reasons why the EU decided its vote. However, many of the EU Statements are from policies that end up not being voted at the General Assembly. Most of the statements are approved beforehand at the C.1 meetings. This vote explanation can be released before or after the vote. Therefore, they will be analysed afterwards.

It is interesting to perceive that in some of these statements, other States also participate. “Interviewed 1” explained that once the EU Members State decided to publish a Statement, it is first sent to third countries who may also be interested in the Statement and they can join. Once the countries have answered if they want to be part of the Statement, it is read at the UNGA and published.

These last two paragraphs are the introduction of the 4.6. Yet, this is the process where the EoV and the different statements released by the EU Delegation start. And in these meetings also lead to the communication with third states, have been presented in this point.

4.4. EU opening speech, exposing the priorities

The EU makes a Statement at the First Assembly opening. There they expose the different main points the EU has for the First Committee drafts and proposals. The EU also has an opening speech in the opening of the UNGA, that sets the general ideas and goals for all the six committees and the other statements voted at the plenary. In the annexe, in Table 20, there are all the topics mentioned in each of the opening speeches.

Some issues are mentioned in multiple discourses. Table 2 shows these topics to make it more visual the identification of the most important areas for the EU in the 2008 to 2018 period. The 2011 Statement was not found; therefore, this year’s opening speech is not analysed in the paper.

Different people have read these discourses over the years. Before the EU was an observer with speaking rights, the Ambassadors of the countries holding the Presidency of the European Commission were the readers. Since 2011 it is the person in charge of the EU Delegation in New York, a member of the EEAS, who has this privilege.

In Table 2 are the most important topics with the years mentioned explained. In the list below, there are the topics that have been mentioned in at least four discourses are:

- Chemical Weapons
- Multilateralism
- Non-Proliferation Treaty
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
- North Korea
- Iran
- Outer space activities
- Arms Trade Treaty
- Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
- Terrorism

TABLE 2


	2008	2009	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Effective multilateral system	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		x
strategy against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons	X			X	X					
NPT	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	x
Iranian Nuclear program	X		X		X					
Denuclearisation of North Korea	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	
Syria	X				X	X	X	X		X
Fissile material (FMCT)	X	X		X	X					X
Post-START (US and Russia)	X			X					X	X
Treaty banning the short and medium-range missiles	X									
Biological Weapons	X		X							
Chemical Weapons Convention	X			X	X	X	X		X	X
SALW	X	X	X	X						
Fight against Terrorism	X				X			X		X
Hague Code of Conduct	X	X	X					X	X	
Outer space	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		
Universalization of the treaties	X									
Human consequences of cluster munitions	X									
Anti-personnel mines	X		X							
Illicit trade in ammunition	X							X		
Transparency	X	X				X				
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy		X	X	X		X				
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Regional security										
BTWC			X	X	X			X		X
Arms Trade Treaty			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Conference on disarmament			X		X					
Convention on cluster munitions			X	X				X		
Middle East				X	X		X			X
Ukraine						X				
Fact Finding Mission						X	X			X
Humanitarian, socio-economic and security impact of conventional weapons and its use						X				
Empowerment of women							X			
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action								X	X	X
Nuclear and radiological security								X		
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention								X		
Responsible state behaviour in cyberspace								X		
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty									X	X
Improving and strengthening stability in cyber space										X

Source: own construction

4.5. Voting

After the Assembly has opened the voting starts. In the General Assembly, the representants vote the drafts and proposals that the First Committee – who prepares the drafts and the proposals- has discussed. So, it can be affirmed that at the UNGA, the States vote the work previously done by the C.1. Figure 6 graphically shows it.

FIGURE 6



Source: Own Construction

The First Committee as a working Committee also votes the work they have done. After, States can explain their choices. They can do as many statements as they want. The EU usually makes some. However, the process on the C.1 is quite occult. Because of this, the analysis does not follow the votes and the work done there. If the policy is approved without a vote, the draft proposal is normally also passed to the General Assembly. There are seasons who only study the drafts related to the First Committee work, that is what we have referred to as the C.1.

Therefore, it will be done to analyse the voting records of the General Assembly on the First Committee. The following table exposes the % of unanimity from the voting records. In the unanimity are just considered the policies which vote was recorded, not the ones passed by consensus. In the Assembly, proposals can be voted separated, some articles and the whole proposal. In those cases, separated votes are also considered.

In the analysis the proposals passed without a vote are not included.

TABLE 3

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012⁵⁴	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
%	67,5%	63%	60%	74%	38%	71%	58,3%	46,3%	65,6%	44,4%	44,2%

Source: Own Construction

2011 is the year with the highest coordination with 74%. Contrary, 2012 has the lowest. This can be explained with Bulgaria and the UK missing some votes, the missing votes were not considered. Contrary, the votes that were not submitted but the State informed the Secretary have been accounted.

There will be more focus on trying to understand the decrease of unanimity shown in the table. It started in 2014 when it declined from 71% to 46,3% and in 2017 when the reduction also represents a 20% from 65,6% in 2016 to 44,4%.

Furthermore, Table 4 exhibits the countries that voted the same in all the proposals. As explained in the methodology, this is an important analysis to understand if there are countries that act together following the EU's voice or if they behave as MMSS or to identify those States who can follow other interest when voting. The Table tells that in 2009, 15 countries voted the same. In 2008, there was a group of 9 and in 2013, there were 6. However, since 2013 this pattern seems to decrease. In 2018, there were no coincidences. One of the hypotheses followed the idea that since the Lisbon Treaty, there was a stronger EU voice on International Security issues. The Treaty was established in 2010 and, as seen in the table, that is when the groups started to diminish.

⁵⁴ UK and Bulgaria were not present in some votes and they did not inform the Secretary of their voting will. Therefore, the results shown in the table represent the unanimity without considering these 2 countries position when there were not there, 14 of 37. If considering all the 27 States to vote unanimously, the result is 10 of 37 and the 27%.

TABLE 4

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
2008	0	3	9	0	0	9	2	9	0	0	2	9	9	0	2	0	2	9	0	0	9	3	0	9	9	3	0	0
2009	3	15	15	0	3	15	0	15	3	0	15	15	15	0	15	15	2	15	3	15	2	15	3	15	15	15	3	0
2010	0	3	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	0	0	3	2	0	0	
2011	4	6	6	0	2	8	6	8	2	0	2	8	8	4	2	8	8	6	4	2	8	6	0	6	2	8	4	0
2012	3	3	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	0	4	4	3	3	0	0	2	0	0	3	2	0	0
2013	0	2	2	2	0	4	6	4	2	0	6	3	4	2	0	4	6	2	2	6	6	3	0	6	2	3	0	0
2014	0	0	2	0	2	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	0
2015	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
2016	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	3	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
2017	0	0	2	4	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	4	4	0	0
2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: own construction

When asked, “interviewed 1” exposed that coordination is was a casualty. There is no well-defined coordination between the states to act as a block. "Interviewed 1" exposed that this can respond to different reasons. These reasons are the principal interests and characteristics of every State's foreign policy. As European countries, they all share similar opinions and views in some of the proposals and they may share the same threats and dangers. Therefore, it can be affirmed that these are a casualty. "Interviewed 1" claimed that the EU countries single common characteristic was being a European Union member.

In Table 5, there is the table with the MMSS code replacing the numbers. There, it is obvious that many countries can have a lot of similarities or who try to coordinate. HR is in red crosses from 2008-2012 because these years it was not a MMSS. Anyway, the counties which seem to follow a pattern are first of all France and the United Kingdom. These countries do not have the same voting trim as any of the other States. They are also the ones who tend to follow less the voting model exposed by the EU.

The neutral states – Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Sweden- tend to act together. Contrary, the NATO Members also lead to common positions. “Interviewed 1” revealed that being a NATO State or not, is just another characteristic that helps the country construct their opinion. Hence, this is not the only characteristic that builds the argumentation for the voting results.

Moreover, other states who seem more united are Latvia and Estonia, Luxembourg and Belgium. Sometimes Slovenia, Denmark and Slovakia join. Looking at the table, there are no other countries that appear to follow the pattern.

What also catches the eye is the construction of this big groups that are constituted by 9 or 15 states in the years before the Lisbon Treaty and, how after it the groups decreased. 2 exceptions are 2011 and 2014 with groups with more than 6 MMSS.

Table 6 reveals that the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Spain are the states who tend to be part of the larger groups and who participate in this coalitions for a more prolonged period.

As an outline, the Table proves that the years where there is a higher % of unanimity there is also a bigger group on the voting results. Therefore, it can be affirmed that when there are fewer differences between the States, the unanimity increases. As a reflex, in 2011, the consensus reached its highest point marking 74% and, that was the year where more countries took part in an association. There were a group of 8, one of 6, one of 4 and there were 3 groups of 2. However, in 2009 there was the largest group with 15 MMSS. Contrary, in 2012, the voting gatherings reduced to small minimums having 16 states following no pattern. That was also the year whit a lower %. In 2018 % and the grouping decreased more. It must be said that this correlation between the voting grouping and unanimity is not perfect. 2016, is an example of this imperfection with 65% of unanimity but with fewer and smaller groups.

TABLE 5

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	
'08		PT ES	CZ EE EL HU LU PL SK SI	X		BE EE EL HU LU PL SK SI	LT	CZ BE EL HU LU PL SK SI			IT	CZ BE EE HU LU PL SK SI	CZ BE EE EL LU PL SK SI		DE		DK	CZ BE EE EL HU LU PL SK SI			CZ BE EE EL HU LU SK SI	BE ES		CZ BE EE EL HU LU PL SI	CZ BE EE EL HU LU PL SK	BE PT			
'09	MT SE	BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	BE CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	X	FI RO	BE BG EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES		BE BG CZ DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES		CY RO	BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES		BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES		PL	BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	AT SE		BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	LV	CY FI	BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	BE BG CZ EE DE EL HU IT LV LU NL PT SK SI ES	AT MT		
'10		LU SI	DK PT	X		LV LT	BG PT				EL DE NL	DE NL	MT			CZ LT	CZ LV	BE SI	IE	HU	ES	BG DK			BE LU	PL			
'11	IE MT SE	BG DK LU PT SK	BE DK LU PT SK	X	FI	EE EL HU LV LI PL ES	BE BG LU PT SK	CZ EL HU LV LI PL ES		CY	NL	CZ EE HU LV LI PL ES	CZ EE EL LV LI PL ES	AU MT SE	SI	CZ EE EL HU LV LI PL ES	CZ EE EL HU LV LI PL ES	BE BG DK PT SK	AU IE SE	DE	CZ EE EL HU LV LI ES	BE BG DK LU SK		BE BG DK LU PT	IT	CZ EE EL HU LV LI PL	AU IE MT		
'12	IE MT	LU SI		X		HU LV LI							CZ HU LI	AU MT		CZ HUI	CZ HU LV	BE SI	AU IE		ES				BE LU	PL			
'13		LU SI	SI	FI		EE HU LV	DE LI NL PL SK	CZ HU LV	HR		DK LI NL PL SK	PT ES	CZ EE LV	MT		CZ EE HU	DK DE NL PL SK	BE	IE	DK DE LI PL SK	DK DE LI NL SK	EL ES		DK DE LI NL PL	BE LU	EL PT			
'14			SI		EL	SK	LV				PL	CY				EE			SE		DE			DK	BG		MT		
'15		LU				LI	SK	LV			NL					EE	CZ	BE		DE				DK					
'16	MT	IT						LV ES					PL		BE	EE ES		NL	AT	LU	HU						EE LV		
'17			PT	SK SI ES		LI		LV								EE	CZ					BG DK		CH SI ES	CH SK ES	CH SK SI			
'18																													

Source: own construction

4.6.Explanation of vote

As it has been explained before, these statements tend to be created before voting. The EU ones tend to be prepared in the EU Meetings with all the MMSS Ambassadors and send to the Third States to see if they want to joint. Commonly the States who are enlargement candidates tend to align with the EU.

Through these documents, Nations have the opportunity to speak up about the motivation of their vote. These are called the explanation of vote (EoV). This data is important for the study to see the policies on which there are EoV and the groups in which they deliver them. The European Union tends to read and release them before the vote is processed. In them, they justify what they intend to do and why. Contrary, the MMSS share them after the vote. This is why these documents analysis follows the vote observation. Table 6 shows the EoV and their result. In red, there are the EoV that explain the vote against the draft. In yellow the ones that justify the abstention and in green the ones who motivate the vote in favour.

The Table shows that some countries publish more Statements than others. The ones who use more this instrument are the United Kingdom, France and Sweden. Nevertheless, some countries do not deliver any. Some webs have this information codified and, they know how many EoVs were released and who produced them. On constructing this paper these databases have been used as a guide. But not all the Statements are public anymore. It seems like overtime, States stopped publishing the EoV, they just read them on the UNGA. In the annexe, there is Table 21 that shows the missing EoV. Those EoVs opinions can be deduced by the voting report. However, by not looking at their content there is information ignored as if it speaks for other MMSS or not.

Looking at Table 6, there can be identified as multiple *. This represents the common Statements of the United Kingdom, France and the United States. There are many drafts on which they act together. Even in some, they refer to themselves as Security Council members. However, this is not the only characteristic they share. They are NATO founders and Nuclear States. In 2015, the 5 permanent members of the Security Council released an EoV on L.13 this is market in the table with a **.

The L.19 in 2012 has the code AUS+, referring to Australia and others. This is because Australia read the EoV in the name of several EU Member States. These States were: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

Following the same logic, in 2014's L.63 the United States statement talked in behalf of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – 21 MMSS-.

Sweden's EoVs are joint with Switzerland since 2015. Austria's EoV tends to share the position of Ireland (69/L.16), but also the one of Malta (68/L.6) and Sweden (65/L.10) (69/L.44). This means that the Neutral countries usually share the same argumentation and the same voting

On Table 7, there are displayed the different EoV where an EU MMSS spoke in the name of other MMSS. In the Table, there are just exposed the MMSS, but they might be other non-MMSS who also shared the Statements. The red cross represents the State that submitted the EoV. The codes are established through the draft coding. This is why before the L. code there are the Session numbers. The 65 refers to 2010; the 67 to 2012; the 68 to 2013; the 69 to 2014; the 70 to 2015; the 71 to 2016, the 72 to 2017 and finally the 73 to the 2018 Session.

TABLE 7

	AT	BE	BG	CH	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
65/L.10	X													X					X								X	
65/L.35							X				X									X	X						X	
67/L.19	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
67/L.49								X			X							X		X				X		X		
68/L.6		X																		X								
68/L.6	X													X					X									
68/L.6			X		X						X											X	X		X	X		
69/L.12		X		X		X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X		X	X			X			X	
69/L.16	X													X														
69/L.44		X		X		X	X	X			X		X		X	X	X	X		X	X			X				
69/L.44	X													X					X								X	
69/L.44			X		X				X		X											X	X			X		
70/L.37		X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
70/L.38		X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
70/L.40		X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
71/L.41		X	X			X	X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
72/L.41								X	X			X									X			X				
73/L.14			X								X											X				X		
73/L.14		X		X		X	X	X				X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X			

Source: own construction

In the Table, it can be seen that France and the United Kingdom did not share any EoV with the rest of the MMSS aside from the EU ones and the EoV submitted by the United States. Sweden stopped sharing Statements with the rest of the EU MMSS in 2015, that is when it started delivering them with Switzerland. The EoV released by Switzerland were not analysed, so there might be more documents were these two countries spoke together. However, it is interesting that Switzerland and Sweden tend to publish the Statement in the name of the two countries, so they talk unitedly and not in the name of the other.

Further, the Table shows that there are many EoV where most States take part in. Austria, Ireland, Malta and Sweden tend to not be part of those because they habitually make them together. Cyprus and Finland are the nations that integrate on less jointly EoV, they participate in different combinations, but there is no explicit model. Finally, Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal and Spain seem to have a lot of nexus being fixed members in their EoV. Apart from

the mentioned groups, it does not resemble that there is any solid or apparent pattern that reproduces.

Besides, it is also interesting to see that those EoV are usually presented by the same states. The ones who read the Statements in the name of other MMSS more frequently are Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland and Spain. Moreover, in the 70th Session, Germany's Statements spoke in the name of the same 19 other MMSS.

To conclude, even if it is not going to be taken into account afterwards, the Third States who tend to be more present in those EoV released by MMSS are Albania, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Montenegro, Turkey, Liechtenstein and Japan.

4.7.Data analysis

Nonetheless, this analysed data needs to be put in its context. That is why a historical analysis of the different procedures will be realized. By historical analysis, it is mean the comparison of the different areas to understand if there are more coordination and similarities between the states than what did “Interviewed 1” said.

In Table 8, different policies had the vote recorded. The red represents that in that year, the EU Member States had voted unanimously in the proposal. In grey are highlighted those drafts that received an EoV that Session, the ones that were sponsored by some MMSS or that that policy was mentioned in the Session opening speech. In the first line, there is the year and in the second one, the code. If a proposal does not have red or grey in any of the 10 periods, this is not analysed. These proposals are:

- Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2020
- Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
- Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World

In this analysis, the only results that have been used are the votes of the draft as a whole. The proposals that do not have grey or red are not going to be considered. The unanimity is exposed in the annexe – tables 22 to 32-, the EoV in tables 6 and 7 and the sponsoring in table 1 and tables 9 to 19 of the annexe.

The different proposals will be considered depending on their vote results through the years. First, there is going to be the proposals that have never reached unanimity, after the ones who have experienced changes and finally the ones who have received full support, full abstention or full negativity from the MMSS.

If a proposal acquires an important amount of EoVs, sponsors or/and it has been mentioned multiple times through the years, this data is going to be presented in bullet points to make the comprehension of the proposal analysis easier to understand. Said bullet points can be constructed following a yearly explanation, following the action of the different States or following the different documents' logic. This would be done by separating the EoV data from the sponsoring and the opening speeches. If the draft has not had much activity or it has just been voted on one or two years, the consideration will be made on a solo text.

TABLE 8

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
A/C.1/	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee				L.15							
2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee								L.4/ Rev1			
Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments	L.32/R ev1			L.47/R ev1			L.45			L.7	
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty	L.55	L.47/R ev1	L.48	L.37	L.43	L.29/R ev1	L.56	L.46	L.28	L.42	L.26
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	L.7	L.24	L.5	L.25	L.52	L.49	L.27	L.32	L.13	L.10/R ev1	L.4
Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures	L.36		L.36								L.35
Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament			L.35							L.33	L.16
Convention on Cluster Munitions								L.49/R ev1	L.22	L.41	L.39
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	L.15	L.20	L.26	L.46	L.25	L.21	L.16	L.21	L.10	L.47	L.44
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	L.9	L.29	L.6	L.27	L.53	L.52	L.30	L.34	L.16	L.13/R ev1	L.6
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	L.5		L.42		L.28		L.22		L.33		L.52
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security	L.45								L.17	L.44	L.27/R ev1
Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium	L.26		L.19		L.16		L.43		L.63		L.12
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	L.37		L.10		L.4/ Rev1						
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East		L.3									L.1
Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world								L.40	L.36	L.17	L.62
Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons		L.6		L.3		L.11		L.23		L.45/R ev1	
Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament						L.6/ Rev1	L.44	L.15	L.64		L.14
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	L.19	L.51	L.50	L.42	L.9	L.26	L.23	L.51	L.42	L.57	L.57/R ev1
Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2020											L.66
Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space											L.54
High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament					L.19						
Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons								L.37	L.23	L.5	L.23
Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons								L.38	L.24		
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction							L.63	L.27/R ev1	L.61/R ev1	L.26/R ev1	L.20
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction	L.6	L.53	L.8	L.4	L.8	L.3	L.5/ Rev1	L.50	L.7/ Rev1	L.40	L.53/R ev1
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace		L.6		L.5		L.13		L.18		L.29	
Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol	L.25		L.12		L.15		L.38		L.43		L.17
Missiles	L.27										L.10

National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology						L.31			L.58		
No first placement of weapons in outer space							L.14	L.47	L.18	L.53	L.51
Nuclear disarmament	L.14	L.48	L.22	L.49		L.36	L.31/R ev1	L.44	L.47	L.18	L.28
Nuclear disarmament verification									L.57/R ev1		L.31
Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	L.40	L.31	L.24		L.45		L.10	L.35	L.31	L.28	
Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control								L.7			
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities		L.49	L.49/R ev1		L.24		L.48		L.9		L.55
Prevention of an arms race in outer space	L.4	L.25	L.2	L.14	L.3	L.41	L.3/Rev1	L.3	L.3	L.3	L.3
Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	L.12			L.24			L.7			L.9	
Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation	L.20	L.13	L.15	L.8	L.18	L.17	L.39		L.45	L.32	L.15
Reducing nuclear danger	L.16	L.18	L.27	L.45	L.27	L.20	L.18	L.20	L.11	L.22	L.43
Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	L.58	L.36									
Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region											L.30
Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations					L.46	L.34	L.21	L.13/R ev1	L.41	L.6	
The Arms Trade Treaty		L.38/R ev1		L.50		L.4	L.32/R ev1	L.54	L.29	L.27	L.8/Rev1
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation	L.38		L.45		L.23		L.25		L.5		L.25
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects	L.57	L.42/R ev.1									L.63
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	L.2	L.4	L.3	L.2	L.2	L.2	L.2/Rev1	L.2	L.2/Rev1	L.2	L.2
Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2015							L.57				
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	L.30	L.54	L.25	L.31/R ev1	L.13	L.18	L.12/R ev1	L.41/R ev1	L.35	L.19	L.64
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities	L.44/R ev1		L.38								L.68/R ev1
Transparency in armaments	L.51	L.50		L.29	L.22	L.30			L.21		
Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices			L.33	L.40/R ev1	L.41			L.25		L.50	L.58
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons											L.24
Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)		L.23									
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons			L.43	L.41	L.49	L.43	L.36	L.26	L.26	L.35	L.54
Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World								L.52/R ev1			L.46
Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control							L.47				

Source: own construction

4.7.1 No unanimity

Convening the 4th special session on disarmament in 2010 had strongly opposite opinions. France, UK and US voted against and Italy and Denmark – who spoke on behalf of Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden- supported the session.

Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons system is voted every 2 years. An EoV explaining the vote against of France, UK and the US was released in 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014.

- In 2008, Belgium exposed its EoV in favour and Lithuania its abstention. And in 2016, Austria, Ireland and Sweden sponsored it
- In 2018, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden supported it.

The *Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium* is another controversial topic between the MMSS.

- UK, France and the US have explained its negative vote in 2008, 2012 and 2014.
- In 2010, Austria, Germany and Belgium exposed its reasons to vote in favour. - Germany also did one in favour in 2014 and 2016 it did one for its abstention.
- In 2016, the EoV in support were from Netherlands and Sweden, who repeated in 2018.

The *Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world*

- Was sponsored by Austria and Ireland in 2015 when the UK, France and US in one hand and Germany in the other, read their statements on why they voted against and Sweden read its EoV on its abstention. Germany spoke in the name of all the EU MMSS except from the Austria, Ireland, UK, France, Sweden and Malta.
- In 2016, 2017 and 2018 the sponsors also were Austria and Ireland.
- In 2017 and 2018 the UK with France and the US also explained why they voted against.

The *Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament*,

- In the 2013 EoV showed all the possible views.
 - France, UK and the US voted against as well as the Netherlands- in name of Belgium-
 - Ireland- also sharing the view of Austria and Malta- voted in favour
 - Spain – speaking in name of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia- abstained.
- In 2015, the UK with its group and the Netherlands also exposed in the EoV the motives for their negative vote as well as in 2018- Netherlands spoke in the name of 14 MMSS (73/L.14).
- In 2018, Bulgaria spoke in name of Greece, Portugal and Spain to justify their abstention.

The follow-up on the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons has had the EoV of Sweden explaining its vote in favour in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2014.

The further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space was voted in 2017 and France, released an EoV explaining its vote against it.

The High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, was voted in 2012 Australia as explained in the EoV explanations was the one reading in the name of different MMSS and the UK explained why they abstained.

Humanitarian consequences of Nuclear Weapons, was sponsored by the Neutral countries in the four voting reports of the period. Cyprus only furtherance it in 2016. In 2014 it was mentioned at the EU opening speech.

The humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons was sponsored by Austria, Ireland and Malta in 2015.

Nuclear disarmament. In 2011, the Netherlands and Germany exposed the motivations after they voted against it. In 2017 Austria and Ireland sponsored the proposal. Only the neutral states voted abstention on the proposal. Not all 5 states abstained in all the votes.

The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. In 2009, the UK released an EoV explaining its negative vote and in 2010 and 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 France and the US joined the UK on another EoV in the same direction. In 2015, Austria and Ireland furtherance the proposal and in 2016, Portugal joined them on the promotion.

The *Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation* is one of the most repeated topics on the opening speeches of the EU. All states voted in favour of it in the 9 voting records with the exception of the UK who has never released an EoV explaining why it has always abstained.

A related proposal, *Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations*, had diverse approaches.

- In 2012, the UK with the US and France realised a statement exposing their vote against.
- In 2013, it was sponsored by Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands and 2015,2016 and in 2017 it was sponsored by Austria, Ireland and Malta.
- The UK presented one on its vote against jointly with France and the US in 2013 and 2014 by France. The three states also submitted one in 2015.
- In 2015, Cyprus explained in an EoV its abstention and.
- In 2016, Sweden exposed an EoV in favour of the proposal and the Netherlands did one on its abstention and Poland-spoke on behalf of 14 MMSS (71/L.41)
- In 2016, the UK, France and the US did an EoV explaining their vote against and Sweden did one describing its vote in favour of the proposal.

The *Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2015* received an EoV of France, UK and the United States on their abstention.

The *Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)* was voted in 2009 and the UK on its own released a statement explaining why they voted in favour.

The proposal *Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments* also had a diverse approach through the years.

- In 2008 was sponsored by Sweden. In 2009, 2010 and 2011 it was joined by Ireland.
- In 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 Ireland supported it alone.
- In 2016, and 2018 it was supported by Austria and Ireland.
- Regarding the EoV, in 2010, the UK released one on its abstention.
- In 2012 it was the UK and France separately who released them. That same year, the Netherlands exposed a favourable vote.
- Finally, 2013, 2014 and 2015 UK, France and the US released one on their negative vote.

The *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* was just voted in 2018 when it got the support of Austria and Ireland. That year the UK, France and the US exposed the motives after their negative vote.

4.7.2 Changes on unanimity

The *Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East* was voted twice. Even though it was not mentioned in any document, it obtained unanimity in its first voting in 2009. However, the second time it was voted in 2018 it did not reach unanimity because the UK voted against.

The *Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. This reached unanimity in 2009, 2011 and 2013. In 2011, the EU exposed why they voted against. That is interesting due to the importance of the TNP for the EU. In 2015, the only MMSS that did not vote against was Italy who abstained. In 2017, Austria, Finland and Italy abstained while the others voted against.

No first placement of weapons in outer space was voted between 2014 and 2018. It reached unanimity in the first 4 votes but in 2018, some states voted against. In 2014, 2015 and 2017 the EU released a Statement on the abstention. In 2018, they exposed that the EU could not support the motion.

The *Missiles* draft in 2018 reached it in favour. However, in 2008 France explained its vote against it while most of the other states abstained or voted against.

In *the renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons* vote in 2008 was unanimous in support but in 2009 France abstained.

- In 2008 it was sponsored by Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany and Luxembourg
- In 2009, by 14 MMSS.
- Both years, France released an EoV, in 2008 explaining why it voted in favour and in 2009 justifying their abstention.

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is suggested in the literature to be one of the topics in where the EU has a single voice. The 2012, 2013 and 2015 opening speeches mentioned the region. There was unanimity from 2008 to 2013. Those years the EU exposed an EoV explaining its vote in favour of the proposal (2008, 2010 and 2013).

- In 2014, some States started abstaining – Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom, and, they continued doing so.
- In 2015, Luxembourg also started abstaining.
- In 2016, Denmark, Italy and Romania also abstained.
- Therefore, in 2018 just 15 MMSS voted in favour of the proposal.

United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons was voted from 2010 to 2018. It got unanimity in favour till 2014 when some States started abstaining.

- In 2010 it was sponsored by 21 MMSS and in 2009 by 22.
- In 2012, 20 states were encouraging it and France submitted an EoV explaining its positive vote.
- In 2013, France made a similar EoV on the same objective and the proposal was sponsored by 12 MMSS.
- In 2014, France repeated the EoV and 24 States supported the proposal.
- In 2015, 21 States supported the proposal. This year the EoV was released by France explaining the abstention.
- In 2016, the states that did not furtherance were Cyprus, Greece and the United Kingdom.
- In 2017, the EoV of France showed the negative vote and the Sweden one its positive vote. The sponsors that year were 16 MMSS.

- Finally, in 2018 the EoV of Sweden also showed its support on the proposal and France exposed its abstention. The sponsoring that year consisted of 17 states.

4.7.3 Unanimity

The *2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee* and the *2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee* are related to the NPT which has been mentioned in almost every opening speech in the period (2009 and 2014 where the only speeches who did not mention the NPT).

The consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures in 2008, all the states except for Malta sponsored it and in 2010 all the MMSS supported it. In 2018 the only one who did not join the sponsoring was Poland.

Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments is voted every 3 years. In 2008, it was mentioned in the opening speech. In 2014, the draft proposal sponsors were all MMSS except for Austria and Belgium. And in 2011, was an EU sponsored policy.

The *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* is probably one of the most important topics for the EU. This has been mentioned in different opening speeches and multiple states have been supporting the policy in the period -2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2018. It was supported by many States through the years, at least 14 MMSS every year till 2018 when it got the support of all the EU MMSS.

The Convention on cluster munition has been mentioned in many opening speeches. Nonetheless, the UNGA did not vote it till 2014. In 2016, it reached unanimity and in 2017 and 2018, almost half of the MMSS sponsored it.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear weapons had a negative unanimity, all the EU states voted against the draft in the 10 voting records. In 2014, Austria released an EoV explaining its negative vote.

The conventional arms control on the regional and subregional level was supported by Italy in 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 and in 2018. The regional security was also mentioned in the 2016 speech.

The Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security in 2018, got an EoV of the EU explaining the change from the in favour of the previous voting periods to the negative vote that they submitted in that year.

The *Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction* was a proposal mentioned in different opening speeches – 2008, 2010- and in 2016 it was sponsored by Austria and Belgium. In 2017 it had Austria's support and in 2018 Poland's.

The *National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology* was sponsored by the Netherlands both times it was voted at the UNGA.

On the *nuclear disarmament verification*. In 2016, was sponsored by Austria, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom and in 2018, it was sponsored by the Netherlands.

The *Prevention of an arms race in outer space* was mentioned in the opening speeches 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2015.

The *Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons* was sponsored by Poland in 2011 and 2014.

The *Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities* was sponsored by 24 MMSS in 2009 and in 2010 all states sponsored it except Greece, Latvia and the United Kingdom. In 2012, it also had a strong sponsoring by the EU members as well as in 2014, 2016 and 2018 when only the UK did not sponsor it.

Strengthening the security and cooperation in the Mediterranean regions has been a long-time proposal sponsored by different EU states. However, it was not voted in the General Assembly till 2018 when it was sponsored by Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The *Arms Trade Treaty* was mentioned in the 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 opening speeches.

- In 2009, 2011, 2013, Finland and the United Kingdom sponsored it.
- In 2014, all the EU states except from Belgium, Hungary, Malta and Romania promoted it.
- In 2015, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden supported it.
- In 2016, all EU states promoted it except for Greece.
- In 2017, the only who did not urge for its approval were Cyprus, Denmark, Italy and the UK.
- In 2018, all the MMSS furtherance for it.

The *Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation* was mentioned in the 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2017. It was a full supported draft in 2008. In 2010 it was sponsored by France, Hungary and Sweden. In 2012, 19 States sponsored it. In 2014 the only non-sponsoring were Greece and Malta. In 2016 it was Sweden the one who did not sponsor while in 2018 it was the UK.

The *illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (SALW)* is another of the policies most supported by the EU.

- It was mentioned in the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012 opening speeches.
- In 2008, 2009 and 2018 it was sponsored by at least 15EU MMSS.

Transparency in armaments was promoted by different states through the years.

- In 2008, 2009 and 2011 all MMSS
- In 2012, the Netherlands furtherance
- in 2013, 21 MMSS did it.
- In 2016, the only states who did not support it were Belgium, Denmark and Sweden.

The treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was mentioned in the opening discourse of 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2018. In 2017, the Netherlands supported the draft and in 2018 Germany adjoint.

Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control got to the UNGA in 2014. It reached unanimity and Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden supported it

Drafts that reached unanimity even though they were never mentioned in any opening speech, that never were sponsored and that never where mentioned in an EoV.

- *The measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol always reached unanimity.*
- *The Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons*
- *Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control*
- *Reducing the nuclear danger.*
- *Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space.*

5. CONCLUSION

Answering the research question - Has the EU act with a single voice in the United Nations General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) since the Lisbon Treaty? - the response is going to be no. The EU has not acted with a single voice. The process with which the EU tries to homogenize the different MMSS views has strengthened and has incorporated new actors into the game. The EEAS does the hard work to prepare the single voice or at least tries to find the biggest amount of areas where the EU can try to find the consensus.

The different steps studied have different importance. The process is still done in Brussels and New York even though this is quite dark. But it has changed due to the new EEAS who are currently the ones who set the proposals in the PSC and the ones who prepare the FAC meetings. The sponsorships do not matter, seems like the countries do it on their comfort. They seem to promote based on arbitrary reasons and a lot of the times the drafts changes over the years, do not reflect a variation on the position. However, what is obvious is that furtherance the project means voting in favour of it.

The vote is the most important data. The voting unanimity in percentage is the type of analysis the scholars had done, and they had always shared the opinion that the Security issues had lower consensus. This continues to be true. While the other committees lead to having more than 80% of common votes, the C.1 highest percentage in the period is 74% while the lowest is 38%. Sometimes the MMSS voted the same in all the different votes in a UNGA session, though the similarities seem to be a small pattern.

The groups of MMSS voting the same correlates with the unanimity. When there is a higher unanimity percentage, there are more groups. Some of the groups are more temporary than others. Three groups seem to be more stable. These are:

- Neutral States: they tend to follow their path and tend to homogenise their opinions and statements with the United States and the other Security Council Members.
- Nuclear States: they follow a more joint path between themselves even though they also act unilaterally in many proposals. What they usually do is go versus what resembles NATO's action. They tend to vote differently in many projects. Normally, in the EoV, they prove their willingness to be a helpful actor whereas, the nuclear states never expose this wish.
- Southern States (Greece, Portugal and Spain): They seem to have some similarities. This connection is not as explicit as the other groups. But there might be a very interesting gap to study in future studies.

The EoV, in general, served to reaffirm the voting data and to justify or understand the voting groups. These groups were more or less coordinated depending on the statements. As seen, there are many statements released by one State speaking on behalf of others (who can or can't be MMSS). There were not many statements where the countries were only MMSS. Normally candidate countries align themselves to MMSS. Additionally, the fact that many EoVs are not public difficult the study of the grouping. However, as "interviewed 1" said, the group patterns formed in the data analysis are a casualty. Without further evidence, this cannot be firmly affirmed. A good way to find the proof is finding the missing Statements and analyse them. The negative voting or the abstention in some areas did not present reject. Some showed discomfort on the changes or expressed that there was more work needed in the area. Also, some of the proposals have different content than what expected in the title. This is why the vote cannot be judged by the title because some might be misleading.

Lastly, the Middle East approach needs an individual conclusion. Literature exposed that this was the only security topic where there was a single voice constructed. However, data showed that this changed since 2014. The proposals regarding the region became very heterogenic, essentially *the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East*. Some countries voted against, some in favour and other abstaining. Opposite, the proposals where there is more

understanding upon are related to non-proliferation, to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to the arms control, to the chemical weapons and the anti-personnel mine's restriction to the Arms Trade Treaty, to the outer space policies, to the nuclear danger and transparency in all the aspects of the nuclear restriction and in the international security operations.


Hence, the first hypothesis - the EU Member States have increased their cohesion in the First Committee since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect- is false because it did not grow. There are few exceptions but, the tendency after 2010 was depreciating the single voice produced before the Treaty was effective. 2011 was the year where all the exceptions occurred, the unanimity improved to 74% of the votes and 15 States voted unanimously in all the different procedures. So, it can be affirmed that at the beginning, it looked like the Lisbon Treaty would produce changes yet, it did not last.

The second hypothesis suggested that the single voice is impossible due to the presence of Neutral and Nuclear States. It has been claimed through the analysis, that those countries acted antagonistically. The other States joined each group depending on the topic. Still, they followed the EU when agreed. The UK produced the only discrepancy between the EU's will, exposed in the opening speeches, and the results. This difference occurred on the *Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation* draft in the 10 voting periods analysed. Plus, as exposed by "interviewed 3", multilateralism was the 2019 EU's Foreign Policy priority.

Finally, the third hypothesis suggested that the OTAN membership had a tremendous influence on the voting pattern. "Interviewed 1" exposed that it was just another characteristic that did not represent more influence than the others. However, this is false. It appears that it is a more important characteristic than others. As seen, all the EU states except the neutrals tend to follow the same voting scheme in some areas. All the EU Member States are OTAN members except for the Neutral States. Therefore, it seems that this characteristic has an immense influence on the votes in the C.1.

As a brief, there is figure 6 showing the different actors and steps that the EU single voice process has. Everything starts in Brussels. There, the working groups develop the documents and send them to the Coreper II who analyse them. At the same time, the Political and Security Committee prepares the Foreign Affairs priorities. Afterwards, the FAC analyses the documents and, if needed, they sent it to the European Council. Furthermore, the States and the EU settle which drafts they sponsor. Once this process ends, this advances in New York even Brussels has to still make decisions. The New York process starts around at the same time the United Nations General Assembly opens. The EU reads a speech at the UNGA First Committee opening where it presents the main interest for the Organisation. Before voting, they can reveal what they intend to vote, or after the vote, they can release an EoV explaining it. When voting, the unanimity can reveal itself and, it can be proved by analysing the EoV if it exists.

FIGURE 7



Source: own construction

Security is a very secret policy arena. There are no many public reports about the discussions and the meetings acts or a precise list of the main priorities and dangers each States goes through. Moreover, the documents since 2016 started to be less public and transparent. Since then, many States did not publish the EoVs on the internet, so the last years' analysis might be a bit less precise.

Therefore, even though this paper has gone deeper in some of the areas of the gap, the European Union action in the First Committee of the UNGA still has multiple areas to analyse. Firstly, there must be a wider analysis of the lacking documents focusing principally on the EoVs that this paper has not discussed. Secondly, the Middle East change is a fascinating arena to explore and to understand. Further, the grouping creation in both the voting results and the EoVs publishing to comprehend their creation and logic also needs further investigation. Finally, it will be interesting to analyse further the role of the US and NATO. The US has a strong influence in the UK and France as seen in the data analysis, but as the data has also shown that there is a strong duality between being a NATO member, or not. Ergo, the importance of these actors in the First Committee topics is an attractive path to follow.

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ANNEXE

All the tables on this annexe have been constructed for this study using the data exposed in the Methodology.

State codes

The other code used are the acronym of the different EU MMSS used by the European Union.

- Austria: AT
- Belgium: BE
- Bulgaria: BG
- Croatia: HR
- Cyprus: CY
- Czech Republic: CZ
- Denmark: DK
- Estonia: EE
- Finland: FI
- France: FR
- Germany: DE
- Greece: EL
- Hungary: HU
- Ireland: IE
- Italy: IT
- Latvia: LV
- Lithuania: LI
- Luxembourg: LU
- Malta: MT
- Netherlands: NL
- Poland: PL
- Portugal: PT
- Romania: RO
- Slovakia: SK
- Slovenia: SL
- Spain: ES
- Sweden: SE
- United Kingdom: UK

Sponsorships

TABLE 9

2008⁵⁵

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	
L.5																										X		
L.30																											X	
L.32	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.36	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.38	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.51	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.55		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X			X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X		
L.57	X	X	X	X				X	X	X					X	X	X			X	X		X		X	X	X	
L.58	X				X			X		X							X											

TABLE 10

2009⁵⁶

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
L.36	X	X	X	X	X			X		X		X		X		X	X		X				X	X			
L.38 Rev.1								X																			X
L.42 Rev.1	X		X					X	X	X		X	X		X		X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X
L.47 Rev.1	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
L.49	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.50	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.54													X													X	

⁵⁵ L.5 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems; L.30 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.32 Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments; L.36 Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; L.38 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.51 Transparency in armaments; L.55 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.57 The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; L.58 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

⁵⁶ L.36 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.38 Rev1 The arms trade treaty; L.42 Rev.1 The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; L.47 Rev.1 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; L.49 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region; L.50 Transparency in armaments; L.54 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free- world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

TABLE 11

2010⁵⁷

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	
L.25													X													X		
L.36	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.38	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
L.43	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
L.45									X			X														X		
L.48	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.49																												
Rev1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		

TABLE 12

2011⁵⁸

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	
L.24																				X								
L.27														X														
L.29	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
L.31																												
Rev1													X													X		
L.37	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.41	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
L.47																												
Rev1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
L.50									X																		X	

TABLE 13

⁵⁷ L.25 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.36 Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; L.38 Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities; L.43 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.45 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.48 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.49 Rev1 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

⁵⁸ L.24 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament; L.27 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels; L.29 Transparency in armaments; L.31 Rev1 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.37 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.41 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.47 Rev1 Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments; L.50 The arms trade treaty

2012⁵⁹

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
L.13													X													X	
L.22																			x								
L.23	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		
L.24		X	X	X				X	X	X					X	X	X			X		X	X	X		X	
L.43	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.49	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		

TABLE 14

2013⁶⁰

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
L.4									X																			X
L.18														X														
L.29 Rev1	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
L.30	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
L.31																				X								
L.34	X						X							X														
L.43		X		X		X	X						X			X	X	X		X	X		X			X		
L.52															X													

⁵⁹ L.13 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.22 Transparency in armaments; L.23 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L. 24 Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities; L.43 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.49 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

⁶⁰ L.4 The Arms Trade Treaty; L.18 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.29 Rev1 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.30 Transparency in armaments; L.31 National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology; L.34 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.43 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.52 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

TABLE 15

2014⁶¹

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
L.5 Rev1			X		X	X			X					X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		
L.10														X														
L.12 Rev1														X														
L.12	X													X					X						X			
L.25	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.30															X													
L.32 Rev1	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
L.36	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.45			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.47	X		X		X	X	X		X	X				X			X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	
L.48			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.56	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.63																					X							

⁶¹ L.5 Rev1 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; L.10 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas; L.12 Rev1 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.21 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.25 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.30 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels; L.32 Rev1 The Arms Trade Treaty; L.36 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.45 Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments; L.47 Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control; L.48 Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities; L.56 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.63 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

TABLE 16
 2015⁶²

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK		
L.13 Rev1	X													X					X											
L.26		X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		
L.27																					X									
L.34															X															
L.35	X													X																
L.37	X													X					X									X		
L.38	X													X					X											
L.40	X													X																
L.41 Rev1														X																
L.46	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.49 Rev1		X	X	X		X	X			X	X		X	X				X	X	X		X		X	X		X	X		
L.50					X																									
L.54	X						X	X	X			X			X					X		X		X	X	X	X	X		

⁶² L.13 Rev1 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.26 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.27 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; L.34 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels; L.35 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas; L.37 Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; L.38 Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons; L.40 Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world; L.41 Rev1 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.46 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.49 Rev1 Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions; L.50 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; L.54 The Arms Trade Treaty;

TABLE 17

2016⁶³

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
L.5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.7 Rev1	X	X																										
L.9	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.21	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.22	X	X		X		X					X		X	X	X			X	X	X		X		X			X	
L.23	X				X									X					X								X	
L.26	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.28	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.29	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.31	X													X								X						
L.33	X													X													X	
L.35	X													X														
L.36	X													X														
L.41	X													X					X									
L.57 Rev1	X								X				X	X		X		X		X	X					X	X	X
L.58																				X								
L. 61 Rev1																					X							

⁶³ L.5 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.7 Rev1 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; L.9 Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities; L.21 Transparency in armaments; L.22 Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions; L.23 Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; L.26 United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.28 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.31 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas; L.33 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems; L.35 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.36 Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world; L.41 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.57 Rev1 Nuclear disarmament verification; L.58 National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology; L.61/Rev1 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

TABLE 18

2017⁶⁴

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
L.5	X													X					X								X	
L.6	X													X					X									
L.13 Rev1															X													
L.18	X													X														
L.26																					X							
L.27	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.35			X	X		X		X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X			X	X	X	X		X		X
L.40	X																											
L.41	X	X		X		X				X	X		X	X				X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X
L.42	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.50																				X								
L.62	X													X														

⁶⁴ L.5 Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; L.6 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.13 Rev1 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels; L.18 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.26 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; L.27 The Arms Trade Treaty; L.35 United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.40 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; L.41 Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions; L.42 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.50 Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

TABLE 19

2018⁶⁵

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK
L.8	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.20																					X							
L.23	X													X					X								X	
L.24	X													X														
L.25	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.26	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.30	X				X			X						X		X			X	X		X						X
L.31																				X								X
L.35	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
L.39	X	X	X	X		X	X			X	X			X	X			X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	
L.52	X	X							X					X				X	X								X	
L.53	X																											
L.54			X	X		X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X		
L.55	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
L.58											X									X								
L.63	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X	X
L.64	X													X														

⁶⁵ L.8 The Arms Trade Treaty; L.20 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; L.23 Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; L.24 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; L.25 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.26 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.30 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region; L.31 Nuclear disarmament verification; L.35 Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; L.39 Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions; L.52 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems; L.53 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; L.54 United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.55 Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities; L.58 Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; L.62 Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world; L.63 The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; L.64 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

EU statements at the First Assembly opening

TABLE 20

2008	<p>Effective multilateral system</p> <p>Maintaining, implementing and strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strategy against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons - Non-Proliferation Treaty - Iranian Nuclear program - Denuclearisation of North Korea - Undeclared nuclear reactor in Syria - Prohibition of fissile material for nuclear power - Post-START (US and Russia) - Treaty banning the short and medium-range missiles - Biological Weapons - Chemical Weapons Convention - Illicit manufacture, transfer and flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW) <p>Enhance detectability of violation to reinforce compliance and obligations under the multilateral treaty regime</p> <p>Fight against Terrorism</p> <p>Hague Code of Conduct</p> <p>Space activities</p> <p>Universalization of the treaties (non-State actors)</p> <p>Human consequences of cluster munitions</p> <p>Fight against anti-personnel mines</p> <p>Illicit trade in ammunition</p> <p>Transparency</p>
2009	<p>Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty - Regional security posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - Conference on Disarmament of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - Hague Code of Conduct and the Missile Technology Control Regime - SALW <p>Transparency</p>

	<p>Strengthening the multilateral system</p> <p>Peaceful uses of nuclear energy</p> <p>Space activities</p>
2010	<p>Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control together with confidence, transparency and reciprocity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NPT and make it credible (Iran and North Korea) - Conference on disarmament - CD of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty - Hague Code of Conduct - Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons - SALW - Arms Trade Treaty - Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines - Convention on Cluster Munitions <p>Effective multilateralism</p> <p>Peaceful use of nuclear energy</p> <p>Strengthening the security of activities in outer space</p>
2012	<p>New START Treaty</p> <p>Risk of non-state actors (terrorist) gaining access to nuclear weapons</p> <p>Effective multilateralism</p> <p>Strengthening the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regime</p> <p>Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, together with confidence and transparency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NPT and the NPT resolution on Middle East + proliferation challenges of Iran and Korea - FMCT - Chemical Weapons Convention - Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty - Proliferation of missiles with potential to deliver weapons of mass destruction - Arms Trade Treaty - SALW <p>Peaceful use of nuclear energy</p>

	Strengthening the security of activities in outer space
2013	<p>Multilateralism</p> <p>Arms Trade Treaty</p> <p>Chemical Weapons Convention</p> <p>Organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons</p> <p>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention</p> <p>Proliferation challenges</p> <p>Syria and DPRK</p> <p>International Atomic Energy Agency</p> <p>Iran</p> <p>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</p> <p>Middle East</p> <p>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</p> <p>Outer space</p> <p>Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons</p> <p>Conference on disarmament</p> <p>Risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorist</p>
2014	<p>Humanitarian, socio-economic and security impact of conventional weapons and its use</p> <p>Arms Trade Treaty</p> <p>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</p> <p>Ukraine</p> <p>Middle East, Syria and DPRK</p> <p>Peaceful uses of nuclear energy</p> <p>Increasing transparency and trust between countries</p> <p>OPCW</p> <p>Fact Finding Missions</p> <p>Outer Space</p>
2015	<p>Arms Trade Treaty</p> <p>NPT</p> <p>Middle East</p> <p>Syria and the Chemical Weapons</p> <p>Fact Finding Mission</p> <p>Risk of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass-destruction</p> <p>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty + North Korea</p> <p>Multilateral Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities</p> <p>Empowerment of women</p>
2016	<p>Effective multilateralism</p> <p>Gender equality</p>

	<p>NPT</p> <p>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty + North Korea</p> <p>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</p> <p>Chemical weapons in Syria</p> <p>BTWC</p> <p>Risk of terrorist acquiring mass destruction weapons</p> <p>Nuclear and radiological security</p> <p>Certain Conventional Weapons Convention</p> <p>Arms Trade Treaty</p> <p>Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention</p> <p>Safety, security and sustainability of the space environment</p> <p>Convention on Cluster Munition</p> <p>Ballistic missile technology</p> <p>Hague Code of Conduct</p> <p>Responsible state behaviour in cyberspace</p>
2017	<p>Korea's missile launches + NPT</p> <p>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</p> <p>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</p> <p>Hague Code of Conduct</p> <p>SALW</p> <p>Chemical Weapons</p> <p>Arms Trade Treaty</p> <p>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)</p> <p>START</p>
2018	<p>Upholding the integrity of the rules-based international system with effective multilateralism as a key principle and the United Nations at its core.</p> <p>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</p> <p>Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention</p> <p>Fact Finding Mission</p> <p>Syria</p> <p>BTWC</p> <p>Improving and strengthening stability in cyber space</p> <p>NPT</p> <p>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</p> <p>Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty</p> <p>Zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East</p> <p>New START Treaty</p> <p>INF</p>

	SALW Arms Trade Treaty
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Explanation of vote – Missing statements

TABLE 21

2008	L.26	NL			
	L.30	FR	UK		
	L.37	IT			
	L.45	EU			
2009	L.4	EU			
	L.23	FR			
2010	L.10	SL			
	L.35	SL	ES		
2011	L.27	PL			
	L.40	SL			
	L.49	FR/UK			
	L.51	ES			
2012	L.2	EU			
	L.16	BE	NL		
	L.19	FR	IT		
	L.41/Rev1	FR			
	L.46	SK	BE		
	L.58	ES			
2013	L.26	SE			
	L.34	PT			
2015	L.11	FR*	DE		
	L.13/Rev1	DE			
	L.15	BU	SE		
	L.23	FR*			
	L.27	US+ (possible)			
	L.37	FI			
	L.38	FI			
	L.49	PL	LV		

	L.52/Rev1	AU	UK		
2016	L.22	PL	LV	CY	
	L.23	FR*			
	L.24	FR*			
	L.36	FR*			
	L.41	FR	DE		
	L.63	BE	FR*	NL	DE
	L.64	BU			
	L.66	FR*			
2017	L.6	FI			
	L.26	US+ (possible)	FR		
	L.35	NL	AU		
2018	L.1	UK			
	L.12	BE	UK*	NL	
	L.20	FR			
	L.24	BU	SE		
	L.46	UK*			
	L.52	UK*			
	L.53/Rev1	DE			
	L.54	UK	AU		
	L.57	SE			
	L.64	UK*			
	L.66	UK*			

Voting report tables

TABLE 22
2008

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=	
Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27
Prevention of an arms race in outer space	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54

Chemical Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Nuclear disarmament	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	
Reducing nuclear danger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	11	
Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non proliferation	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	26

Transparency in armaments p4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Transparency in armaments p5b	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Transparency in armaments p5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Transparency in armaments p7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Transparency in armaments	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects p4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects p13	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East pre 6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54

TABLE 23
2009

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=	
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	25	
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	
Prevention of an arms race in outer space	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pro 6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non proliferation	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	26	
Reducing nuclear danger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52	
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas P7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	52	
Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	50
Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	53	
Arms Trade Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects P4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects P15	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Nuclear disarmament	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	
Transparency in armaments 3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Transparency in armaments 4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Transparency in armaments 5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Transparency in armaments 6d	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Transparency in armaments 6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Transparency in armaments 8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Transparency in armaments	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	11
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	53	

TABLE 24
2010

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=		
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	
Prevention of an arms race in outer space	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels par. 2	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	36	
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	30		
Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non proliferation	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	26	
Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	37	
Nuclear disarmament p15	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	49
Nuclear disarmament	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4
Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas p5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	52
Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	52
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments P12	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	53
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	51
Reducing nuclear danger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament p3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	52	
Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	52		
Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures p6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems p1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	46		
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	43	
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p9	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54

TABLE 25
2011

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=	
Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	25	
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	
Prevention of an arms race in outer space	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	

TABLE 26
2012

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=	
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	24

Prevention of an arms race in outer space	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	x	50	
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	2	1	x	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	x	29
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	x	50
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	2	0	x	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	x	11	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments p11	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	50
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	48
Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52
Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium	2	2	x	2	1	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	36	

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non proliferation	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	25	
High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	49	
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities p12,	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities P13	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52
Reducing nuclear danger	0	0	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems p8	2	2	x	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	0	42
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	2	2	x	2	1	2	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	0	40
Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52

Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52	
Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	48
Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non proliferation	2	2	x	2	1	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	0	39	
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p2	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52	
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p8	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52	
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p9	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52	
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p16	2	2	x	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52	
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels p2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	33	
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	
Transparency in armaments	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54	

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East p5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 6p	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty pre6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54

TABLE 27
 2013

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	26
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	28
Prevention of an arms race in outer space	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The Arms Trade Treaty p1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The Arms Trade Treaty p3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The Arms Trade Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	13

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments p9	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	54		
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments p11	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	54	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	52		
Reducing nuclear danger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	12	
Transparency in armaments pre6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Transparency in armaments pre7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56

Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	52	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments Preamble	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	54
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments P9	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	54
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments P11	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	54
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	52
Reducing nuclear danger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non proliferation	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	0	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	0	43	
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems p8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	50

Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	48	
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	13
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels p2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	35	
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Nuclear disarmament p16	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	52
Nuclear disarmament	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4
The Arms Trade Treaty p. 3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The Arms Trade Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p11	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p17	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56

TABLE 29
2015

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=	
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	26

Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	14		
Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementing of nuclear disarmament commitments p13	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	53	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	31
Nuclear disarmament P16	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	53
Nuclear disarmament	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4
Convention on Cluster Munitions	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	50
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	13

Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World	2	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	14
The Arms Trade Treaty P3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The Arms Trade Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East preamble 5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East preamble 6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	46
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty p6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56

TABLE 30
2016

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=	
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	28
Prevention of an arms race in outer space	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
No first placement of weapons in outer space	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	28
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities P8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56

Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems pre8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	53		
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	51	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments p-14	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	54	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	16	
Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	
Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	13	

Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	13	
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East preamble 5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56	
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East preamble 6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56	
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	43
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty p4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56	
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty p5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56	
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56	

TABLE 31
2017

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=	
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	27
Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments p22	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	11	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	12
Reducing nuclear danger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction preamble	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56	
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction p2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56	
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction p15	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56	

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	9
Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East p5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East p6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	43
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty p4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty p5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56

TABLE 32
 2018

	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE	UK	=
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Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	54
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	28
Prevention of an arms race in outer space	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
No first placement of weapons in outer space	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	21	
Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	28
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels p2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	32
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The Arms Trade Treaty Pre	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56

Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction Pre 4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction P2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction P3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56

United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons P10	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	51	
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons P12	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	52
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons P13	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	54
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons p18	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	53
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 20	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons P 21	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons P31	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	53

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	11
Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world 11pre	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	13
Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects pre 7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects p6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	56
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments pre 4	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	36

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments pre12	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	10	
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments p13	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	34
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments p15	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	52
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments p24	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	10
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	11

