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## “In-group bias in preferences for redistribution: a survey experiment in Italy”

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## *Abstract*

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Using a new survey and experimental data, we investigate how information on inequality and immigration affect preferences for redistribution in Italy. Our randomized treatments show that preferences for redistribution are often inelastic to information. However, we find that provision of information on poverty statistics related to the native-immigrant composition of poverty reduces economic in-group bias by affecting exclusionary redistributive preferences: respondents are less likely to support policies which exclude immigrants from access to the welfare state once they learn that immigrants are less represented among the poor and natives are not as poor as they used to believe. Finally, we find some evidence of in-group bias by investigating the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects across groups.

*JEL classification:* D72, D91, H2, H23, H41.

*Keywords:* Redistribution, Survey, Perceptions, Immigration, Inequality, Online Experiment.

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# 1 Introduction

Economic inequality has become a key issue of the policy debate worldwide. Besides the conventional view that reducing wealth inequality would make economic growth faster, it is also commonly believed that fighting wealth inequality meets the demand for fairness and redistribution of most people, especially the poor (OECD, 2021; Stiglitz, 2012). Empirical studies, however, have failed to find a causal relation between inequality and preferences for redistribution (Ashok, Kuziemko and Washington, 2015; Kuziemko, Norton, Saez and Stantcheva, 2015). The lack of causality has led scholars to question the standard assumption that people hold correct information about inequality when forming their preferences for redistribution. Several experimental studies have shown, in fact, that individuals systematically misperceive inequality and these misperceptions are correlated with their redistributive preferences (Bussolo, Ferrer-i Carbonell, Giolbas and Torre, 2019; Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018; Hauser and Norton, 2017). Despite this evidence, survey experiments implemented to correct misperceptions of inequality have provided inconclusive evidence: treated individuals only slightly change their preferences for redistribution when informed on the true level of inequality (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018; Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013; Fehr, Mollerstrom and Perez-Truglia, 2022; Hoy and Mager, 2021; Karadja, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2015).

Several alternative theories have been explored to shed light on why people are not more supportive of redistribution after being informed on growing inequality. For example, some studies have shown that beliefs in meritocracy contribute to the moral justification of inequality (Fehr and Vollmann, 2020), while others have provided evidence of trust in political institutions depressing preferences for redistribution (Kuziemko et al., 2015).

An alternative view is that preferences for redistribution are negatively affected by immigration. The existence of a negative relationship between immigration and preferences for redistribution is not new in the literature and it has been often referred to the in-group bias hypothesis (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).

Two versions of the hypothesis have been proposed, the economic and cultural in-group bias (for a review on the topic, see [Cavaille and Van der Straeten, 2022](#); [Elsner and Concannon, 2020](#)).

The economic in-group bias hypothesis claims that native taxpayers are less likely to support redistributive policies as immigration rate increases because immigrants are perceived as a net fiscal burden ([Luttmer, 2001](#); [Razin, Sadka and Swagel, 2002](#)). Natives believe that immigrants pay much less (in taxes) than what they receive (in benefits), which would make immigrants free riders of the welfare system.

The cultural in-group bias hypothesis claims instead that natives are less willing to support redistributive policies because they have a distaste for sharing public goods with individuals coming from a culturally distant group ([Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999](#); [Luttmer, 2001](#)).<sup>1</sup> While the cultural channel has often been tested in the United States, less evidence is provided for Europe ([Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist, 2012](#); [Eger, 2010](#)).<sup>2</sup>

The increasing evidence of the economic and cultural in-group bias in preferences for redistribution in the last years has led scholars to talk about welfare chauvinism. A welfare chauvinist is someone who does not necessarily want to reduce the overall level of redistribution, but does not want to grant immigrants the access to social benefits. The discussion on welfare chauvinism is getting particular attention in light of the success of far-right and anti-immigrants political parties in several European countries where voters seem to support a stronger intervention of the State but they endorse a particular vision of the welfare system where policies are designed according to principles like nativism or equity/reciprocity rather than equality, solidarity and need ([Alesina, Murard and Rapoport, 2021b](#); [Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2021](#); [Cavaille and Van der Straeten, 2022](#); [Dahlberg et al., 2012](#); [Elsner and Concannon, 2020](#)).

Empirical studies on the two in-group biases above have provided mixed findings. They both

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<sup>1</sup>In other similar studies, this channel is often referred as taste or anti-solidarity effect ([Garand, Xu and Davis, 2017](#); [Lee, Roemer and Van der Straeten, 2006](#); [Senik, Stichnoth and Van der Straeten, 2009](#)).

<sup>2</sup>An alternative, related strand of literature has also explored the hypothesis that immigration may be positively correlated to preferences for redistribution. This is known as the compensation hypothesis. Natives support redistribution because they want to be insured against the risk associated with globalization ([Pastor and Veronesi, 2018](#); [Rodrik, 1998](#)).

seem to offer a plausible - although often weak - explanation for the preferences for redistribution, with the cultural bias being - among the two - the most important source of opposition to welfare expansion (Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2021; Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong, 1997; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Garand et al., 2017; Gilens, 1995; Gründler and Köllner, 2020; Senik et al., 2009; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Stichnoth, 2012).

Given the inconclusive findings above, a recent strand of literature suggests that attitudes towards migrants and preferences for redistribution are influenced by perceptions of immigration. Survey evidence shows that natives are extremely pessimistic about immigration: they overestimate the share of migrants in the population, believe that they are much more welfare-dependent and more culturally diverse than they actually are, (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2022; Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal, 2020; Hopkins, Sides and Citrin, 2019; Jørgensen and Osmundsen, 2022). Additionally, when using experiments to provide information on immigration, these studies reveal inconclusive findings. While Hopkins et al. (2019) show, in seven separate survey experiments over 11 years, that correcting misperceptions about the size of immigrant populations does not affect support for immigration, Grigorieff et al. (2020) find that providing information not only about the size but also about the characteristics of the immigrant population affects public support for immigration. Finally, a recent study on several countries by Alesina et al. (2022) shows that simply priming individuals on immigration lowers their support for redistribution but information on actual share does not affect policy preferences. Their experiment also shows that providing respondents with anecdotal evidence on hard-worker immigrants positively affects support for redistribution.

Given the complex interactions between perceptions of inequality and immigration, on the one hand, and preferences for redistribution, on the other hand, in the present paper, we study the role of perceptions of immigration in shaping preferences for redistribution, and its potential connection with perceptions of inequality. We jointly analyze the two phenomena—immigration and inequality—for two interrelated reasons. First, Western countries are experiencing both a growing level of inequality and immigration. Second, perceptions and public preferences need to be analyzed in a multidimensional framework. According to Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva (2020), people hold

many perceptions (the share of immigrants, the share of national income going to the top 1%, or the top-income elasticity) that affect many policy views (top tax rate, level of government intervention, the number of immigrants allowed to enter in the country). Moreover, perceptions interact with each other and each policy view can be understood as a function of several or all perceptions, but policy views can also interact between them. The importance of multidimensionality and the consequences of ignoring have been highlighted recently in a couple of empirical studies (Bavetta, Donni and Marino, 2020; Bavetta, Li Donni and Marino, 2019).

Building on previous works (Magni, 2021; Martinangeli and Windsteiger, 2022) providing individuals with pieces of information on inequality, poverty and immigration, we conduct a survey experiment in Italy to investigate whether redistributive policies broadly defined can be better understood by using a unified framework where information on inequality interacts with information on immigration related to the economic and cultural in-group biases we explained above. The focus of our investigation is how our informational treatments affect the formation of policy preferences, but we also wanted to explore how they affect other aspects that contribute to the creation of an individual's point of view. To make the investigation sufficiently articulated in this respect, we have identified three mechanisms to point our attention to:

- M1. how information affects policy preferences;
- M2. how information affects perceptions;
- M3. how information affects feelings and opinions.

The methodology we have deployed to investigate M1-M3 is based on a structured survey that comprises: a treatment part with four different informational treatments and a post-treatment part with (i) questions to capture the multidimensional structure of individuals' preferences for redistribution, (ii) questions to capture the respondents' multiple perceptions, (iii) questions to capture their feelings and opinions about inequality and immigration.

In other words, we design an experiment where the treatment part consists in giving the respondents information on facts about inequality and immigration and the post-treatment part is aimed at

investigating if information affects policy preferences and if promotes the updating of perceptions and/or change in feelings and opinions (for a detailed description of the survey, see Section 2.2).

Our treatments are conceived to do justice to the multidimensional character of perceptions. In the first treatment, we provide information on inequality by stressing how the differences between rich and poor have increased (T1 - *inequality hypothesis*). In the second treatment, we provide the same information contained in T1, but also evidence on the native-immigrant composition of poverty in Italy (T2 - *inequality hypothesis + economic in-group bias*). In the third treatment, information on inequality as in T1 is provided along with the information on how cultural diversity of the Italian society increases along with the number of immigrants with different religion and countries of origin (T3 - *inequality hypothesis + cultural in-group bias*). Finally, the last treatment includes all of the 3 information above (T4 - *inequality hypothesis + economic in-group bias + cultural in-group bias*).

In order to capture the multidimensional nature of policy preferences, in the post-treatment part of the survey, our set of questions distinguishes between general preferences for redistribution, tax preferences, preferences for allocation of the public budget over different policies, support for a cash benefit with a focus on immigrants' access to the welfare state, conditions for migrants' access to the welfare state. The latter two questions are aimed at capturing what we will define as *exclusionary redistributive preferences*, namely support for a welfare state the access to which is permitted only to Italian citizens and denied to immigrants.

Finally, the post-treatment part includes questions to elicit perceptions of inequality and immigration on the specific dimensions highlighted in the informational treatments, feelings of economic impoverishment and economic and cultural threat coming from immigration and opinions on the most important problems in the country.

With respect to M1-M3 we also explore if there are heterogeneous treatment effects, namely if some specific groups of individuals (e.g., right-wing, rich, and so on), are more likely than other groups to differently react to the information they are provided with.

We find several results:



- R1. We find that respondents in the control group have perceptions on certain issues (like, e.g, the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% of the population or the global incidence of poverty) that turn out to be quite distant from reality, with some polarization found along the gender, the education and the political ideology dimensions.
- R2. It also turns out from our data that the information we provided about the composition of poverty (i.e., the ratio between native and immigrants) affects the formation of exclusionary policy preferences (i.e., policies that grants access on a nationality basis). We also find that such a result can be explained as due to a combined perceptions updating and change in feelings: treated individuals update their perceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty and feel richer as a consequence, thereby balancing the information on inequality (the ratio of the share of wealth between the top 10 and the bottom 50 of the population), which they also receive and which makes them feel poorer instead.
- R3. About the role of information on polarization, it turns out that political ideology plays a role as far as perception on inequality is concerned, as well as income, fairness preferences and education when looking at both perceptions and preferences.

Along with the said results, there are others that one might have expected and which are absent instead. Some of these are equally worth noticing in our opinion. For instance, it might be surprising that perceptions of inequality are not a very strong correlate of redistributive preferences, with political ideology and fairness preferences explaining most of the polarization in preferences.

Results R1-R3 lead to a number of interesting observations that we try to explore in the paper. In particular, R2 suggests that there might be an economic in-group bias acting beneath the way people forms policy preferences, since the information that the share of poor immigrants is smaller than what originally thought and that natives are less severely affected by poverty than what was believed, reduces support for an exclusionary welfare state rather than increasing it. This allows us to connect with a number of available papers that also explore the connections we are concerned with (see (Alesina et al., 2021b; Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2021; Cavaille and Van der Straeten, 2022; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Elsner and Concannon, 2020) for details). However, with this study we add

several original features to the reference literature.

For instance, while Magni (2021); Martinangeli and Windsteiger (2022) already explore the effect of information about inequality and immigration on preferences for redistributive policies, we investigate in addition if this connection can be better understood in a unified framework where information on inequality interacts with information on immigration related to the economic and cultural in-group biases.

Another element of originality of our investigation is represented by the choice of Italy as our reference country. Italy is an interesting case for several reasons. First, recent data show that there was a strong rise in wealth concentration and inequality since the mid-1990s (Acciari, Alvaredo and Morelli, 2020). Second, immigration has also increased and anti-immigration parties have grown substantially in the last years (D’Alimonte, 2019; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022). Third, as a consequence of the raise of the Five Star Movement, which has been one of the most electorally successful European populist parties<sup>3</sup>, Italy has implemented one of the biggest redistributive program over the last years<sup>4</sup>.

In addition to these features and in the direction of a more general contribution to the literature on survey experiments with provision of information, we also find that some groups of respondents are prone to motivated reasoning (e.g., educated people). The data we collect offers controversial indication that might be interesting to flag for future investigation. For instance, they suggest that multiple information can be more effective in causing respondents to update their prior, but also that some cognitive dissonance or distrust in the information applies when the true statistics are too much distant from the individuals’ opinion, which might explain why the said update does not occur.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our data collection, survey construction, and experi-

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<sup>3</sup>The classification of the Five Star Movement as a populist party is unanimously accepted, although there is disagreement on its political position because of it results from a mix of left-libertarian and anti-immigrant stances (Coticchia and Vignoli, 2020; Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2021; Mosca and Tronconi, 2019).

<sup>4</sup>In 2019, the government guided by the leader of the Five Star Movement Giuseppe Conte has introduced a basic income called “Citizenship Income” (*Reddito di cittadinanza*), which is a strict, mean-tested program for poor individuals who have been residing in Italy for the last 10 years and have income less than 9360 Euros per year. On average, poor households who are entitled to receive the benefit might get an average of 540 Euros each month.

mental design are explained in detail in Section 2. Section 3 describes the baseline results in terms of perceptions, policy preferences and feelings and opinions across respondent characteristics. Section 4 discusses the findings from the experimental part of our study. The last section concludes.

## 2 The survey

### 2.1 Survey Data

The survey questionnaire was administered by YOUNGOV, an international research data and analytic group, GDPR compliant.<sup>5</sup> YOUNGOV emailed the link of the survey to their panels of respondents.<sup>6</sup> The survey was administered in November 2021 in Italy. Only natives (non-immigrants) from 18 years of age were allowed to take the survey. We collected data on a sample of 3,500 individuals nationally representative along the gender, age, and region quota. They were randomly allocated to five groups, one control group and four treatment groups. Random assignment with equal probability to the four treatments yielded a target sample size per experimental condition of 700 individuals. Our study is pre-registered at AEARCTR-0008591 and has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the University of Florence.

We employed several methods to ensure the highest possible quality of answers. First, in the welcome page, respondents were warned that low quality responses would be flagged. We also attempted to make them feeling socially involved by emphasizing that we were non-partisan academic researchers seeking to expand scientific knowledge and that their opinions mattered to us. To this regard, we also highlighted that the success of our research depended on their degree of comprehension of the questions as much as their degree of sincerity of the answers.

Second, we introduced a couple of attention checks. We asked respondents whether they paid sufficient attention to provide their answers to the questions. If they declared that they did not,

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<sup>5</sup>GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) is the Europe’s data privacy and security law.

<sup>6</sup>Respondents who decide to participate in the survey click on the link and are channeled to the questionnaire. Respondents are paid only if they fully complete the survey. They receive incentives, in the form of “Points,” for participation. For the majority of surveys a respondent will earn between 25 and 120 Points (1,000 points = 10 euro) for completing a survey according to the length of the survey. Our survey implies earnings for 50 points.

we excluded them from our sample. Only 1% of the sample (38 individuals) was dropped. We also included a trap question as suggested by [Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart \(2020\)](#) to identify respondents that were inattentive and speeded through the surveys. We also explained to participants why researchers use these checks<sup>7</sup> and asked them to select a specific answer to a simple question unrelated to the survey content. In such a way, we were able to check whether or not respondents were reading questions carefully. People who did not answer correctly to this question were directly dropped out of the sample without completing the questionnaire.

Finally, to further increase the quality of the data, we kept track of the time spent by each respondent on the survey as a whole. By doing so, we could identify respondents who spent too little or too much time on questions. We dropped respondents in the bottom 5% and top 5% of the survey time distribution. The average time for completion of the survey was 22 minutes and the median time was 18 minutes. The full distribution of the survey duration is provided in the Appendix [C](#) (Figure [C.1](#)).

After the quality checks described above, the final sample becomes slightly smaller, with 3,138 respondents (instead of 3,500), but its main characteristics are close to those of the general population. Table [1](#) shows that our sample is almost perfectly representative along targeted dimensions of age, gender, and region, but it is also close to the general population with respect to other relevant non-targeted characteristics. The only exceptions are in the dimensions of civil status, education, and work status<sup>8</sup>. The definition of the variables are contained in Appendix [B](#).

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<sup>7</sup>The explanation could mitigate concerns about negative emotional reactions to the use of attention checks on the part of participants.

<sup>8</sup>One concern could be that our sample represents only the online population. However, [Grewenig, Lergetporer, Simon, Werner and Woessmann \(2018\)](#) show that response differences between onliners and offliners disappear when controlling for background characteristics.

Table 1: Sample and population: summary statistics.

	Sample Statistics	Population statistics
Male	0.48	0.48
18-24 y.o.	0.07	0.08
25-34 y.o.	0.13	0.12
35-44 y.o.	0.16	0.15
45-54 y.o.	0.19	0.19
55+ y.o.	0.45	0.46
married	0.51	0.46
working	0.56	0.59
unemploy	0.08	0.09
degree	0.26	0.20
income	1,792.69	1,861.58
Northwest	0.27	0.27
Northeast	0.20	0.20
Center	0.20	0.20
South	0.22	0.23
Islands	0.11	0.11

**Notes:** We used ISTAT and EUROSTAT data for the population statistics.

Finally, we check the integrity of randomization (Appendix [C](#), Table [C.1-C.9](#)) by testing whether our groups are balanced across a full list of observables. We test the randomization either (*i*) between treated and untreated respondents, and (*ii*) between the treatment groups. On aggregate, the samples are balanced, with few exceptions. To correct for over and under sampling, we use probability weights in all our regressions.

## 2.2 Structure of the survey

All survey questions, in the order they were presented to participants, are available in Appendix [A](#)<sup>9</sup>

The questionnaire has the following block structure.

**Welcome page.** The questionnaire opens with the Information sheet to describe the study and the

<sup>9</sup>The link to the survey is available in the provisional mode [here](#).

Informed consent. In this part, respondents are acknowledged of their legal rights as participants and are asked to answer honestly and with attention in order to provide good quality data.

**Pre-treatment.** In this block, we collect socio-demographic information on the participants (e.g., sex, age, education, job status). Moreover, we elicit respondents' political ideology (left-right), voting behaviours, fairness ideals (equality, equity, and need), trust in institutions, and income. Some of these variables will be used to assess whether the treatments display heterogeneous effects. In particular, following previous studies we study whether individuals with different political preferences (ideology and fairness preferences), level of education and income react differently to information on inequality and immigration (Alesina et al., 2021b, 2018; Fehr et al., 2022; Gärtner, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2020).<sup>10</sup>

**Informational treatments.** Our four treatments are assigned randomly. The treated groups receive information through short animated videos.<sup>11</sup>

The first treatment (T1) is designed to increase perceptions of wealth inequality by providing qualitative and quantitative information on the increasing gap between poor and rich people (inequality hypothesis). The treatment first claims that the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer; second, it provides information on the share of wealth going to top 10% and bottom 50%. We use data provided by Acciari et al. (2020) who rely on the Italian national accounts balance sheets. The entire video can be visualized by clicking [here](#), while the entire text is reported below:

Text T1: *In Italy the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer. Sorting individuals living in Italy based on their wealth, from the poorest to the richest, the poorest 50 percent of the population saw their wealth reduced, from 12 to 3 percent of total wealth. The richest 10 percent of the population increased their wealth from 44 to 56 percent of total wealth.*

In order to avoid respondents thinking to different types of inequalities, we clarify - using an introductory text just before the video - that by wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits,

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<sup>10</sup>We purposefully placed our treatments after these questions. In this way, we can estimate the heterogeneity of the treatment effects without having to worry that the information treatment influences the responses, especially those on political orientation.

<sup>11</sup>Providing information in graphical form seems to be more effective than equivalent textual information (Meyer, Shamo and Gopher, 1999; Nyhan and Reifler, 2019; Zacks and Tversky, 1999).

savings, stocks, and bonds. Such information is provided also in the subsequent treatments.

The second treatment (T2) repeats the information on inequality contained in T1 but it adds information on the native-immigrants composition of poverty (inequality hypothesis + economic in-group bias). In a short introductory text before the video, we clarify that we refer to regular immigrants, who legally live in the country but were born in another country.<sup>12</sup> Again, qualitative and quantitative information on the native-immigrants composition of poverty is provided. In particular, the video says that, within the poor living in Italy, there is an increasing number of immigrants. We then give three statistics from the Italian National Statistical Office: the share of immigrants among the poor, the incidence rate of poverty among the immigrants, and the natives. The video is available [here](#) and we also provide the entire text below:

*Text T2: In Italy, within the poor, we find an increasing number of immigrants. If we consider the absolute poor, that is, those who are unable to meet basic needs, 27 percent of the total are immigrants. Analyzing the incidence of poverty, while out of 100 Italians, 6 are poor, out of 100 immigrants, 30 are poor.*

The third treatment (T3) provides information on inequality as in T1 but it adds information on the increased diversity of the immigrant population (inequality hypothesis + cultural in-group bias). The video claims that cultural diversity in Italy is growing and to support this statement, we provide information on the country of origin and the religion of immigrants living in Italy. Data are taken from different sources (Italian National Statistical Office and ISMU Foundation). The video can be watched by clicking [here](#) and it contains the following text:

*Text of T3: In Italy, cultural diversity is growing. If we consider where the immigrants come from, 50 percent of them come from Africa, Asia, North and South America, the rest come from Europe. If we analyze religion, 80 percent of immigrants are Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Buddhists or of other religions, the rest are Catholics.*

As above, before watching the video, we clarified that we referred to legal immigrants.

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<sup>12</sup>As in [Alesina et al. \(2022\)](#), we prefer to focus on legal instead of illegal immigrants since the latter may pose additional challenges (e.g., laws on the entry) and it is a much more controversial and politicized issue.

Finally, the fourth treatment (T4) combines all the above information, about inequality, the native-immigrant composition of poverty and the immigrants' cultural diversity (inequality hypothesis + economic in-group bias + cultural in-group bias).

**Post-treatment: policy preferences and donation.**

To investigate the multidimensionality of policy preferences, we consider several outcome variables. We start by capturing general redistributive preferences with a question eliciting respondents' agreement with public policies that tax the rich and spend more on benefits to the poor. Second, we capture preferences for taxation: we show respondents the income brackets and the relative tax rates in the Italian fiscal system and ask them if they believe these rates should be decreased, leaved the same, or increased. Third, we ask them if they agree or not with a set of proposals to reduce inequalities by taxing the rich (a wealth tax and an inheritance tax). Fourth, to capture preferences for public spending, we ask respondents how they would like to spend the total government budget among different sectors (social security, income support program, defense, schooling, health, etc.). Fifth, we ask whether they support a cash benefit whose main characteristics resemble the recently introduced Italian basic income. More specifically, we ask if they support this benefit for all poor or for poor Italians only. The latter question aims at capturing exclusionary redistributive preferences, namely preferences for a welfare state based on citizenship. Finally, we capture exclusionary redistributive preferences by also eliciting under which conditions immigrants should be allowed to benefit from the national welfare (immediately, after one year, after citizenship, etc.).<sup>13</sup>

To conclude, we also include a behavioral measure asking individuals about their willingness to donate to three charities according to their aim: 1) OXFAM (an organization fighting inequality); 2) CARITAS (an organization supporting poor people living in Italy); 3) ARCI (an organization supporting the cultural and social integration of immigrants in Italy). The money that individuals are asked to decide if donate to a charity comes from a prize they might win through a lottery, with five prizes of 100 euros each.

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<sup>13</sup>We use a question from the European social survey (ESS) that allows to discriminate between i) unconditional stances towards immigrants' access to welfare benefits, ii) conditionality on the basis of welfare contributions and iii) conditionality based upon citizenship.



**Post-treatment: mechanisms.** After the treatments, we also include additional questions to investigate which mechanisms may explain how information affects policy preferences.

More specifically, we include several questions that proxy three different mechanisms: perceptions, feelings, and opinions. The reason why we do not limit ourselves to perceptions updating relies on the suggestive evidence that while information influences the individual factual knowledge of a certain reality (perceptions updating), it might also affect emotions, feelings, or opinions (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020; Elçi, 2022; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Rhodes-Purdy, Navarre and Utych, 2021). Since these mechanisms are not often explored in the literature of survey experiments with informational treatments, we aim at being very extensive in order to collect more evidence on other potential mechanisms.

After the questionnaire (to avoid priming respondents on the topics we are investigating), we include seven questions to elicit perceptions of inequality and immigration. The first two are aimed at eliciting perceptions on the share of the wealth owned by the top 10 and bottom 50 percent (these two pieces of information are included in T1). Then, we elicit three questions related to perceptions of the native-immigrant composition of poverty: the share of poor immigrants over the total population of poor people living in Italy, the incidence rate of poverty among immigrants (the proportion of poor immigrants on the total number of immigrants) and Italians (the proportion of poor Italians on the total number of Italians). Finally, we ask two questions to elicit perceptions of the diversity of immigrants, by asking respondents their beliefs on the share of European and Catholic immigrants living in Italy.

By comparing the control and the treated groups, we are capable of assessing whether individuals update their perceptions after the provision of the information.

Questions to capture changes in feelings are also placed after the information treatments. In particular, we ask participants to position themselves on an economic scale ranging from 1 to 10, representing the distance between rich and poor people. We expect that participants exposed to information on inequality (T1) will feel impoverished and will position themselves lower on the scale, with respect to the control group.

To further investigate the role of information on feelings, we also include questions to analyze whether people feel threatened by immigrants. On the one hand, we ask respondents if immigrants are a burden to the country’s finances or if, instead, they contribute to them; on the other hand, we ask respondents if immigrants enrich or undermine the cultural life of the country in which they live. We expect that informational treatments on immigration should make people feel threatened by immigrants.

As an additional mechanism, we also check if the provided information affects people’s opinions on the salience of problems in the country. We propose a list of eight problems that the respondent must rank from the most important to the least important. We expect that inequality (“difference between rich and poor”) would be ranked higher in the treated groups than in the control groups, and that “unconditional provision of public subsidies to the poor” (“loss of traditional values”) would be ranked higher in T2 (T3) and T4.

### 3 Baseline analysis

We start with a descriptive analysis of the baseline control group (i.e., individuals who did not receive any information). The definitions of the variables are in the Appendix [B](#).

#### 3.1 Perceptions

Table [2](#) reports the average, mean, and interquartile ranges of individuals’ perceptions as well as the value of corresponding actual counterpart. In general, misperceptions are quite striking, especially on certain issues. On average, respondents tend to misperceive both the share of wealth held by top 10% and bottom 50%, overestimating both of them. However, misperceptions on the bottom part of the distribution are much stronger. Similarly, they misperceive the share of immigrants among the poor living in Italy, the incidence of poverty among immigrants and Italians. Nevertheless, they tend to be more pessimistic on the incidence of poverty among Italians. Finally, they tend to misperceive also the share of immigrants coming from Europe and underestimate the share of non-Catholic immigrants.

Table 2: Misperceptions statistics

	Actual	Mean	Sd	25th	75th
richshare (Share of wealth - top 10)	56	65.03	21.22	51.00	80.00
poorshare (Share of wealth - bottom 50)	3	25.16	19.27	10.00	35.00
poorimmshare (Immigrants share among the poor)	27	43.19	22.97	25.00	60.00
poorimminc (Poverty incidence among immigrants)	30	43.45	25.56	23.00	64.00
pooritainc (Poverty incidence among Italians)	6	31.84	21.19	15.00	44.00
immorigin (Share of no-European immigrants)	50	66.23	20.75	50.00	84.00
immreligion (Share of no-Catholic immigrants)	80	72.98	19.46	60.00	89.00

**Notes:** Baseline control group (N=617).

While averages can be interesting, we find dispersion in people's perceptions at the individual level much more informing. For such reason, we compute for each individual the deviation between the perceived and the actual values. This is a measure of individual level of accuracy that can range from -100 to 100. Values close to zero approximate no misperception, while positive (negative) differences correspond to overestimation (underestimation). Figures 1, 3 show the distribution of these deviations. When considering inequality in wealth, a visual inspection of Figure 1 shows that individuals tend to both overestimate and underestimate the share held by rich people (top 10%) although, on average, they tend to overestimate it. When looking at the share held by the poor (bottom 50%), respondents tend to mostly overestimate it.






Figure 1: Misperceptions on wealth inequality (top 10% and bottom 50%).

**Notes:** Distribution of misperceptions on the share of wealth held by the top 10% in Panel (a) and by the bottom 50% in Panel (b). Misperceptions are calculated as the difference between perceptions and actual values. Positive (negative) differences correspond to overestimation (underestimation). Baseline control group ( $N = 617$ ).

When looking at the data on perceptions of immigration, and in particular on the native-immigrant composition of poverty (Figure 2), individuals tend to both overestimate and underestimate the share of immigrants among poor living in Italy, but most of them tend to overestimate it. Additionally, respondents also tend to overestimate the incidence of poverty both among immigrants (Panel (b)) and among Italians (Panel (c)).



(a)



(b)

(c)

Figure 2: Misperceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty.

**Notes:** Distribution of misperceptions on the share of poor immigrant among poor in Panel (a), on the incidence of poverty among immigrant in Panel (b), and on the incidence of poverty among Italians in Panel (c). Misperceptions are calculated as the difference between perceptions and actual values. Positive (negative) differences correspond to overestimation (underestimation). Baseline control group ( $N = 617$ ).

Finally, with respect to the perceptions on the cultural diversity of immigrants (Figure 3), the respondents tend to both under and overestimate, but they mostly overestimate their No-European origins. When considering the share of No-catholic immigrants, we again have respondents that both overestimate and underestimate, although they tend to mostly underestimate the two statistics.




Figure 3: Misperceptions on the immigrants’ cultural diversity

**Notes:** Distribution of misperceptions of the share of immigrants coming from Europe in Panel (a), and of the share of catholic immigrants Panel (b). Misperceptions are calculated as the difference between perceptions and actual values. Positive (negative) differences correspond to overestimation (underestimation). Baseline control group ( $N = 617$ ).

An important question in the literature on misperceptions is if they are correlated with political ideology, income, or other relevant observable characteristics. Such information is important since it allows figuring out whether there is a polarization across groups in the society, and on which perceptions. While polarization can be beneficial to a certain extent, e.g., by providing a plurality of views and perspectives, it can also be problematic since it creates conflicts and impedes individuals to find solutions to important societal problems (Heltzel and Laurin, 2020).

To inspect the presence of polarized perceptions, we plot the elicited perceptions by the respondent group with 95% confidence intervals around the average perceptions (Figure 4.6). The groups are: male vs female; married vs not married; young respondents (18–45 years old) vs. older respondents (more than 45 years old); individuals working (part and full-time employees and self-employed) vs unemployed; highly educated (college and more) vs lowly educated; South Italy residents (including Islands) vs Center Italy and North Italy residents; populist voters vs non-populist voters;<sup>14</sup> meritocrats, namely those those who believe that only effort should determine

<sup>14</sup>We include a variable for populist voters because Italy’s aggregate proportion of votes for populist parties has

economic outcomes vs non-meritocrats; those who distrust political institutions vs those who trust; right-center vs left-center respondents; finally, poor (first quartile of income distribution) vs rich (last quartile of income distribution).

Overall, groups tend to misperceive in a similar way, but there are consistent and systematic differences across issues (inequality and immigration) and groups. For instance, Figure 4 compares perceptions of inequality: while we do not find any polarization in the perceptions of wealth held by the top 10%, we find that perceptions on the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% are polarized across gender, levels of education, voting preferences (both on the right-left political ideology scale and on the populist-no-populist voter dichotomy). For instance, left-wing respondents are more likely to perceive a lower share of wealth going to the bottom 50% than right-wing people.





Figure 4: Polarization in Perceptions on wealth inequality

**Notes:** The figure shows the average perceptions of wealth in the top 10% (Panel (a)) and in the bottom 50% (Panel (b)) for different groups of respondents. The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals around the average response. Definitions of groups are in Appendix B. Baseline control group.


Figure 5 inspects the presence of polarization in perceptions of immigration when looking at native-immigrant composition of poverty. While perceptions on the share of immigrants among the poor or increased from 30% in the general election of 1994 to almost 70% in 2018. Additionally, being a voter of a populist party reflects a well-recognized combination of anti-institutional and anti-party sentiments in the Italian population (Vercesi, 2021). Considering such variable helps us to understand whether these voters perceive the reality more or less accurately than other voters.

the incidence of poverty among immigrants do not reveal any particular polarization across groups, we find again a very polarized environment when we look at the perceptions of the incidence of poverty among Italians. Females, less educated individuals, people living in the South, populist voters, distrustful individuals, right-wing voters, and poor people are all more likely to believe that there is much more poverty among Italians than it is believed by their opposite group.






(a)



(b)



(c)

Figure 5: Polarization in Perceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty

**Notes:** The figure shows the average perceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty - the share of poor immigrants among poor (Panel (a)), poverty incidence among immigrants (Panel (b)), poverty incidence among Italians (Panel (c)) - for different groups of respondents. The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals around the average response. Definitions of groups are in Appendix [B](#). Baseline control group.

Finally, we do not observe polarized perceptions on the cultural diversity of the immigrants.




Figure 6: Polarization in Perceptions on the immigrants' cultural diversity

**Notes:** The figure shows the average perceptions on the immigrants' cultural diversity - share of non-European immigrants (Panel (a)) and share of non-Catholic immigrants (Panel (b)) - for different groups of respondents. The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals around the average response. Definitions of groups are in Appendix [B](#). Baseline control group.

Overall, we find an interesting pattern when looking at polarization on perceptions. Perceptions related to the extent of poverty among Italians - perceptions of wealth held by the bottom 50% and perceptions of the incidence rate of poverty among Italians - seem to display the greatest level of polarization among the Italian population. Such conflict might explain the recent contentious debates in the Italian public opinion on the expansion or reduction of newly introduced basic income, especially considering the requirements to access the benefit<sup>15</sup>

To compare our results with other studies investigating group differences in quantitative perceptions in politically relevant domains ([Alesina et al., 2018](#); [Haaland and Roth, 2020](#); [Settele, 2022](#)), we report in Appendix [C](#) a regressions analysis of perceptions on gender, political ideology, income, being close to a populist party and being highly educated (Tables [C.10](#), [C.16](#)). While not all perceptions show ideological, educational, or gender differences, when we do find some statistically significant differences, they range from about 20 to 50 percent of a standard deviation. These

<sup>15</sup>Some of these debates can be found [here](#), [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#).

numbers reassure us on the validity of our findings since they are very close to those reported by [Settele \(2022\)](#) in Table C.1 of her work.

To conclude, there are several key findings emerging from our analysis. First, respondents have perceptions quite distant from reality. Second, some issues are more problematic than others (e.g., the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% or the incidence of poverty among Italians). Third, some characteristics are more likely than others to predict polarization, for instance gender, education and political preferences.

### 3.2 Policy Preferences

In the present Section, we investigate how redistributive preferences correlate with perceptions and personal characteristics. Table [3](#) consider several types of preferences: general support for redistribution by taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor (first column); preferences for a higher tax rate for rich people (second column); preferences for a wealth tax (third column) and estate tax (fourth column); support for a monetary benefit (basic income) to all poor, independent of their citizenship (fifth column); preferences for more public spending on the poor (sixth column), on unemployment benefits (seventh column), on education (eighth column). The ninth column refers to a redistribution index, created by following the methodology in [Kling, Liebman and Katz \(2007\)](#) and used in many survey experiments ([Alesina et al. 2022, 2018](#); [Grigorieff et al. 2020](#)). The index is a standardized and unweighted average of the z-scores of the outcomes variables from columns 1 through 8, where z-scores are obtained by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. Finally, the last two columns capture exclusionary redistributive preferences. The tenth column refers to individuals' preferences for a monetary benefit (basic income) only for Italians. The last column refers to preferences for excluding immigrants from welfare's access. All variables, not only the index, are standardized so coefficients represent the effect size in terms of standard deviations away from the mean. Definitions of all these outcomes are in Appendix [B](#).

A quick look at Table [3](#) shows that perceptions do not seem to be a very strong correlate of

preferences for redistribution. There are few exceptions.

First, the perceptions on the share of wealth going to top 10% and to the bottom 50% are negatively correlated with some preferences for social spending: more specifically, people who are more likely to believe that the top 10% and bottom 50% of the distribution are richer are less likely to support spending on unemployment (column 7). While the second finding is in line with political economy models claiming that when inequality decreases, support for the welfare state should decrease, the first goes against these predictions. Despite the apparent inconsistent result, there are several explanations for it but our study does not allow to disentangle among them.<sup>16</sup>

Second, those who believe that the incidence of poverty among immigrants is higher are more likely to agree that all people in need should be supported with a basic income (column 6). However, respondents who believe that the incidence rate of poverty among Italians is higher, while supporting redistribution (column 1), are also more likely to prefer Italians as unique beneficiaries of the welfare state (column 10 and 11).

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<sup>16</sup>A possible explanation of this result is related to beliefs of meritocracy (Mijs, 2021; Trump, 2020): the higher the level of inequality, the stronger the beliefs that differences are fair, the lower the support for vulnerable groups which are considered as undeserving (e.g. unemployed). Another explanation is that increasing inequality is seen as a positive signal of the trickle down economics (Ekins, 2019; Hope, Limberg and Weber, 2021; Stantcheva, 2021): if rich people become richer, they are more likely to create jobs, and taxing them is perceived as a negative incentive for their economic investments and for the whole economy.

Table 3: Correlation between Perceptions and Policy Preferences

	General Redistr. (1)	Tax Rich (2)	Wealth Tax (3)	Estate Tax (4)	Support Poor (all) (5)	Spend Poor (6)	Spend Unempl. (7)	Spend Educ. (8)	Index Redistr. (9)	Support Poor (It) (10)	Exclusive (11)
richshare	0.042 (0.045)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.042)	0.002 (0.044)	0.023 (0.049)	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.135*** (0.048)	-0.013 (0.045)	-0.023 (0.043)	0.032 (0.047)	0.030* (0.017)
poorshare	-0.017 (0.045)	-0.037* (0.022)	-0.021 (0.046)	0.012 (0.046)	0.041 (0.047)	-0.037 (0.054)	-0.106** (0.050)	-0.038 (0.051)	-0.062 (0.043)	0.022 (0.046)	0.016 (0.020)
poorimmshare	-0.024 (0.047)	0.020 (0.023)	0.009 (0.052)	-0.014 (0.051)	-0.090* (0.050)	0.070 (0.050)	0.034 (0.049)	-0.030 (0.049)	-0.001 (0.048)	-0.055 (0.048)	0.006 (0.021)
poorimminc	-0.038 (0.046)	-0.010 (0.022)	0.040 (0.051)	-0.041 (0.049)	0.109** (0.047)	-0.087* (0.048)	-0.022 (0.045)	0.058 (0.048)	-0.000 (0.044)	0.038 (0.047)	-0.040* (0.021)
pooritainc	0.169*** (0.049)	0.037* (0.022)	-0.031 (0.052)	-0.020 (0.050)	0.061 (0.052)	0.037 (0.051)	0.080 (0.050)	-0.051 (0.052)	0.083* (0.044)	0.130*** (0.049)	0.061*** (0.022)
immorigindiv	0.058 (0.054)	0.048** (0.023)	0.061 (0.049)	0.073 (0.049)	-0.004 (0.057)	-0.008 (0.050)	0.077 (0.047)	0.069 (0.049)	0.109** (0.046)	-0.010 (0.048)	0.002 (0.023)
immreligiondiv	-0.062 (0.048)	-0.019 (0.023)	0.018 (0.051)	-0.051 (0.049)	0.012 (0.054)	0.029 (0.048)	-0.047 (0.049)	-0.076 (0.050)	-0.055 (0.045)	0.114** (0.049)	0.022 (0.020)
male	0.193** (0.080)	0.072* (0.039)	0.233*** (0.084)	0.250*** (0.082)	0.151* (0.084)	0.021 (0.089)	-0.028 (0.082)	0.120 (0.085)	0.280*** (0.079)	0.150* (0.084)	0.060* (0.035)
age1824	-0.309 (0.211)	-0.385*** (0.102)	-0.542*** (0.196)	-0.433** (0.184)	-0.172 (0.227)	0.066 (0.251)	-0.199 (0.244)	0.585*** (0.182)	-0.464** (0.214)	-0.182 (0.199)	-0.115 (0.084)
age2534	-0.171 (0.145)	-0.165** (0.068)	-0.400*** (0.143)	-0.231 (0.142)	0.080 (0.132)	-0.135 (0.138)	-0.148 (0.143)	0.117 (0.137)	-0.316** (0.137)	0.097 (0.128)	-0.061 (0.059)
age3544	0.020 (0.123)	-0.083 (0.058)	-0.181 (0.118)	-0.138 (0.120)	-0.025 (0.117)	0.070 (0.124)	-0.030 (0.129)	0.161 (0.126)	-0.076 (0.112)	-0.135 (0.125)	0.060 (0.056)
age4554	-0.105 (0.117)	-0.088* (0.052)	-0.072 (0.115)	-0.140 (0.113)	-0.096 (0.113)	-0.057 (0.118)	-0.105 (0.116)	0.112 (0.125)	-0.166 (0.110)	0.066 (0.110)	-0.048 (0.049)
married	0.100 (0.086)	0.042 (0.041)	0.059 (0.088)	0.093 (0.087)	0.020 (0.088)	-0.111 (0.092)	0.043 (0.086)	0.153* (0.088)	0.114 (0.083)	-0.029 (0.088)	-0.076** (0.038)
highed	-0.159* (0.086)	0.069* (0.041)	0.044 (0.088)	-0.008 (0.087)	-0.067 (0.088)	0.003 (0.091)	-0.198** (0.091)	0.189** (0.092)	-0.013 (0.084)	-0.182** (0.090)	-0.065* (0.035)
working	0.045 (0.111)	0.073 (0.048)	0.074 (0.102)	0.156 (0.104)	0.130 (0.103)	-0.039 (0.108)	0.055 (0.102)	0.021 (0.105)	0.153 (0.098)	-0.084 (0.101)	-0.149*** (0.046)
unemploy	0.135 (0.150)	0.005 (0.075)	0.219 (0.147)	0.041 (0.145)	0.187 (0.160)	0.094 (0.172)	0.374** (0.169)	-0.127 (0.160)	0.239 (0.158)	0.150 (0.137)	-0.077 (0.071)
student	0.310 (0.233)	0.205* (0.111)	0.570** (0.233)	0.384* (0.225)	0.164 (0.243)	0.036 (0.265)	0.309 (0.258)	0.099 (0.219)	0.590** (0.239)	-0.072 (0.230)	-0.228** (0.093)
southall	0.059 (0.086)	-0.017 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.086)	0.016 (0.086)	0.198** (0.083)	0.217** (0.090)	0.092 (0.088)	-0.070 (0.082)	0.121 (0.084)	0.103 (0.086)	0.032 (0.037)
urbanc	-0.068 (0.101)	-0.094* (0.052)	-0.153 (0.115)	-0.081 (0.108)	-0.025 (0.107)	-0.088 (0.106)	0.086 (0.103)	-0.231** (0.106)	-0.194* (0.106)	-0.052 (0.110)	0.004 (0.046)
urbans	0.074 (0.095)	0.034 (0.046)	0.073 (0.093)	0.060 (0.100)	0.118 (0.100)	-0.100 (0.104)	0.164* (0.097)	0.037 (0.102)	0.127 (0.088)	0.117 (0.094)	-0.027 (0.043)
rural	-0.011 (0.163)	-0.033 (0.071)	-0.040 (0.160)	0.070 (0.145)	-0.064 (0.155)	0.076 (0.163)	0.173 (0.189)	0.062 (0.162)	0.051 (0.155)	-0.079 (0.171)	-0.005 (0.077)
right	-0.631*** (0.099)	-0.208*** (0.046)	-0.456*** (0.098)	-0.467*** (0.098)	-0.355*** (0.101)	-0.190** (0.096)	-0.230** (0.099)	-0.154 (0.102)	-0.748*** (0.089)	0.371*** (0.095)	0.166*** (0.042)
center	-0.369*** (0.103)	-0.133*** (0.050)	-0.368*** (0.104)	-0.370*** (0.100)	-0.113 (0.099)	-0.049 (0.110)	-0.055 (0.109)	-0.296*** (0.103)	-0.487*** (0.103)	0.201** (0.101)	0.097** (0.045)
distrust	0.010 (0.080)	0.028 (0.040)	-0.139* (0.080)	-0.251*** (0.080)	-0.157* (0.085)	0.018 (0.085)	-0.005 (0.083)	0.065 (0.084)	-0.103 (0.077)	-0.036 (0.084)	0.072** (0.036)
meritocrat	-0.404*** (0.088)	-0.039 (0.044)	-0.032 (0.088)	-0.123 (0.088)	-0.310*** (0.093)	-0.052 (0.089)	-0.223** (0.089)	0.068 (0.086)	-0.297*** (0.086)	-0.191** (0.090)	0.001 (0.040)
_cons	0.289** (0.120)	0.701*** (0.061)	0.208* (0.126)	0.220* (0.124)	0.085 (0.126)	0.107 (0.135)	0.079 (0.127)	-0.180 (0.127)	0.240** (0.120)	-0.099 (0.131)	0.299*** (0.056)

Baseline control group (N=617). The table reports estimates of separate regressions of the variable in the column on the relative (standardized) perception (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Third, people who believe that immigrants are more likely to be non-European are more likely to support redistribution (column 9) and a higher tax rate for rich people (column 2). While we first hypothesized - based on several accounts on the United States (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Luttmer, 2001) - that perceptions of diversity should depress preferences for redistribution, this positive correlation in Italy might point to different explanations. First, there might be a different cultural in-group bias in Italy than the one we originally hypothesized. Respondents might have a distaste for European immigrants (especially from the Eastern Europe, since we are referring to regular immigrants) and be less willing to share public goods with them.<sup>17</sup> This makes sense also in light of the rise of anti-EU populist political parties (Margalit, 2019; Rodrik, 2020). Second, some theories state that natives ask for more redistribution to be compensated from the increasing globalization and the competition in the labor market coming from immigrants (the so-called compensation hypothesis (Burgoon, Koster and Van Egmond, 2012; Finseraas, 2008; Naumann, Stoetzer and Pietrantuono, 2018)). Of course, our data does not allow to explore in detail which of these explanations makes more sense or if there are other more convincing alternatives.

Finally, and more in line with our initial hypotheses, the higher is the perception that immigrants are non-Catholic, the greatest is the support for a welfare benefits for Italians only (column 10). Such correlation, contrary to the above one, is in line with our prediction that people are less likely to share a public good (the welfare) when people are more distant culturally speaking.

To conclude, looking at other observable characteristics, males are more likely to support redistribution. Educated individuals are more likely to support spending in education, and less likely in unemployment benefits. They are also more likely to support an exclusionary welfare state. Right-wing respondents are less likely to favor redistribution and more likely to have exclusionary policy preferences. Meritocrats are also less likely to support redistribution but they do not support an exclusionary welfare state.

We also re-estimate the above regressions but on a smaller samples<sup>18</sup> to include controls for the

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<sup>17</sup>Some studies have indeed show that people may feel hostility toward some immigrants but not others and this should be matter of investigation since immigration might prime different feelings (Dennison and Geddes, 2018; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013).

<sup>18</sup>Respondents are not obliged to report information on the political party they voted and the income they earn.

being populist and poor. The results are included in the Appendix. Table [C.17](#) shows that populist voters are less likely to support redistribution but are more likely to support a welfare state whose access is based on the Italian nationality. Table [C.18](#) show that rich respondents are less likely to support a basic income for Italians only.

## 4 Policy Preferences: Causal Evidence

To investigate whether the information treatments affect policy preferences, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^4 \beta_j T_{ij} + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_i$  is the outcome of interest (e.g., policy preferences and our three potential mechanisms),  $T_{ij}$  is a dummy indicator for whether subject  $i$  was exposed to the information contained in the treatment  $j$  ( $j=1,2,3,4$ );  $X_i$  is a vector of controls (for example the demographics) and  $\epsilon_i$  is an individual-specific error term. For all the specifications, we use robust standard errors and apply probability weights. We are interested in the sign and the magnitude of  $\beta_1$ , namely the effect of the treatment on our outcomes variables.

In other specifications of interest in Section [6](#), we investigate whether certain groups respond differently to the information. To do so, we add to equation [1](#) an interaction between the treatment dummies and some covariates. In such a way, we are able to understand whether a specific group (e.g., poor people) once received the information react differently than the other group (e.g., rich individuals).

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For such reason, we have smaller samples when we include these variables ( $N = 499$  (populist sample) and  $N = 456$  (income sample)).

Table 4: Treatment effects on policy preferences

	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Poor	Spend Unempl.	Spend Educ.	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (It)	Exclusive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
T1	0.031 (0.057)	0.027 (0.027)	0.047 (0.055)	0.037 (0.056)	0.025 (0.058)	0.023 (0.058)	-0.070 (0.055)	-0.077 (0.057)	0.019 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.056)	-0.041* (0.024)
T2	-0.017 (0.057)	-0.022 (0.027)	0.018 (0.056)	0.075 (0.055)	-0.062 (0.057)	0.046 (0.058)	0.046 (0.055)	-0.031 (0.057)	0.007 (0.057)	-0.147*** (0.057)	-0.011 (0.025)
T3	-0.001 (0.058)	0.006 (0.027)	0.021 (0.055)	-0.019 (0.056)	0.069 (0.056)	0.071 (0.059)	-0.017 (0.057)	-0.073 (0.057)	0.016 (0.056)	0.008 (0.057)	-0.006 (0.025)
T4	-0.017 (0.057)	0.003 (0.027)	-0.015 (0.056)	0.004 (0.055)	-0.029 (0.056)	0.074 (0.060)	-0.066 (0.056)	-0.100* (0.057)	-0.036 (0.057)	-0.135** (0.057)	-0.041* (0.024)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix [B](#). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: male, age brackets, married, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in the South, in a city, suburbs, and rural area. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## 4.1 Treatment Effects on Policy Preferences

We start by analyzing the role of the information on policy preferences.<sup>19</sup> Overall, we find that information is not always effective in changing policy preferences. While this is in line with most survey experiments with provision of information ([Alesina et al., 2018](#); [Fehr et al., 2022](#); [Hoy and Mager, 2021](#); [Karadja et al., 2017](#)), we find that the information provided in T2 and T4 affects exclusionary redistributive preferences: people exposed to information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty decrease their support for policies which favor Italians as unique beneficiaries of the basic income programs. The magnitudes are economically significant: respondents exposed to T2 (T4) are 0.15 (0.135) standard deviations less likely to support these measures.

In the next Sections, we further analyze the above result by looking at mechanisms and within treatments effects. This will allow us to better understand how information on the native-immigrants composition of poverty affects exclusionary preferences.

## 4.2 Mechanisms

To explore potential mechanisms through which information can affect the formation of policy preferences, we assess perceptions updating and changes in feelings and opinions.

<sup>19</sup>In the Appendix, Section [D](#), we provide also evidence of treatment effects on the propensity to donate.



### 4.2.1 Perceptions updating

Our first mechanism of interest is perceptions updating. There are several possible alternative outcomes. Once exposed to accurate information, people holding perceptions distant from factual realities may update them according to the information (updating outcome 1). However, people may ignore the new information provided and may not update their perceptions (updating outcome 2); A third possibility is that perceptions might backfire and go in the opposite direction of the information (updating outcome 3). Finally, people might also update perceptions different from the ones related to information (updating outcome 4).

In our design, we are able to investigate for the presence of all the four possible outcomes. By looking at Table 5 we can explore the effect of the treatments on seven perceptions related to information we gave in the four treatment. The first two columns refer to perceptions of inequality whose related information is given in all treatments. Columns 3-5 refer to information provided in T2 and T4 on the native-immigrant composition of poverty. Finally, the last two columns refer to information on immigrants' cultural diversity provided in T3 and T4.

Table 5: Treatment effects on Perceptions

	Share of Wealth Top 10 (1)	Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2)	Share of Immigrants among poor (3)	Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4)	Incidence of poverty Italians (5)	Share of no-European Immigrants (6)	Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7)
T1	-0.179*** (0.056)	-0.069 (0.056)	-0.083 (0.058)	-0.059 (0.057)	0.018 (0.056)	0.031 (0.056)	0.105* (0.055)
T2	-0.236*** (0.056)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.178*** (0.055)	-0.204*** (0.053)	-0.241*** (0.054)	0.110** (0.055)	0.056 (0.056)
T3	-0.176*** (0.054)	-0.087 (0.057)	-0.034 (0.056)	-0.066 (0.056)	-0.009 (0.055)	-0.101* (0.053)	0.172*** (0.052)
T4	-0.173*** (0.055)	-0.156*** (0.057)	-0.123** (0.056)	-0.173*** (0.053)	-0.161*** (0.055)	-0.212*** (0.053)	0.134*** (0.052)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: male, age brackets, married, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in the South, in a city, suburbs, and rural area. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

We find that people update - in most cases - according to the information provided (updating outcome 1). However, we also find that, in some circumstances, people do not (updating outcome 2). In particular, people do not update perceptions on share of wealth going to the bottom 50%,

except in the last treatment. In other cases, people change perceptions not related to the information provided (updating outcome 4). This is the case of the share of non-European immigrants in the second treatment: this information is actually provided only in T3 and T4. However, this same perception is almost unchanged in T3 where information on the share of non-European immigrants is instead provided (updating outcome 2). We do not find, on average, evidence of people backfiring (updating outcome 3).

It is worth stressing that, in the last treatment, people update all perceptions in the expected direction, namely according to the information provided. Contrary to the other treatments, they also update the information on the share of wealth held by bottom 50% (updating outcome 1). Although the mechanism is not clear and the result deserves further research, we believe that we add to the relatively new but suggestive evidence that providing people with multiple information might have stronger effects. For instance, while [Hopkins et al. \(2019\)](#) find that provision of accurate information about the size of the immigrant population has little effect on attitudes toward immigration, [Grigorieff et al. \(2020\)](#) document that including information on several characteristics of the immigrant population helps to reduce misperceptions and polarization, while increasing public support for immigration with a persistent effect.

While the above results reassure us that people watched the videos and updated in the expected direction, it is clear that individuals are not perfectly Bayesian agents.<sup>20</sup> There might be different but often related mechanisms explaining such result.

First, and in particular considering the information on the share of wealth going to the bottom 50%, cognitive dissonance might be at work: individuals sometimes ignore evidence that is extremely inconsistent with their internal beliefs and values ([Festinger, 1957](#)). Research in fact shows that both advantaged and disadvantaged members of unequal societies are more likely to justify income differences and to adjust their descriptions of inequality as a form of self-protection ([Dover, 2022](#); [Jost, Banaji and Nosek, 2004](#); [Trump and White, 2018](#)).

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<sup>20</sup>Although the Bayesian updating rule is important in the economic theory, several studies suggest that people may often ignore information when forming beliefs, contrary to Bayes's rule ([Tversky and Kahneman, 1973](#); [Zizzo, Stolarz-Fantino, Wen and Fantino, 2000](#)).

Second, but closely related to cognitive dissonance, there is increasing evidence that people are more likely to have directional instead of accuracy motivations when processing information. In other words, motivated reasoning may play an important role when deciding which information is used for updating (Bénabou and Tirole, 2016; Epley and Gilovich, 2016; Flynn, Nyhan and Reifler, 2017): people tend to hold beliefs and opinions that are more conducive to their existing views, and to accept only the information that is consistent with their worldviews or with their shared social identities. Motivated reasoning can explain why systematic differences in misperceptions and preferences may be self-serving in nature (Deffains, Espinosa and Thöni, 2016). For instance, Kraus, Onyeador, Daumeyer, Rucker and Richeson (2019) document how white Americans engage in motivated cognition to remain ignorant of racial economic inequality in service of their prevailing narrative. Alesina, Ferroni and Stantcheva (2021a) find similar results but exacerbated by partisan gaps. Motivated reasoning can explain why people ignore the information on the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% but it can also help us to understand why information on a factual reality (e.g., inequality and poverty) push people to change perceptions on other factual realities (e.g., the share of non-European immigrants).

Third, the conceptual framework elaborated by Alesina et al. (2020) might be at work: when information is given, it enters a multidimensional space of perceptions and policy preferences and the way in which perceptions change depends on how learning occurs when people receive different pieces of information which are weighted before the updating. Since few studies have interacted more than one information (Di Tella and Rodrik, 2020; Martinangeli and Windsteiger, 2022), it is difficult to understand how people update multiple information. But our study shows that this can be a fruitful avenue for future research to explain the updating of perceptions not corresponding to the information provided.

Four, people might believe that the information is not credible (Benegal and Scruggs, 2018) and might trust only the one coming from their partisan sources (Barisione, 2017).

Fifth, people might suffer from some cognitive bias in the form of some degree of innumeracy (Blaufus, Chirvi, Huber, Maiterth and Sureth-Sloane, 2020), a decreased tendency to engage in

analytic reasoning (Haghtalab, Jackson and Procaccia, 2021; Pennycook and Rand, 2019).

Finally, there is also evidence that people are better at integrating desirable information into their beliefs than undesirable information (Eil and Rao, 2011; Lefebvre, Lebreton, Meyniel, Bourgeois-Gironde and Palminteri, 2017).

#### 4.2.2 Feelings and opinions

Beside perceptions, we also investigate if information affects individuals' feelings and opinions. Such channels are important since, as we already pointed out in the previous section, individuals do not react to new information in a purely rational way, but they also react emotionally or changing their opinions on other facts.

To capture feelings and opinions, first, we ask participants to self-position themselves on an economic scale ranging from 1 to 10 representing the distance between rich and poor people. This subjective measure of their economic status is crucial to understand if people react to the information by feeling poorer or richer. Second, we ask respondents whether immigrants are a threat for their country. In particular, we ask them if immigrants are a burden for the country's finances or contribute to them and if immigrants enrich or undermine the cultural life of the country in which they live. Finally, we ask them to rank the most important problems in Italy by listing several of them. In particular, we focus on how respondents rank inequality ("difference between rich and poor"), welfarism ("unconditional provision of public subsidies to the poor") and threat to identity ("loss of traditional values").

Table 6 shows the treatment effects on these outcomes. As we hypothesized, people substantially feel poorer (0.16 standard deviations) after being exposed to the information on inequality in T1. Nevertheless, it is worth to point out that this is inconsistent with a pure rational updating of perceptions: in Table 5, we show that, respondents update downward their beliefs on the share of wealth hold by the top 10%, but they do not update on the share of wealth hold by bottom 50%. This fact suggests that the information is not processed quantitatively but qualitatively and that individuals are not perfectly Bayesians. In other words, our result suggests that information is not

necessarily processed for its content in terms of hard facts (the share of wealth hold by the rich and the poor) but possibly for the general message it conveys, namely that poor are becoming poorer as well as richer as becoming richer. This might explain why people feel poorer despite the updating of beliefs should point to a different result. Looking at the other columns, it emerges that T1 does not affect how people see immigrants in their countries nor the salience of the country's problems, in particular it does not induce people to rank inequality (framed as the difference between rich and poor) as a higher-order problem with respect to others. While our results do not resolve the puzzle found in other studies, namely that preferences for redistribution are inelastic to information on inequality (Ciani, Fréget and Manfredi, 2021; Fehr et al., 2022; Hoy and Mager, 2021; Kuziemko et al., 2015), we show that information on inequality might induce people to feel poorer, but not even such mechanism make preferences more elastic.

Moving to the other treatments, we find that T2 has no effects on feelings and opinions but, as in T1, we find that people exposed to T3 are more likely to feel poorer. Looking at the magnitude, information on diversity seems to strengthen the effect found in T1 where only information on inequality is provided (0.18 s.d.). To conclude, we find that information on diversity in T3 increases the salience of welfarism (0.15 s.d.) as it was in our expectations.

Finally, the last treatment, T4, makes inequality salient (0.155 s.d.). We believe that, as said above, this can be explained by the strengthening effect multiple information play (Grigorieff et al., 2020; Hopkins et al., 2019).

Table 6: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale	Migrants Economic Threat	Migrants Cultural Threat	Problem: Low Education	Problem: Income Differences	Problem: Loss of Identity	Problem: Unconditional Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T1	-0.163*** (0.057)	-0.016 (0.056)	-0.024 (0.055)	-0.048 (0.056)	0.054 (0.056)	-0.035 (0.055)	0.037 (0.056)
T2	0.061 (0.054)	-0.019 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.054)	-0.089 (0.055)	0.091 (0.056)	0.001 (0.057)	0.079 (0.056)
T3	-0.180*** (0.055)	0.067 (0.057)	0.013 (0.055)	-0.087 (0.054)	0.087 (0.058)	0.004 (0.057)	0.150*** (0.056)
T4	-0.047 (0.055)	-0.056 (0.055)	-0.060 (0.055)	-0.066 (0.055)	0.155*** (0.056)	-0.043 (0.057)	0.109* (0.056)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix [B](#). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: male, age brackets, married, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in the South, in a city, suburbs, and rural area. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

### 4.3 The within treatment effects

Table [3](#) gives evidence that information contained in T2 and T4 reduce exclusionary preferences for redistribution. But why? We here try to provide a more detailed interpretation of this result. To start with, Table [5](#) shows that respondents update their perceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty. In particular, they come to realize that immigrants are not represented among the population of poor people living in Italy as much as they used to think. Additionally, they realize that immigrants are hit by poverty much more than Italians. In other words, they realize that poverty is not that severe as expected for their in-group.

While the updating of perceptions might alone explain our main result on exclusionary preferences, we want to further explore it by looking at within treatment effects, namely the effect of the treatments not on the control group, but on the first treated group which receives only information on inequality. In such a way, we are able to disentangle the effect of the information on inequality from the information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty (T2), from the one on the diversity of immigrants (T3) and from both as well (T4). In Table [7](#) we report the within treatment effects on policy preferences. We find that our previous results on preferences for a exclusionary welfare state are entirely driven by the information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty. The difference in size between [3](#) and [7](#) is negligible (e.g., for instance looking at T2, 0.147 s.d vs

0.126 s.d. respectively) indicating that most of the effect is driven by the information in T2. Similar results are obtained when looking at T4.

Table 7: Within Treatment effects on policy preferences

	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Poor	Spend Unempl.	Spend Educ.	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (It)	Exclusive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
T2	-0.046 (0.057)	-0.049* (0.027)	-0.030 (0.055)	0.040 (0.055)	-0.082 (0.057)	0.022 (0.059)	0.116** (0.053)	0.046 (0.058)	-0.009 (0.056)	-0.126** (0.057)	0.029 (0.024)
T3	-0.032 (0.058)	-0.022 (0.027)	-0.028 (0.054)	-0.056 (0.055)	0.047 (0.057)	0.047 (0.060)	0.053 (0.055)	0.006 (0.059)	-0.002 (0.056)	0.029 (0.057)	0.034 (0.024)
T4	-0.044 (0.057)	-0.023 (0.027)	-0.062 (0.056)	-0.031 (0.055)	-0.049 (0.057)	0.049 (0.061)	0.004 (0.054)	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.052 (0.056)	-0.114** (0.057)	-0.002 (0.024)
N	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, right-wing, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

For a complete picture, we look at the within treatment effects on feelings and opinions. We find that people feel richer in T2 and T4 compared to T1 (Table 8): Italians as a group feel richer after receiving the information on the poverty of immigrants compared to the information on inequality which makes them feel poorer instead.

Table 8: Within Treatment effects on Feelings and Opinions

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale	Migrants Economic Threat	Migrants Cultural Threat	Problem: Low Education	Problem: Income Differences	Problem: Loss of Identity	Problem: Unconditional Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T2	0.223*** (0.056)	-0.004 (0.055)	-0.019 (0.052)	-0.040 (0.056)	0.036 (0.056)	0.036 (0.056)	0.040 (0.056)
T3	-0.017 (0.057)	0.083 (0.056)	0.035 (0.054)	-0.038 (0.055)	0.034 (0.058)	0.039 (0.056)	0.113** (0.055)
T4	0.115** (0.057)	-0.041 (0.055)	-0.038 (0.054)	-0.018 (0.056)	0.101* (0.055)	-0.006 (0.056)	0.070 (0.055)
N	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521	2521

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, right-wing, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

To conclude, we believe that we find support for the hypothesis of an economic in-group bias although in the opposite direction with respect to our hypotheses. We indeed expected that only exposing respondents to information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty would have driven them to reduce their preferences for redistribution and increase their support for an ex-

clusionary welfare state. However, we find that people realize that they were too pessimistic and revise their perceptions and preferences accordingly. Additionally, we find that the information in T2 makes them feel richer after feeling poorer once exposed to the information in T1. The combination of perceptions updating and change in feelings is thus an important avenue for future research to explain policy preferences.

## 5 Robustness analysis

We test the robustness of our results by re-estimating our main results of Table 4, 5 and 6 in several different ways. First, we show that our results are unaffected by dropping observations we flagged as low quality. In so doing, we re-estimate all models on the full sample of 3.521 individuals. Table E.1, E.2 and E.3 show that our main results are in line with the main findings. Second, we also drop respondents who felt that the survey was biased and, despite we drop almost the 13 per cent of the sample, we find that the effect of T2 on exclusionary redistributive preferences are confirmed (Tables E.4, E.5 and E.6). Third, we drop respondents with an extreme pattern of answers on a set of 28 questions as in Alesina et al. (2022) and we still find our main treatment effects (Tables E.7, E.8 and E.9). Finally, we re-estimate our coefficients without probability weights (Table E.10, E.11 and E.12). More details and Tables are reported in the Appendix E.

## 6 Heterogeneous treatment effects

The last Section is devoted to heterogeneous treatment effects. The literature has often found that certain groups are more reactive to information, especially along the political ideology and income dimensions (Alesina et al., 2018; Cruces et al., 2013; Fehr et al., 2022; Karadja et al., 2017; Settele, 2022). For comparison purposes, we also explore if political ideology (left vs right and voting for a populist party or not), income (rich vs poor), fairness preferences (meritocrats vs not meritocrats) and education (highly educated vs not highly educated) explain differences in the way people react to information and form their preferences. In particular, we report heterogeneous treatment effects



on policy preferences, perceptions, feelings and opinions. The heterogeneity analysis is getting importance among scholars given the context of rising polarization in our society: by looking at heterogeneous effects we are able to investigate if information is able to reduce or increase the distance between specific societal groups.

## 6.1 Political Ideology

Table C.19 in the Appendix C reports our estimates of the treatment effects on policy preferences for people having declared to be right-wing or at the center of the political spectrum in order to compare these two groups with left-wing individuals. Contrary to other works (Alesina et al., 2022, 2018; Karadja et al., 2017; Settele, 2022) but in line with others (Douenne and Fabre, 2022; Fehr, Müller, Preuss et al., 2020; Haaland and Roth, 2020), we do not find that right-wing individuals are more or less likely than left-wing people to change their preferences after the treatments. However, they are more likely to update their perceptions of inequality reducing their distance with left-wing people (Table C.20). Finally, we do not find that right and left-wing people react to information differently when looking at estimates of treatments on feelings and opinions (Table C.21): right-wing people are more likely to feel poorer and threatened culturally by immigrants in T3, but the effect is only slightly significant.

We also explore another channel through which political ideology might have a role. We look at heterogeneous effects between populist and non-populist voters. As above, we do not find any heterogeneous effect on policy preferences C.22 or feelings/opinions C.24 but, similarly to right-wing individuals, populist voters are more likely to update inequality perceptions reducing their distance with non-populist voters C.23.<sup>21</sup>

To conclude, it seems that information might reduce political polarization on perceptions of inequality but it cannot affect political preferences. A possible interpretation for the above results is the widespread evidence that partisans are more likely to engage in motivated reasoning when forming their policy preferences. Thus, they are more likely to either dismiss the information not in

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<sup>21</sup>We also re-run the analysis by using intention to vote for a populist party in the next elections instead of having voted for a populist party in the past election, but results are unchanged.

line with their prior beliefs (cognitive dissonance) or to reinterpret it according to their preferences in order to remain loyal to their political affiliation (Nyhan, 2020).

## 6.2 Income

Table C.25 reports heterogeneous effects on policy preferences for rich and middle-income individuals leaving poor people as base category: we find that rich are more likely than poor people to support an exclusionary welfare state in T1 (0.16 s.d.), T3 (0.24 s.d.) and T4 (0.18 s.d.). Moreover, they are more likely to oppose an increase of the tax rate to the rich in T1 (0.18 s.d.).

Looking at heterogeneous effects on perceptions (Table C.26), we do not find that rich people's updating is different from the one done by poor people. However, Table C.26 shows that information in T3 makes rich people feeling richer.

The last result might partially explain the strongest treatment effect - in term of magnitude - on the support for an exclusionary welfare state among the rich. We believe that this is close to a combination of self-interest hypothesis and cultural in-group bias: when rich people are exposed to information on inequality and cultural diversity, they reduce their support for redistribution by denying access to a potential pool of (culturally diverse) beneficiaries of the welfare state because the fiscal burden might increase for them, and it is less acceptable given that they are not of the same in-group.

## 6.3 Fairness preferences

A common hypothesis in the literature is that preferences for redistribution are deeply shaped by moral views related to beliefs of meritocracy (Almås, Cappelen and Tungodden, 2020; Mijs, 2021). For such reason, we also explore if people holding strong fairness preferences related to meritocracy react to information differently from people not holding these preferences. Table C.31 reports treatments effects on policy preferences. We find that meritocrats, once exposed to the information in T3, are more likely to reduce their preferences for redistribution (0.38 s.d in column 1 and 0.32 s.d. in column 9). While we do not find any treatment effects on perceptions (Table C.32), we

find that meritocrats are more likely to feel threatened culturally by migrants in T3. Despite the latter is only statistically significant at 10%, it might point to a cultural ingroup bias by people endorsing a meritocratic view.

## 6.4 Education

Finally, we explore heterogeneous effects by levels of education. Table C.28 shows that people with the highest level of education, when exposed to T2, are 0.24 standard deviations less likely than people with the lowest level of education to support a basic income for all poor (column 5). Given that educated people were less likely to support this measure to start with, information increases polarization among educated and not educated people. Looking at potential mechanisms, although significant only at ten percent level, educated individuals are more likely to believe that unconditional welfare is a major problem in Italy in T2 (column 7 in Table C.30). Such result suggests a potential economic in-group bias for educated individuals.

Returning to Table C.28, when exposed to information in T3, educated people are also less likely (0.12 and 0.23 s.d) to support policies aimed at taxing rich people (column 2 and 3) and more likely (0.10 s.d.) to exclude immigrants from the welfare state (column 11). Similar results can be found when educated individuals are exposed to T4. Looking for potential mechanisms, Table C.29 shows that educated individuals, contrary to not-educated ones, update perceptions in T3 not related to the information provided: they update perceptions on the share of poor immigrants in T3 and T4. Such result provides potential evidence that educated individuals are more likely to suffer from motivated reasoning<sup>22</sup> or that they are more likely to make additional connections and reasoning given the information provided. We also find heterogeneous effects on feeling/opinions (Table C.30) since educated individuals are more likely to feel poorer after being exposed to T3.

In a way similar to rich people but from a different perspective, the two above mechanisms - perceptions and feelings - might suggest a combination of self-interest and cultural in-group bias for educated people: information on diversity decreases support for redistribution and increases

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<sup>22</sup>This is in line with several studies finding a relation between education and motivated reasoning (Bayes and Druckman, 2021; Linden, Leiserowitz and Maibach, 2018; Pennycook, McPhetres, Bago and Rand, 2022).

support for an exclusionary welfare because of the feeling of impoverishment associated with an increasing perceptions of a growing culturally diverse and poor population.

## 7 Conclusions

We investigated how perceptions and information on inequality and immigration explain preferences for redistribution. More specifically, we run a survey experiment in Italy where information on inequality is interacted with information on immigration. Our results show that people misperceive inequality and immigration to a great extent. We also show that misperceptions are more polarized on certain issues and across certain groups. We also find that, on average, preferences for redistribution are quite inelastic to information. Nevertheless, we find that information on the native-immigrants composition of poverty reduces exclusionary preferences. More precisely, we find that people reduce their support for a welfare state granting access only to Italians. Our experiment thus reveals the presence of an economic in-group bias driven by misperceptions on the share of poor immigrants and the incidence of poverty among Italians. Finally, we find possible evidence of an in-group bias by investigating heterogeneous treatment effects along the income, fairness ideals and education dimensions.

Our survey highlights several possible avenues for future research. First, there might be different explanations to people not updating their perceptions (e.g., motivated reasoning, cognitive dissonance) but it would be important to disentangle them to give a clearer interpretation of experiments where information is provided. Second, to form their policy preferences, people sometimes incorporate information, but it is not clear which is the mechanism at work. We explore two more mechanism, feelings and a specific type of opinion, but many other may play a role. Third, it is not clear which type of information is more effective to change people's preferences. We find that a direct comparison between two social (and often framed as competing) groups can be a good strategy for public informational campaigns. Fourth, most survey experiments are run in the United States, but our survey shows that many established findings within the American population (e.g., the presence of polarization along the political spectrum) might not work in other countries

where polarization is found on other dimensions like education. Finally, our intuition on interacting information seems to reveal that people make more sense of factual realities when provided with multiple information. While this was already shown in [Grigorieff et al. \(2020\)](#), to our knowledge, not much evidence to explain why this happens has been collected.

## A Appendix - Questionnaire

Answer options are in parenthesis and in italic, separated by a semicolon.

### A.1 Welcome Page

#### Project title

Political preferences in Italy

#### Researchers and institutions involved

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Maria Marino, Department of Applied Economics, Autonomous University of Barcelona

*We are a group of researchers from the University of Florence and Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.*

*Our goal is to analyze your political preferences.*

*No matter what your ideas are. By completing this questionnaire, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society. You might not agree with all the information provided, but you will have the opportunity to express your own views.*

*It is very important for the success of our research that you complete the entire survey, read the questions carefully, answer honestly. There is NO right or wrong answer.*

*Your participation in this study is voluntary and you can withdraw from the questionnaire at any time, or, if you have completed it, you can write to Yougov to request the deletion of your data.*

*Your name will never be recorded and you will be never be identified.*

*By participating in this survey, you are enrolled in a lottery with five prizes of 100 euros each. If you win, the prize will be paid out in the usual way.*

*This survey should take (on average) about 10 minutes to complete.*

**If you have any questions regarding this research, you can contact the principal investigators of this study:**

Maria Marino, Department of Applied Economics, Autonomous University of Barcelona, e-mail: maria.marino@uab.cat

Riccardo Bruni, Department of Letters and Philosophy, DILEF, e-mail: riccardo.bruni@unifi.it

**If you have any concerns, complaints or questions about this study or your rights as a research participant, you can contact:**

The Department of Letters and Philosophy, DILEF, e-mail: segr-dip@lettereifilosofia.unifi.it; tel: +39 055 2756200. Any critical issues, not otherwise resolvable, will be addressed to the Director of the Department.

The Data Protection Officer (DPO) of the Autonomous University of Barcelona by phone (+34 935812774) or by email (proteccio.dades@uab.cat).

I have read the information provided above.

I know that participation in the study is purely voluntary and data are anonymized.

I know I can withdraw from the survey at any time without consequences.

I was told how to ask for additional information and make a complaint.

(If you are 18 years old or older, you are an Italian citizen, agree with the statements above, and freely consent to participate in the study, please click on the I AGREE button to begin the survey.)

*(I AGREE, I DISAGREE)*

## A.2 Pre-treatment Block

1. Which is your marital status? (*Single; Married; Living together with a partner; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed*)
2. Which region were you born? (*Abruzzo; Basilicata; Calabria; Campania; Emilia Romagna; Friuli Venezia Giulia; Lazio; Liguria; Lombardia; Marche; Molise; Piemonte; Puglia; Sardegna; Sicilia; Toscana; Trentino Alto Adige; Umbria; Valle d'Aosta; Veneto; I was born abroad*)
3. How would you define the place where you live? (*The center of a large city; The suburb of a large city; Farm/rural area; Small town/village*)
4. Which of the following categories best describes your highest educational level? (*Primary education; Upper secondary education; University degree; Master program or PhD program*)
5. What is your current employment status? (*Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Housewife; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree*)
6. (If Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner) Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation. (*Construction; Real estate activities; Business services; Finance and insurance; Trade and transport; Manufacturing, raw material extraction; public utilities; Information and communication; Culture, leisure and other services; Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Public administration; education; health and social work activities; other (specify)*)
7. (If Unemployed and looking for work; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree) Even if you are not currently working, what sector did your latest occupation fall under? Check the one that applies. (*Construction; Real estate activities; Business services; Finance and insurance; Trade and transport; Manufacturing, raw material extraction; public utilities; Information and communication; Culture, leisure and other services; Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Public administration; education; health and social work activities; other (specify)*)



*Before proceeding to the next set of questions, we want to ask for your feedback about the responses you provided so far. In your honest opinion, should we use your responses, or should we discard your responses since you did not devote your full attention to the questions so far? (Yes, I have devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should use my responses for your study; No, I have not devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should not use my responses for your study.)*

8. On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you agree/disagree with these statements, where 0 corresponds to Disagree completely and 10 to Agree completely ? -A society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed among all people. (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*) -A society is fair when hard-working people earn more than others. (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*) -A society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in need regardless of what they give back to society. (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*)
9. How much is approximately your monthly income after tax? We refer to the overall income from work or business, any other income such as rents, dividends and government transfers (unemployment allowance, citizenship income, etc.)? Remember that the survey is anonymized. (*Specify*) or *I prefer to not say*
10. In politics, people often talk about left and right. Where would you place your political preferences? (*Left; Center left; center; center right; right*)
11. Which political party did you vote for in the last general election (in 2018)? (*Partito Democratico; Civica Popolare Lorenzin; +Europa; Forza Italia; Lega Nord; Fratelli d'Italia; Movimento Cinque Stelle; Liberi e uguali; Potere al popolo (Rifondazione comunista); other (please indicate which party); I did not vote*)
12. Which political party today do you feel closest to? (*Partito Democratico; Italia Viva; +Europa; Azione; Forza Italia; Lega; Fratelli d'Italia; Movimento Cinque Stelle; Sinistra Italiana; other (please indicate which party); to no party*)

13. On a scale from 0 to 10, what is the degree of trust that you personally place in the following institutions, where 0 corresponds to an absolute lack of trust and 10 to full trust? - Parliament - Government - Political parties (*absolute lack of trust 0-10 full trust*)
14. In questionnaires like ours, sometimes there are subjects who do not carefully read the questions. This means that there are a lot of answers which compromise the results of research studies. To show that you read our questions carefully, please choose turquoise as your answer in the next question. What's your favorite colour? (*Red; Yellow; Blue; Orange; Green; Viola; Turquoise; Black; White*)

[START RANDOMIZATION]

### **A.3 Treatments Block**

#### **A.3.1 Treatment 1**

Recently some studies have been carried out that allow us to better understand our country. We summarize some of these results through short animated videos. In some videos, with wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds.

[T1 \(link to video\)](#)

Text of T1: *In Italy the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer. We sort individuals living in Italy based on their wealth, from the poorest to the richest. The poorest 50 percent of the population saw their wealth reduced, from 12 to 3 percent of total wealth. The richest 10 percent of the population increased their wealth from 44 to 56 percent of total wealth.*

#### **A.3.2 Treatment 2**

Recently some studies have been carried out that allow us to better understand our country. We summarize some of these results through short animated videos. In some videos, with wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. By immigrants

we mean those people who were not born in Italy, but moved here legally at some point in their life and are currently residing here. We only consider regular immigrants, NOT irregular ones.

(random order)

[T1 \(link to video\)](#) Text of T1: *As Above*

[T2 \(link to video\)](#) Text of T2: *In Italy, within the poor, we find an ever-increasing number of immigrants. If we consider the absolute poor, that is, those who are unable to meet basic needs, 27 percent of the total are immigrants. If we then analyze the incidence of poverty, while out of 100 Italians, 6 are affected by poverty, out of 100 immigrants, 30 are affected by it.*

### **A.3.3 Treatment 3**

Recently some studies have been carried out that allow us to better understand our country. We summarize some of these results through short animated videos. In some videos, with wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. By immigrants we mean those people who were not born in Italy, but moved here legally at some point in their life and are currently residing here. We only consider regular immigrants, NOT irregular ones.

(random order)

[T1 \(link to video\)](#) Text of T1: *As Above*

[T3 \(link to video\)](#) Text of T3: *In Italy, cultural diversity is growing. If we consider where the immigrants come from, 50 percent of them come from Africa, Asia, North and South America, the rest come from Europe. If we then analyze religion, 80 percent of immigrants are Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Buddhists or of other religions, the rest are Catholics.*

#### **A.3.4 Treatment 4**

Recently some studies have been carried out that allow us to better understand our country. We summarize some of these results through short animated videos. In some videos, with wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. By immigrants we mean those people who were not born in Italy, but moved here legally at some point in their life and are currently residing here. We only consider regular immigrants, NOT irregular ones.

(random order)

T1 (link to video)

T2 (link to video)

T3 (link to video)

Text of T1, T2, T3: *As Above*

[END RANDOMIZATION]

### **A.4 Post-treatment block**

#### **A.4.1 Mechanisms 1 - Feelings and opinions**


15. In our society there are groups which are rich and groups which are poor. Below is a scale that runs from the rich to the poor. Where would you put yourself on this scale? With wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. (*bottom 1-10 top scale*)
16. Below we list some of the most important problems that Italy has to face today. Which do you think are the most important? Rank them from most important to least important. (*poor investment in school and university; climate change; differences between rich and poor; corruption; loss of traditional cultural values; unconditional provision of public subsidies to the poor; bureaucracy; sexism*)

### A.4.2 Outcome Variables - Self-reported policy preferences

In the next questions, we will ask you your opinion on how government raises and spends money on various policies. Remember that there are no right or wrong answer. We only want to know your opinion.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

17. How much do you agree/disagree that the government should increase taxes on the rich and spend more on benefits for the poor. *(Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely)*
18. As you probably know, income tax rates in Italy are paid on the respective income brackets. The Figure shows the tax rates with the relative income brackets. For each of them, tell if you would decrease, leave as it is or increased.



Reddito imponibile	ALIQUOTA	TAX PREFERENCE
8.000-15.000	23	[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]
15.001-28.000	27	[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]
28.001-55.000	38	[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]
55.001-75.000	41	[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]
beyond 75.000	43	[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]

(random order of the next two questions)

19. Apart from income taxes, the public budget can be increased by taxing the wealth (properties,

estate and assets). A recent proposal aims at taxing wealth above 50 million euros with a tax rate of 2%. How much do you agree/disagree with this proposal? (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*)

20. Apart from income taxes, the public budget can be increased by imposing a tax on the transfer of wealth from a deceased person to his or her heirs. A recent proposal aims at increasing the actual rate up to 20% for wealth above 5 millions (top 1% percent of the population). How much do you agree/disagree with this proposal? (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*)
21. Once raised, taxes can be used to finance public spending. Suppose that you are the person deciding on the Italian public spending for the next year. You can choose how you want to divide the budget (in percent) between the following 7 categories:

Please enter the percent of the budget you would assign to each spending category (the total must sum to 100).

- 1) Defense and National Security (e.g., costs of the Defense department and the costs of supporting security operations in foreign countries, maintain public order in the national territory)
- 2) Public Infrastructure (e.g., transport infrastructure like roads, bridges and airports, and water infrastructure)
- 3) Spending on Schooling and Higher Education
- 4) Old-age pensions and disability pensions, which provide economic support to the elderly and disabled
- 5) Support for the unemployed
- 6) Support to poor people (for example subsidies to meet food and health costs and the payment of bill)
- 7) Public Spending on Health

*(Slider with continuous percentage choices 0%-100% for each of the above categories)*

22. How much do you agree or disagree with the following government policies? (Providing to Italian citizens living in absolute poverty an income support of 540 Euro per month for food, health and bills-related expenses ?) (Providing to people residing in Italy and living in absolute poverty an income support of 540 Euro per month for food, health and bills-related expenses ?) (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*)

(The following question include a randomization within the 5 groups)

23. Here are 3 (4) things that may upset people. We want you to indicate how many of these upset you. We are not interested in which ones, only in how many of them.

Pay excise taxes on petrol.

Football players earning tens of millions.

That we have to pay a broadcasting license fee.

(That immigrants automatically receive the same welfare benefits as Italians).

24. In your opinion, when should immigrants be granted the right to social benefits / services in Italy? (*Immediately on arrival; after living in Italy for a year, whether or not they have worked; Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; once they have become a Italian citizen; they should never get the same rights*)

#### **A.4.3 Outcome Variables - Donation**

25. By participating in our survey, you could be drawn as the winner of one of five prizes of 100 euros each. We would like to know if, in case you won, you would be willing to donate part or all of your 100 euros to a good cause. Below you will find 3 charities. You can enter how many euros of your winning you would like to donate to each of them. If you are one of the winners, you will be paid, in addition to the normal fee for participating in the survey, 100 euros minus the amount you donated to charity. We will pay the desired donation amount directly to the charity of your choice. Enter how much of your 100 euros you want to donate to each charity: 1) OXFAM (charity fighting against the difference of wealth between the rich and the poor) 2) CARITAS (charity supporting poor people living in Italy, both Italians and

immigrants) 3) ARCI (charity supporting the cultural and social integration of immigrants in Italy). (*slider 0-100 for each charity*)

#### **A.4.4 Mechanisms 2 - Migrants as threat**

26. Would you say that Italy's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live in Italy from other countries? *Italy's cultural life is undermined 0 - 10 Italy's cultural life is enriched*
27. Would you say that migrants are generally a burden on our country's finances or that they contribute to them? *Immigrants are a burden on country's finances 0-10 Immigrants contribute to the country's finances*

#### **A.4.5 List experiment**

[START RANDOMIZATION - WITHIN GROUPS]

Here are 3 (4) things that may upset people. We want you to indicate how many of these upset you. We are not interested in which ones, only in how many of them. Pay excise taxes on petrol. Football players earning tens of millions. That we have to pay a broadcasting license fee. (That immigrants automatically receive the same welfare benefits as Italians).

[END RANDOMIZATION]

#### **A.4.6 Mechanisms 2 - Posterior beliefs**

[START RANDOMIZATION] (Control group) Finally, we will ask you a series of questions to find out the information you have on some issues concerning our country.

(Treated grouped T1, T2, T3, T4) Finally, we will ask you a series of questions to find out the information you have on some issues concerning our country. To some of them, you should already know the answer. [END RANDOMIZATION]

Consider the total wealth of Italians, that is, real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks



and bonds. Then sort the individuals living in Italy according to their wealth, from poorest to richest so that we can consider 10 percent of the richest and 50 percent of the poorest.

28. According to your best estimate, which is the percentage of wealth that the richest 10% of the population owns today? (*slider 0-100*)

29. According to your best estimate, which is the percentage of wealth that the poorest 50% of the population owns today? (*slider 0-100*)

Now think about regular immigrants, that is, those who were not born in Italy, but who moved here legally and currently reside there.

30. According to your best estimate, what is the percentage of immigrants out of the total of the absolute poor in Italy, that is, those who are unable to meet basic needs (food, clothing, housing)? (*slider 0-100*)

31. According to your best estimate, out of 100 immigrants, how many are absolute poor? (*slider 0-100*)

32. According to your best estimate, out of 100 Italians, how many are absolute poor? (*slider 0-100*)

33. According to your best estimate, which percentage of the immigrants out of the total of the immigrants come from Europe? (*slider 0-100*)

34. According to your best estimate, which percentage of the immigrants out of the total of the immigrants is catholic? (*slider 0-100*)

35. According to your best estimate, what was the purpose of this study? (*open space*)

36. Do you feel that this survey was biased? (*yes; no; I do not know*)

## **B Appendix - Variables definition**

### **Core Respondents' Characteristics**

*male*: dummy if the respondent is male

*age1824*: dummy if the respondent's age is between 18 and 24 y.o.

*age2534*: dummy if the respondent's age is between 25 and 34 y.o.

*age3544*: dummy if the respondent's age is between 35 and 44 y.o.

*age4555*: dummy if the respondent's age is between 45 and 55 y.o.

*age55more*: dummy if the respondent's age is above 55 y.o.

*poor*: dummy if the respondent's monthly net income is below the 50th percentile of the income distribution in the country

*rich*: dummy if the respondent's monthly net income is above the 90th percentile of the income distribution in the country

*Northwest*: dummy if the respondent lives in the North-West of Italy

*Northeast*: dummy if the respondent lives in the North-East of Italy

*Center*: dummy if the respondent lives in the Center of Italy (Sicily and Sardinia)

*Island*: dummy if the respondent lives in the Islands of Italy (Sicily and Sardinia)

*southall*: dummy if the respondent lives in the South including the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia)

*married*: dummy if the respondent is married

*degree*: dummy if the respondent has college degree

*postdegree*: dummy if the respondent has a Master degree or Ph.D.

*highed*: dummy if the respondent has college degree or a higher level of education

*working*: dummy if the respondent works as employee (both part and full time) or self-employee

*unemploy*: dummy if the respondent is unemployed

*student*: dummy if the respondent is a student

*urbanc*: dummy if the respondent lives in the center of a big city

*urbans*: dummy if the respondent lives in the suburb of a big city

*rural*: dummy if the respondent lives in a rural area

*left*: dummy if the respondent's self-positioning on the ideological scale is left or center-left

*right*: dummy if the respondent's self-positioning on the ideological scale is right or center-right

*populist*: dummy if the respondent says he/she voted one of the following political parties: Lega,

M5s, Fratelli d'Italia e Forza Italia.

*meritocrat*: dummy if the respondent both agrees that society is fair when people who work more have higher pays (>7) and does not agree that society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed (<7)

*distrust*: dummy if the respondent declares that his/her degree of trust in Parliament, Government and political parties is below 3

### **Mechanisms variables**

*richshare*: Respondent's belief on the share of the wealth hold by top 10 (share)

*poorshare*: Respondent's belief on the share of the wealth hold by bottom 50 (share)

*poorimmshare*: Respondent's belief on the share of poor immigrants among poor living in Italy (share)

*poorimminc*: Respondent's belief on the share of poor immigrants among immigrants (incidence of poverty among immigrants) (share)

*pooritainc*: Respondent's belief on the share of poor Italians among Italians (incidence of poverty among Italians) (share)

*immorigindiv*: Respondent's belief on the share of no-European immigrants (share)

*immreligiondiv*: Respondent's belief on the share of no-Catholic immigrants (share)

*Poor-rich wealth scale*: Respondent's belief, on a scale from 1 to 10, on his/her position on a wealth scale from poor to rich

*Migrants Economic Threat*: Respondent's belief, on a scale from 0 to 10, that migrants are a burden for the economy of Italy

*Migrants Cultural Threat*: Respondent's belief, on a scale from 0 to 10, that migrants are a threat for the culture of Italy

*Problem: Income difference*: Respondent's ranking, on a scale from 1 to 8, that income differences between rich and poor is the most important problem in Italy

*Problem: Loss of identity*: Respondent's ranking, on a scale from 1 to 8, that the loss of traditional cultural values is the most important problem in Italy

*Problem: Unconditional welfare*: Respondent's ranking, on a scale from 1 to 8, that the unconditional welfare to poor is the most important problem in Italy

### **Outcome variables**

*General Redistr.*: Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, for redistributive policies (increas-

ing tax to rich and give support to poor)

*Tax Rich*: Dummy if the respondent agrees that the tax rate of rich people should be increased

*Wealth Tax*: Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, that a wealth tax should be increased

*Estate Tax*: Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, that a estate tax should be increased

*Support Poor (all)*: Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, for a monetary benefit of 540 Euro per month for food, health and bills-related expenses for all poor

*Spend. Poor*: Respondent's belief on the share of current government budget that should be allocated to poor

*Spend. Unempl.*: Respondent's belief on the share of current government budget that should be allocated to unemployed people <sup>23</sup>

*Index Redistr.*: Respondent's score of a general index of redistribution over the above variables following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007)

*Support Poor (It)*: Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, for a monetary benefit of 540 Euro per month for food, health and bills-related expenses for Italian poor only

*Exclusive*: Dummy if the respondent agrees that immigrants should never access the welfare or access only if they have the Italian citizenship <sup>24</sup>

*Oxfam*: Respondent's share of donation to Oxfam, a charity working against differences between poor and rich

*Caritas*: Respondent's share of donation to Caritas, a charity working to help poor people living in Italy

*Arci*: Respondent's share of donation to Arci, a charity working for the cultural integration of migrants in Italy

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<sup>23</sup>We only consider preferences for spending in education, poor and unemployment to capture redistributive preferences as in Alesina et al. (2018), but we also ask respondents how they would allocate the budget on defence, infrastructure, pensions, and health.

<sup>24</sup>The original question asks individual if they think that immigrants should be granted social benefits immediately on arrival; after living in Italy for a year, whether or not they have worked; Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; once they have become a Italian citizen; they should never get the same rights.

## C Appendix - Figures and Tables

### C.1 Figures




Figure C.1: Distribution of Total Time Spent on the Survey. The figure shows the distribution of the total time respondents across all countries spent on the survey (bottom and top 5% are dropped)

### C.2 Tables

Table C.1: Randomization Balance Control-T1

	Control			T1			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	617	0.49	0.50	632	0.48	0.50	-0.010
age1824	617	0.07	0.26	632	0.07	0.26	-0.003
age2534	617	0.12	0.33	632	0.13	0.33	0.005
age3544	617	0.15	0.36	632	0.16	0.37	0.011
age4554	617	0.19	0.39	632	0.18	0.39	-0.004
age55more	617	0.46	0.50	632	0.45	0.50	-0.008
married	617	0.48	0.50	632	0.48	0.50	-0.002
working	617	0.57	0.50	632	0.54	0.50	-0.034
unemploy	617	0.10	0.31	632	0.08	0.28	-0.021
highed	617	0.33	0.47	632	0.35	0.48	0.027
rich	456	0.20	0.40	455	0.22	0.41	0.016
poor	456	0.32	0.47	455	0.27	0.44	-0.050*
left	617	0.43	0.50	632	0.45	0.50	0.021
right	617	0.33	0.47	632	0.32	0.47	-0.017
Northwest	617	0.27	0.45	632	0.27	0.45	0.001
Northeast	617	0.21	0.41	632	0.20	0.40	-0.008
Center	617	0.19	0.39	632	0.20	0.40	0.011
South	617	0.22	0.41	632	0.22	0.41	-0.000
Islands	617	0.11	0.31	632	0.10	0.31	-0.004

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table C.2: Randomization Balance Control-T2

	Control			T2			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	617	0.49	0.50	630	0.49	0.50	0.006
age1824	617	0.07	0.26	630	0.06	0.24	-0.013
age2534	617	0.12	0.33	630	0.13	0.33	0.004
age3544	617	0.15	0.36	630	0.16	0.37	0.006
age4554	617	0.19	0.39	630	0.20	0.40	0.015
age55more	617	0.46	0.50	630	0.45	0.50	-0.013
married	617	0.48	0.50	630	0.52	0.50	0.033
working	617	0.57	0.50	630	0.58	0.49	0.006
unemploy	617	0.10	0.31	630	0.08	0.27	-0.028*
highed	617	0.33	0.47	630	0.34	0.47	0.015
rich	456	0.20	0.40	482	0.22	0.41	0.012
poor	456	0.32	0.47	482	0.28	0.45	-0.034
left	617	0.43	0.50	630	0.42	0.49	-0.015
right	617	0.33	0.47	630	0.34	0.47	0.006
Northwest	617	0.27	0.45	630	0.27	0.44	-0.007
Northeast	617	0.21	0.41	630	0.19	0.39	-0.017
Center	617	0.19	0.39	630	0.20	0.40	0.012
South	617	0.22	0.41	630	0.23	0.42	0.007
Islands	617	0.11	0.31	630	0.11	0.32	0.006

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

Table C.3: Randomization Balance Control-T3

	Control			T3			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	617	0.49	0.50	626	0.47	0.50	-0.013
age1824	617	0.07	0.26	626	0.08	0.27	0.004
age2534	617	0.12	0.33	626	0.12	0.33	-0.000
age3544	617	0.15	0.36	626	0.16	0.36	0.003
age4554	617	0.19	0.39	626	0.20	0.40	0.010
age55more	617	0.46	0.50	626	0.44	0.50	-0.016
married	617	0.48	0.50	626	0.52	0.50	0.036
working	617	0.57	0.50	626	0.56	0.50	-0.011
unemploy	617	0.10	0.31	626	0.08	0.28	-0.021
highed	617	0.33	0.47	626	0.34	0.47	0.010
rich	456	0.20	0.40	445	0.21	0.41	0.003
poor	456	0.32	0.47	445	0.32	0.47	0.006
left	617	0.43	0.50	626	0.45	0.50	0.018
right	617	0.33	0.47	626	0.34	0.47	0.003
Northwest	617	0.27	0.45	626	0.28	0.45	0.006
Northeast	617	0.21	0.41	626	0.19	0.40	-0.013
Center	617	0.19	0.39	626	0.19	0.39	-0.004
South	617	0.22	0.41	626	0.23	0.42	0.011
Islands	617	0.11	0.31	626	0.11	0.31	0.000

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

Table C.4: Randomization Balance Control-T4

	Control			T4			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	617	0.49	0.50	633	0.48	0.50	-0.001
age1824	617	0.07	0.26	633	0.08	0.27	0.004
age2534	617	0.12	0.33	633	0.13	0.34	0.010
age3544	617	0.15	0.36	633	0.15	0.36	-0.004
age4554	617	0.19	0.39	633	0.19	0.39	-0.000
age55more	617	0.46	0.50	633	0.45	0.50	-0.010
married	617	0.48	0.50	633	0.55	0.50	0.062**
working	617	0.57	0.50	633	0.56	0.50	-0.011
unemploy	617	0.10	0.31	633	0.06	0.24	-0.041***
highed	617	0.33	0.47	633	0.34	0.47	0.011
rich	456	0.20	0.40	476	0.18	0.38	-0.027
poor	456	0.32	0.47	476	0.31	0.46	-0.009
left	617	0.43	0.50	633	0.46	0.50	0.029
right	617	0.33	0.47	633	0.32	0.47	-0.015
Northwest	617	0.27	0.45	633	0.26	0.44	-0.013
Northeast	617	0.21	0.41	633	0.20	0.40	-0.010
Center	617	0.19	0.39	633	0.20	0.40	0.011
South	617	0.22	0.41	633	0.23	0.42	0.013
Islands	617	0.11	0.31	633	0.11	0.31	-0.001

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

Table C.5: Randomization T1-T2

	T1			T2			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	632	0.48	0.50	630	0.49	0.50	0.016
age1824	632	0.07	0.26	630	0.06	0.24	-0.009
age2534	632	0.13	0.33	630	0.13	0.33	-0.001
age3544	632	0.16	0.37	630	0.16	0.37	-0.004
age4554	632	0.18	0.39	630	0.20	0.40	0.020
age55more	632	0.45	0.50	630	0.45	0.50	-0.005
married	632	0.48	0.50	630	0.52	0.50	0.035
working	632	0.54	0.50	630	0.58	0.49	0.040
unemploy	632	0.08	0.28	630	0.08	0.27	-0.006
highed	632	0.35	0.48	630	0.34	0.47	-0.012
rich	455	0.22	0.41	482	0.22	0.41	-0.004
poor	455	0.27	0.44	482	0.28	0.45	0.016
left	632	0.45	0.50	630	0.42	0.49	-0.037
right	632	0.32	0.47	630	0.34	0.47	0.023
Northwest	632	0.27	0.45	630	0.27	0.44	-0.009
Northeast	632	0.20	0.40	630	0.19	0.39	-0.009
Center	632	0.20	0.40	630	0.20	0.40	0.001
South	632	0.22	0.41	630	0.23	0.42	0.007
Islands	632	0.10	0.31	630	0.11	0.32	0.010

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

Table C.6: Randomization T1-T3

	T1			T3			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	632	0.48	0.50	626	0.47	0.50	-0.003
age1824	632	0.07	0.26	626	0.08	0.27	0.007
age2534	632	0.13	0.33	626	0.12	0.33	-0.005
age3544	632	0.16	0.37	626	0.16	0.36	-0.008
age4554	632	0.18	0.39	626	0.20	0.40	0.015
age55more	632	0.45	0.50	626	0.44	0.50	-0.008
married	632	0.48	0.50	626	0.52	0.50	0.038
working	632	0.54	0.50	626	0.56	0.50	0.023
unemploy	632	0.08	0.28	626	0.08	0.28	0.001
highed	632	0.35	0.48	626	0.34	0.47	-0.017
rich	455	0.22	0.41	445	0.21	0.41	-0.013
poor	455	0.27	0.44	445	0.32	0.47	0.055*
left	632	0.45	0.50	626	0.45	0.50	-0.004
right	632	0.32	0.47	626	0.34	0.47	0.021
Northwest	632	0.27	0.45	626	0.28	0.45	0.004
Northeast	632	0.20	0.40	626	0.19	0.40	-0.004
Center	632	0.20	0.40	626	0.19	0.39	-0.016
South	632	0.22	0.41	626	0.23	0.42	0.012
Islands	632	0.10	0.31	626	0.11	0.31	0.004

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

Table C.7: Randomization T1-T4

	T1			T4			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	632	0.48	0.50	633	0.48	0.50	0.009
age1824	632	0.07	0.26	633	0.08	0.27	0.008
age2534	632	0.13	0.33	633	0.13	0.34	0.005
age3544	632	0.16	0.37	633	0.15	0.36	-0.014
age4554	632	0.18	0.39	633	0.19	0.39	0.004
age55more	632	0.45	0.50	633	0.45	0.50	-0.002
married	632	0.48	0.50	633	0.55	0.50	0.064**
working	632	0.54	0.50	633	0.56	0.50	0.023
unemploy	632	0.08	0.28	633	0.06	0.24	-0.019
highed	632	0.35	0.48	633	0.34	0.47	-0.016
rich	455	0.22	0.41	476	0.18	0.38	-0.043*
poor	455	0.27	0.44	476	0.31	0.46	0.041
left	632	0.45	0.50	633	0.46	0.50	0.007
right	632	0.32	0.47	633	0.32	0.47	0.003
Northwest	632	0.27	0.45	633	0.26	0.44	-0.015
Northeast	632	0.20	0.40	633	0.20	0.40	-0.002
Center	632	0.20	0.40	633	0.20	0.40	-0.000
South	632	0.22	0.41	633	0.23	0.42	0.014
Islands	632	0.10	0.31	633	0.11	0.31	0.003

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.



Table C.8: Randomization T2-T4

	T2			T4			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	630	0.49	0.50	633	0.48	0.50	-0.007
age1824	630	0.06	0.24	633	0.08	0.27	0.017
age2534	630	0.13	0.33	633	0.13	0.34	0.006
age3544	630	0.16	0.37	633	0.15	0.36	-0.010
age4554	630	0.20	0.40	633	0.19	0.39	-0.015
age55more	630	0.45	0.50	633	0.45	0.50	0.003
married	630	0.52	0.50	633	0.55	0.50	0.029
working	630	0.58	0.49	633	0.56	0.50	-0.017
unemploy	630	0.08	0.27	633	0.06	0.24	-0.013
highed	630	0.34	0.47	633	0.34	0.47	-0.005
rich	482	0.22	0.41	476	0.18	0.38	-0.039
poor	482	0.28	0.45	476	0.31	0.46	0.025
left	630	0.42	0.49	633	0.46	0.50	0.044
right	630	0.34	0.47	633	0.32	0.47	-0.021
Northwest	630	0.27	0.44	633	0.26	0.44	-0.006
Northeast	630	0.19	0.39	633	0.20	0.40	0.007
Center	630	0.20	0.40	633	0.20	0.40	-0.001
South	630	0.23	0.42	633	0.23	0.42	0.007
Islands	630	0.11	0.32	633	0.11	0.31	-0.007

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

Table C.9: Randomization T3-T4

	T2			T4			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
male	626	0.47	0.50	633	0.48	0.50	0.012
age1824	626	0.08	0.27	633	0.08	0.27	0.001
age2534	626	0.12	0.33	633	0.13	0.34	0.010
age3544	626	0.16	0.36	633	0.15	0.36	-0.006
age4554	626	0.20	0.40	633	0.19	0.39	-0.010
age55more	626	0.44	0.50	633	0.45	0.50	0.006
married	626	0.52	0.50	633	0.55	0.50	0.026
working	626	0.56	0.50	633	0.56	0.50	0.000
unemploy	626	0.08	0.28	633	0.06	0.24	-0.020
highed	626	0.34	0.47	633	0.34	0.47	0.001
rich	445	0.21	0.41	476	0.18	0.38	-0.030
poor	445	0.32	0.47	476	0.31	0.46	-0.015
left	626	0.45	0.50	633	0.46	0.50	0.011
right	626	0.34	0.47	633	0.32	0.47	-0.018
Northwest	626	0.28	0.45	633	0.26	0.44	-0.019
Northeast	626	0.19	0.40	633	0.20	0.40	0.003
Center	626	0.19	0.39	633	0.20	0.40	0.015
South	626	0.23	0.42	633	0.23	0.42	0.002
Islands	626	0.11	0.31	633	0.11	0.31	-0.001

Balance Table. The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable with robust standard errors. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

Table C.10: Correlates of richshare (Share of wealth - top 10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
right	-0.22** (0.09)			-0.06 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.10)		-0.21 (0.24)		-0.26** (0.12)
center	-0.16 (0.10)			-0.14 (0.14)			-0.24 (0.18)		
male		0.10 (0.08)		0.21* (0.12)					
highed			-0.01 (0.09)		0.17 (0.11)				
maleXright				-0.31* (0.18)					
maleXcenter				0.00 (0.20)					
highedXright					-0.50** (0.20)				
highedXcenter					-0.37* (0.19)				
populist						-0.19** (0.09)	-0.25 (0.16)		
populistXright							0.18 (0.28)		
populistXcenter							0.38 (0.26)		
rich								0.04 (0.13)	0.11 (0.14)
middle								0.01 (0.11)	
richXright									-0.10 (0.24)
richXcenter									-0.08 (0.25)
_cons	0.11* (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.09)	0.03 (0.06)	0.11* (0.07)	0.16** (0.08)	-0.00 (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)
N	617	617	617	617	617	499	499	456	456

Baseline control group. The outcome variable is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.11: Correlates of poorshare - Share of wealth (bottom 50).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
right	0.27*** (0.09)			0.17 (0.14)	0.05 (0.10)		0.10 (0.24)		0.24* (0.12)
center	0.37*** (0.10)			0.31*** (0.14)			0.52** (0.21)		
male		-0.22*** (0.08)		-0.31*** (0.11)					
highed			-0.22*** (0.08)		-0.34*** (0.10)				
maleXright				0.23 (0.18)					
maleXcenter				0.09 (0.21)					
highedXright					0.30 (0.20)				
highedXcenter					0.31* (0.18)				
populist						0.38*** (0.09)	0.32** (0.14)		
populistXright							0.04 (0.28)		
populistXcenter							-0.27 (0.27)		
rich								-0.25* (0.13)	-0.24* (0.14)
middle								-0.12 (0.11)	
richXright									-0.13 (0.23)
richXcenter									0.57* (0.31)
-cons	-0.18*** (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.06)
N	617	617	617	617	617	499	499	456	456

Baseline control group. The outcome variable is standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.12: Correlates of poorimmshare - (Immigrants share among the poor).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
right	0.14 (0.09)			0.13 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.10)		0.13 (0.28)		0.01 (0.12)
center	0.25** (0.10)			0.15 (0.13)			0.63*** (0.21)		
male		-0.07 (0.08)		-0.12 (0.12)					
highed					-0.23** (0.11)				
maleXright			-0.18** (0.09)	0.03 (0.19)					
maleXcenter				0.22 (0.21)					
highedXright					0.26 (0.21)				
highedXcenter					-0.10 (0.18)				
populist						0.06 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.13)		
populistXright							0.11 (0.31)		
populistXcenter							-0.36 (0.27)		
rich								0.00 (0.13)	-0.25 (0.17)
middle								0.09 (0.11)	
richXright									0.33 (0.24)
richXcenter									0.37 (0.32)
_cons	-0.10* (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)
N	617	617	617	617	617	499	499	456	456

Baseline control group. The outcome variable is standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.13: Correlates of poorimminc (Poverty incidence among immigrants).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
right	-0.05 (0.09)			-0.07 (0.14)	-0.17* (0.10)		0.06 (0.30)		-0.12 (0.11)
center	0.22** (0.10)			0.22 (0.13)			0.42* (0.22)		
male		0.03 (0.08)		0.04 (0.12)					
highed			-0.01 (0.08)		-0.08 (0.11)				
maleXright				0.04 (0.19)					
maleXcenter				0.01 (0.21)					
highedXright					0.18 (0.20)				
highedXcenter					0.02 (0.17)				
populist						0.05 (0.09)	0.15 (0.14)		
populistXright							-0.19 (0.33)		
populistXcenter							-0.30 (0.27)		
rich								-0.11 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.17)
middle								-0.02 (0.11)	
richXright									0.09 (0.25)
richXcenter									-0.01 (0.30)
-cons	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)
N	617	617	617	617	617	499	499	456	456

Baseline control group. The outcome variable is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.14: Correlates of poirtainc (Poverty incidence among Italians).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
right	0.38*** (0.09)			0.43*** (0.14)	0.20* (0.10)		0.41 (0.25)		0.14 (0.11)
center		0.43*** (0.11)		0.56*** (0.15)			0.50** (0.21)		
male		-0.36*** (0.08)		-0.26** (0.11)					
highed			-0.25*** (0.08)		-0.27*** (0.10)				
maleXright				-0.05 (0.18)					
maleXcenter				-0.41** (0.20)					
highedXright					0.05 (0.18)				
highedXcenter					0.20 (0.17)				
populist						0.34*** (0.09)	0.15 (0.12)		
populistXright							-0.05 (0.29)		
populistXcenter							-0.07 (0.27)		
rich								-0.42*** (0.12)	-0.45*** (0.11)
middle								-0.28*** (0.11)	
richXright									0.38* (0.22)
richXcenter									0.17 (0.19)
-cons	-0.23*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.06)	-0.35*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.06)
N	617	617	617	617	617	499	499	456	456

Baseline control group. The outcome variable is standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.15: Correlates of immorigindiv (Origin of no-European immigrants).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
right	0.13 (0.09)			0.07 (0.14)	0.08 (0.10)		0.33 (0.20)		0.20* (0.11)
center	0.02 (0.10)			-0.06 (0.13)			-0.32 (0.21)		
male		0.20** (0.08)		0.11 (0.12)					
highed			-0.05 (0.08)		-0.11 (0.11)				
maleXright				0.10 (0.19)					
maleXcenter				0.24 (0.20)					
highedXright					0.18 (0.20)				
highedXcenter					0.15 (0.16)				
populist						0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.14)		
populistXright							-0.25 (0.25)		
populistXcenter							0.39 (0.26)		
rich								-0.01 (0.13)	0.06 (0.16)
middle								-0.05 (0.11)	
richXright									-0.15 (0.24)
richXcenter									0.05 (0.32)
-cons	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.10* (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)
N	617	617	617	617	617	499	499	456	456

Baseline control group. The outcome variable is standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.16: Correlates of immreligiondv (Share of no-Catholic immigrants).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
right	0.19** (0.09)			0.17 (0.13)	0.18* (0.10)		-0.01 (0.23)		0.19* (0.11)
center	-0.02 (0.11)			-0.01 (0.14)			-0.15 (0.24)		
male		-0.06 (0.08)		-0.09 (0.12)					
highed			-0.09 (0.09)		-0.08 (0.11)				
maleXright				0.05 (0.18)					
maleXcenter				-0.05 (0.22)					
highedXright					0.06 (0.19)				
highedXcenter					0.00 (0.18)				
populist						0.21** (0.09)	0.10 (0.14)		
populistXright							0.19 (0.26)		
populistXcenter							0.15 (0.28)		
rich								0.15 (0.12)	0.07 (0.16)
middle								-0.02 (0.11)	
richXright									0.09 (0.22)
richXcenter									0.23 (0.31)
-cons	-0.06 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)
N	617	617	617	617	617	499	499	456	456

Baseline control group. The outcome variable is standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.



Table C.17: Correlation between Perceptions and Policy Preferences - POPULIST SAMPLE

	General Redistr. (1)	Tax Rich (2)	Wealth Tax (3)	Estate Tax (4)	Support Poor (all) (5)	Spend Poor (6)	Spend Unempl. (7)	Spend Educ. (8)	Index Redistr. (9)	Support Poor (1b) (10)	Exclusive (11)
richshare	0.057 (0.032)	0.019 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.049)	0.018 (0.051)	0.064 (0.057)	-0.019 (0.054)	-0.115** (0.054)	-0.018 (0.050)	0.006 (0.054)	0.058 (0.052)	0.022 (0.021)
poorshare	-0.021 (0.053)	-0.041* (0.024)	-0.035 (0.054)	0.029 (0.055)	0.067 (0.056)	-0.007 (0.057)	-0.147*** (0.055)	-0.055 (0.056)	-0.066 (0.054)	0.036 (0.050)	0.013 (0.023)
poortimshare	-0.040 (0.051)	0.008 (0.025)	-0.008 (0.056)	-0.044 (0.057)	-0.108* (0.057)	0.047 (0.053)	0.043 (0.053)	-0.057 (0.054)	-0.039 (0.053)	-0.041 (0.053)	0.012 (0.023)
poortiminc	-0.002 (0.050)	0.003 (0.025)	0.047 (0.059)	-0.024 (0.058)	0.127** (0.053)	-0.082 (0.051)	-0.001 (0.049)	0.108** (0.053)	0.046 (0.049)	0.038 (0.054)	-0.035 (0.023)
poortitainc	0.157*** (0.051)	0.032 (0.024)	-0.081 (0.056)	-0.082 (0.053)	0.031 (0.057)	0.049 (0.056)	0.068 (0.052)	0.002 (0.056)	0.054 (0.049)	0.120*** (0.051)	0.074*** (0.024)
immorigindiv	0.081 (0.061)	0.055** (0.025)	0.060 (0.056)	0.078 (0.056)	0.015 (0.065)	0.004 (0.053)	0.063 (0.049)	0.063 (0.055)	0.123** (0.053)	-0.005 (0.056)	0.009 (0.025)
immreligiondiv	-0.081 (0.057)	-0.042* (0.025)	-0.006 (0.059)	-0.075 (0.056)	-0.011 (0.064)	0.000 (0.054)	-0.060 (0.054)	-0.081 (0.057)	-0.103** (0.053)	0.098* (0.056)	0.015 (0.024)
populist	-0.322*** (0.096)	-0.099** (0.047)	-0.306*** (0.096)	-0.278*** (0.096)	-0.118 (0.094)	-0.116 (0.095)	0.007 (0.095)	-0.150 (0.098)	-0.382*** (0.097)	0.468*** (0.098)	0.105** (0.041)
-cons	0.062 (0.135)	0.699*** (0.064)	0.083 (0.146)	0.016 (0.136)	-0.189 (0.144)	0.144 (0.139)	-0.103 (0.134)	-0.138 (0.132)	-0.001 (0.138)	-0.344** (0.136)	0.374*** (0.061)

Baseline control group (N=499). The table reports estimates of separate regressions of the variable in the column on the relative (standardized) perception (King et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, left-wing, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in a city, suburb or rural area, and living in the South or Islands. \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table C.18: Correlation between Perceptions and Policy Preferences - INCOME SAMPLE

	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Unempl.	Spend (8)	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (I)	Exclusive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
richshare	0.063 (0.058)	-0.015 (0.025)	0.012 (0.054)	0.035 (0.057)	0.025 (0.053)	-0.125** (0.055)	0.011 (0.052)	-0.020 (0.056)	0.012 (0.056)	0.009 (0.021)
poorshare	-0.076 (0.057)	-0.075*** (0.026)	-0.029 (0.056)	0.005 (0.058)	0.028 (0.054)	-0.096 (0.060)	-0.068 (0.059)	-0.102* (0.056)	0.022 (0.054)	0.023 (0.025)
poorimmshare	-0.021 (0.057)	0.028 (0.027)	0.011 (0.059)	-0.007 (0.062)	-0.145*** (0.056)	0.030 (0.057)	-0.064 (0.059)	-0.010 (0.059)	-0.024 (0.056)	0.004 (0.026)
poorimminc	-0.045 (0.055)	-0.012 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.058)	-0.056 (0.060)	0.090* (0.051)	-0.024 (0.051)	0.115** (0.053)	-0.009 (0.052)	-0.004 (0.055)	-0.036 (0.025)
poortainc	0.079 (0.053)	0.014 (0.026)	-0.075 (0.056)	-0.085 (0.058)	0.016 (0.056)	0.074 (0.059)	-0.032 (0.064)	0.014 (0.053)	0.191*** (0.056)	0.065** (0.026)
immorigindiv	0.052 (0.062)	0.045 (0.028)	0.071 (0.061)	0.103* (0.059)	-0.043 (0.065)	0.047 (0.053)	0.057 (0.062)	0.103* (0.061)	0.025 (0.061)	-0.009 (0.027)
immreligiondiv	-0.082 (0.063)	-0.044 (0.027)	-0.010 (0.063)	-0.078 (0.060)	-0.022 (0.067)	0.029 (0.057)	-0.130** (0.061)	-0.104* (0.061)	0.069 (0.061)	0.040 (0.025)
rich	-0.284* (0.132)	0.007 (0.072)	-0.183 (0.151)	0.019 (0.149)	-0.287* (0.147)	-0.103 (0.156)	0.204* (0.153)	-0.141 (0.149)	-0.336** (0.137)	-0.102 (0.066)
middle	-0.143 (0.117)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.144 (0.115)	-0.064 (0.118)	-0.281** (0.115)	0.007 (0.121)	0.273** (0.127)	-0.098 (0.115)	-0.381*** (0.111)	-0.022 (0.056)
-cons	-0.003 (0.134)	0.700*** (0.067)	0.030 (0.142)	-0.160 (0.143)	-0.088 (0.145)	-0.088 (0.138)	-0.353** (0.154)	-0.105 (0.142)	0.284** (0.142)	0.382*** (0.067)

Baseline control group (N=456). The table reports estimates of separate regressions of the variable in the column on the relative (standardized) perception (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, left-wing, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in a city, suburb or rural area, and living in the South or Islands. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.19: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on policy preferences - POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

	General Redistr. (1)	Tax Rich (2)	Wealth Tax (3)	Estate Tax (4)	Support Poor (all) (5)	Spend Unempl. (6)	Spend Educ. (7)	Index Redistr. (8)	Support Poor (lb) (9)	Exclusive (10)	Exclusive (11)
T1	0.002 (0.072)	0.027 (0.036)	-0.045 (0.073)	-0.014 (0.077)	0.053 (0.079)	0.015 (0.085)	-0.078 (0.081)	-0.073 (0.083)	-0.022 (0.073)	0.049 (0.090)	-0.025 (0.031)
T2	-0.030 (0.072)	-0.035 (0.038)	-0.054 (0.076)	0.030 (0.078)	0.027 (0.081)	0.069 (0.085)	0.011 (0.081)	-0.006 (0.086)	-0.007 (0.075)	-0.122 (0.092)	0.007 (0.032)
T3	-0.077 (0.074)	-0.039 (0.038)	-0.014 (0.071)	-0.027 (0.075)	0.102 (0.078)	0.117 (0.087)	-0.072 (0.083)	-0.066 (0.086)	-0.030 (0.073)	0.070 (0.090)	-0.001 (0.032)
T4	-0.017 (0.071)	-0.040 (0.037)	-0.121 (0.076)	-0.058 (0.074)	0.029 (0.078)	0.111 (0.084)	-0.093 (0.079)	-0.094 (0.083)	-0.084 (0.073)	-0.185** (0.090)	-0.033 (0.030)
T1X:right	0.038 (0.130)	0.013 (0.061)	0.144 (0.129)	0.070 (0.129)	-0.016 (0.136)	0.013 (0.134)	-0.081 (0.124)	-0.064 (0.134)	0.034 (0.122)	-0.155 (0.128)	-0.028 (0.057)
T2X:right	0.032 (0.129)	0.004 (0.062)	0.121 (0.129)	0.014 (0.127)	-0.119 (0.133)	-0.030 (0.133)	0.063 (0.125)	-0.072 (0.132)	0.004 (0.126)	-0.086 (0.129)	-0.036 (0.057)
T3X:right	0.059 (0.134)	0.094 (0.061)	0.008 (0.127)	-0.099 (0.126)	-0.028 (0.132)	-0.097 (0.132)	0.136 (0.128)	-0.098 (0.131)	0.020 (0.124)	-0.187 (0.129)	0.007 (0.057)
T4X:right	-0.100 (0.131)	0.054 (0.062)	0.119 (0.130)	-0.040 (0.125)	-0.136 (0.133)	-0.147 (0.136)	0.088 (0.127)	-0.075 (0.132)	-0.046 (0.125)	0.132 (0.127)	-0.009 (0.056)
T1X:center	0.029 (0.140)	-0.031 (0.068)	0.168 (0.136)	0.089 (0.139)	-0.123 (0.143)	0.004 (0.150)	0.136 (0.146)	0.060 (0.139)	0.076 (0.137)	-0.057 (0.143)	-0.019 (0.060)
T2X:center	0.040 (0.137)	0.058 (0.068)	0.160 (0.137)	0.200 (0.134)	-0.181 (0.135)	-0.045 (0.149)	0.062 (0.146)	0.014 (0.147)	0.095 (0.135)	-0.001 (0.142)	-0.035 (0.061)
T3X:center	0.235* (0.137)	0.051 (0.069)	0.117 (0.134)	0.157 (0.138)	-0.117 (0.139)	-0.070 (0.156)	0.043 (0.154)	0.090 (0.148)	0.144 (0.137)	0.021 (0.143)	-0.023 (0.062)
T4X:center	0.085 (0.140)	0.094 (0.068)	0.244* (0.140)	0.278** (0.136)	-0.098 (0.137)	0.027 (0.161)	-0.020 (0.148)	0.047 (0.144)	0.195 (0.138)	0.079 (0.142)	-0.004 (0.060)
right	-0.603*** (0.093)	-0.222*** (0.044)	-0.521*** (0.091)	-0.514*** (0.091)	-0.383*** (0.096)	-0.195** (0.092)	-0.174* (0.092)	-0.194** (0.093)	-0.782*** (0.087)	0.422*** (0.090)	0.211*** (0.041)
center	-0.356*** (0.098)	-0.140*** (0.048)	-0.424*** (0.099)	-0.433*** (0.100)	-0.128 (0.097)	-0.072 (0.105)	-0.039 (0.105)	-0.293*** (0.097)	-0.527*** (0.099)	0.228** (0.101)	0.120*** (0.044)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.20: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Perceptions - POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

	Share of Wealth Top 10 (1)	Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2)	Share of Immigrants among poor (3)	Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4)	Incidence of poverty Italians (5)	Share of no-European Immigrants (6)	Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7)
T1	-0.287** (0.084)	0.061 (0.084)	-0.079 (0.083)	0.035 (0.084)	0.127 (0.077)	-0.012 (0.085)	0.035 (0.084)
T2	-0.335*** (0.086)	-0.039 (0.084)	-0.106 (0.081)	-0.195** (0.077)	-0.201*** (0.074)	0.178** (0.085)	0.111 (0.084)
T3	-0.308*** (0.082)	-0.069 (0.083)	0.074 (0.082)	0.011 (0.082)	0.042 (0.075)	-0.184** (0.079)	0.132* (0.078)
T4	-0.290*** (0.080)	-0.126 (0.082)	-0.016 (0.080)	-0.123 (0.077)	-0.099 (0.077)	-0.283*** (0.078)	0.171** (0.076)
T1Xright	0.191 (0.130)	-0.285** (0.128)	-0.000 (0.134)	-0.040 (0.134)	-0.194 (0.129)	0.110 (0.131)	0.106 (0.125)
T2Xright	0.214* (0.128)	0.017 (0.130)	-0.083 (0.126)	0.061 (0.123)	-0.109 (0.120)	-0.152 (0.128)	-0.061 (0.125)
T3Xright	0.272** (0.125)	-0.036 (0.131)	-0.138 (0.129)	-0.036 (0.130)	-0.025 (0.126)	0.082 (0.123)	0.029 (0.116)
T4Xright	0.246* (0.127)	0.048 (0.134)	-0.183 (0.130)	0.032 (0.123)	-0.083 (0.123)	0.180 (0.124)	-0.086 (0.117)
T1Xcenter	0.192 (0.143)	-0.157 (0.145)	-0.006 (0.147)	-0.354** (0.146)	-0.184 (0.149)	0.046 (0.142)	0.170 (0.143)
T2Xcenter	0.122 (0.145)	-0.009 (0.146)	-0.194 (0.140)	-0.128 (0.135)	-0.038 (0.144)	-0.071 (0.140)	-0.145 (0.149)
T3Xcenter	0.184 (0.139)	0.001 (0.148)	-0.266* (0.141)	-0.282* (0.146)	-0.172 (0.138)	0.260* (0.138)	0.136 (0.139)
T4Xcenter	0.156 (0.141)	-0.171 (0.144)	-0.198 (0.141)	-0.261* (0.134)	-0.116 (0.149)	0.069 (0.136)	-0.034 (0.139)
right	-0.229** (0.093)	0.239** (0.093)	0.136 (0.094)	-0.052 (0.093)	0.363*** (0.087)	0.113 (0.093)	0.181** (0.090)
center	-0.143 (0.103)	0.315*** (0.100)	0.243** (0.103)	0.208** (0.103)	0.336*** (0.103)	0.017 (0.102)	-0.023 (0.108)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.21: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Feelings and Opinions - - POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1)	Migrants Economic Threat (2)	Migrants Cultural Threat (3)	Problem: Low Education (4)	Problem: Income Differences (5)	Problem: Loss of Identity (6)	Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7)
T1	-0.146* (0.084)	0.033 (0.074)	-0.017 (0.073)	0.065 (0.078)	0.050 (0.081)	0.019 (0.075)	-0.034 (0.078)
T2	0.130 (0.083)	0.071 (0.078)	-0.047 (0.075)	-0.063 (0.083)	0.195** (0.081)	0.058 (0.079)	-0.001 (0.083)
T3	-0.095 (0.080)	0.075 (0.075)	-0.090 (0.073)	-0.029 (0.081)	0.088 (0.083)	-0.045 (0.076)	0.129 (0.080)
T4	-0.021 (0.081)	-0.021 (0.072)	-0.074 (0.074)	-0.039 (0.080)	0.187** (0.080)	-0.072 (0.075)	0.055 (0.077)
T1X:right	-0.064 (0.130)	-0.034 (0.122)	-0.014 (0.123)	-0.198 (0.127)	0.064 (0.132)	-0.070 (0.126)	0.101 (0.128)
T2X:right	-0.117 (0.122)	-0.163 (0.125)	-0.014 (0.121)	0.024 (0.127)	-0.164 (0.131)	-0.084 (0.129)	0.077 (0.127)
T3X:right	-0.217* (0.125)	-0.049 (0.124)	0.202* (0.118)	-0.116 (0.123)	0.078 (0.133)	0.080 (0.127)	-0.037 (0.125)
T4X:right	-0.100 (0.125)	0.052 (0.122)	0.129 (0.122)	-0.034 (0.127)	-0.042 (0.130)	0.174 (0.126)	0.085 (0.127)
T1X:center	0.017 (0.149)	-0.108 (0.129)	0.044 (0.124)	-0.228 (0.147)	-0.093 (0.139)	-0.099 (0.136)	0.190 (0.141)
T2X:center	-0.118 (0.142)	-0.187 (0.126)	0.001 (0.123)	-0.129 (0.143)	-0.183 (0.137)	-0.148 (0.140)	0.208 (0.142)
T3X:center	-0.060 (0.146)	0.084 (0.134)	0.201 (0.129)	-0.104 (0.143)	-0.130 (0.147)	0.130 (0.143)	0.159 (0.145)
T4X:center	0.030 (0.145)	-0.145 (0.127)	-0.036 (0.127)	-0.099 (0.144)	-0.112 (0.136)	-0.058 (0.141)	0.151 (0.146)
right	0.048 (0.088)	0.866*** (0.088)	0.805*** (0.090)	-0.174* (0.089)	-0.389*** (0.094)	0.578*** (0.090)	0.341*** (0.090)
center	-0.030 (0.104)	0.527*** (0.093)	0.461*** (0.091)	-0.150 (0.106)	-0.098 (0.098)	0.355*** (0.097)	0.058 (0.103)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.22: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on policy preferences - POPULIST SAMPLE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Poor	Spend Unempl.	Spend Educ.	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (It)	Exclusive
T1	0.056 (0.088)	-0.007 (0.045)	0.009 (0.090)	0.151* (0.089)	0.089 (0.098)	0.072 (0.102)	-0.072 (0.093)	-0.072 (0.100)	0.056 (0.093)	0.073 (0.107)	-0.033 (0.038)
T2	-0.093 (0.090)	-0.026 (0.046)	-0.093 (0.092)	0.026 (0.093)	-0.046 (0.099)	-0.024 (0.103)	0.056 (0.094)	0.073 (0.103)	-0.039 (0.094)	-0.116 (0.105)	-0.017 (0.038)
T3	-0.035 (0.093)	-0.010 (0.047)	-0.050 (0.091)	0.016 (0.092)	0.145 (0.100)	0.065 (0.108)	0.064 (0.100)	0.055 (0.104)	0.061 (0.095)	0.078 (0.109)	-0.032 (0.038)
T4	0.026 (0.088)	-0.027 (0.046)	-0.035 (0.093)	0.032 (0.091)	0.123 (0.098)	0.120 (0.106)	-0.016 (0.094)	-0.000 (0.100)	0.050 (0.095)	-0.181* (0.107)	-0.071** (0.035)
T1Xpopulist	0.021 (0.124)	0.080 (0.060)	0.122 (0.123)	-0.178 (0.123)	-0.048 (0.130)	-0.158 (0.131)	-0.005 (0.122)	0.081 (0.130)	0.000 (0.125)	-0.157 (0.131)	-0.036 (0.053)
T2Xpopulist	0.158 (0.125)	0.014 (0.061)	0.229* (0.125)	0.123 (0.124)	0.003 (0.130)	0.142 (0.132)	0.018 (0.123)	-0.090 (0.133)	0.157 (0.127)	-0.059 (0.131)	-0.025 (0.054)
T3Xpopulist	0.107 (0.127)	0.032 (0.061)	0.176 (0.123)	-0.047 (0.124)	-0.060 (0.130)	-0.056 (0.135)	-0.099 (0.129)	-0.139 (0.133)	-0.013 (0.126)	-0.070 (0.132)	0.007 (0.053)
T4Xpopulist	0.002 (0.123)	0.050 (0.060)	0.139 (0.124)	-0.003 (0.122)	-0.206 (0.128)	-0.091 (0.135)	-0.058 (0.123)	-0.084 (0.128)	-0.051 (0.125)	0.104 (0.130)	0.035 (0.031)
populist	-0.301*** (0.088)	-0.130*** (0.043)	-0.382*** (0.088)	-0.321*** (0.089)	-0.124 (0.091)	-0.096 (0.090)	0.030 (0.089)	-0.208** (0.089)	-0.430*** (0.089)	0.524*** (0.089)	0.149*** (0.039)
N	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.23: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Perceptions - POPULIST SAMPLE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Share of Wealth Top 10	Share of Wealth Bottom 50	Share of Immigrants among poor	Incidence of poverty Immigrants	Incidence of poverty Italians	Share of no-European Immigrants	Share of no-Catholic Immigrants
T1	-0.299*** (0.096)	0.093 (0.095)	-0.117 (0.101)	-0.032 (0.100)	0.065 (0.091)	-0.122 (0.103)	-0.018 (0.105)
T2	-0.334*** (0.093)	0.061 (0.097)	-0.141 (0.097)	-0.247*** (0.089)	-0.204** (0.087)	0.084 (0.098)	0.034 (0.105)
T3	-0.406*** (0.096)	-0.093 (0.089)	0.058 (0.099)	0.027 (0.102)	0.036 (0.089)	-0.138 (0.094)	0.255*** (0.091)
T4	-0.249*** (0.090)	-0.116 (0.093)	-0.056 (0.099)	-0.226** (0.093)	-0.170* (0.091)	-0.342*** (0.093)	0.212** (0.094)
T1Xpopulist	0.240* (0.125)	-0.281** (0.125)	0.039 (0.131)	-0.016 (0.130)	-0.077 (0.123)	0.196 (0.130)	0.125 (0.128)
T2Xpopulist	0.208* (0.124)	-0.137 (0.128)	-0.036 (0.126)	0.074 (0.119)	-0.041 (0.118)	0.026 (0.126)	0.047 (0.130)
T3Xpopulist	0.338*** (0.125)	-0.002 (0.124)	-0.182 (0.128)	-0.199 (0.130)	-0.054 (0.121)	0.027 (0.122)	-0.146 (0.117)
T4Xpopulist	0.149 (0.121)	-0.072 (0.126)	-0.116 (0.127)	0.062 (0.120)	0.050 (0.121)	0.131 (0.121)	-0.146 (0.117)
populist	-0.209** (0.090)	0.323*** (0.086)	0.065 (0.093)	0.052 (0.093)	0.299*** (0.085)	0.023 (0.092)	0.203** (0.092)
N	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.24: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Feelings and Opinions - POPULIST SAMPLE

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1)	Migrants Economic Threat (2)	Migrants Cultural Threat (3)	Problem: Low Education (4)	Problem: Income Differences (5)	Problem: Loss of Identity (6)	Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7)
T1	-0.228** (0.093)	0.068 (0.087)	0.003 (0.084)	0.082 (0.095)	0.038 (0.100)	0.044 (0.096)	-0.053 (0.083)
T2	0.095 (0.088)	-0.069 (0.080)	-0.027 (0.084)	-0.035 (0.094)	0.053 (0.099)	-0.114 (0.089)	0.117 (0.092)
T3	-0.130 (0.092)	0.106 (0.087)	0.001 (0.087)	0.049 (0.097)	0.046 (0.103)	-0.169* (0.094)	0.229*** (0.089)
T4	0.025 (0.092)	-0.014 (0.080)	0.010 (0.085)	-0.036 (0.096)	0.245** (0.096)	-0.094 (0.091)	0.038 (0.087)
T1Xpopulist	0.057 (0.126)	-0.175 (0.118)	-0.089 (0.115)	-0.096 (0.124)	0.045 (0.130)	-0.155 (0.125)	0.036 (0.119)
T2Xpopulist	-0.045 (0.118)	0.008 (0.113)	-0.086 (0.115)	-0.043 (0.124)	0.107 (0.130)	0.106 (0.123)	-0.135 (0.124)
T3Xpopulist	-0.024 (0.123)	-0.108 (0.119)	-0.021 (0.116)	-0.114 (0.124)	0.044 (0.133)	0.193 (0.125)	-0.155 (0.122)
T4Xpopulist	-0.132 (0.122)	-0.100 (0.114)	-0.150 (0.116)	0.014 (0.125)	-0.037 (0.126)	0.032 (0.125)	0.037 (0.121)
populist	-0.115 (0.086)	0.759*** (0.081)	0.803*** (0.083)	-0.194** (0.086)	-0.242*** (0.091)	0.471*** (0.088)	0.365*** (0.087)
N	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.



Table C.25: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on policy preferences - INCOME SAMPLE

	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Poor	Spend Unempl.	Spend Educ.	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (IU)	Exclusive (II)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
T1	0.203* (0.119)	0.092 (0.057)	0.147 (0.111)	0.137 (0.120)	-0.032 (0.120)	0.075 (0.132)	0.131 (0.129)	0.038 (0.125)	0.228* (0.124)	-0.133 (0.124)	-0.099* (0.053)
T2	0.064 (0.122)	-0.095* (0.058)	0.024 (0.112)	0.011 (0.118)	-0.095 (0.114)	0.103 (0.129)	0.057 (0.121)	0.069 (0.126)	0.024 (0.122)	-0.312** (0.124)	-0.059 (0.053)
T3	0.035 (0.120)	-0.003 (0.055)	-0.002 (0.113)	0.083 (0.116)	0.070 (0.115)	0.114 (0.128)	-0.072 (0.126)	0.205 (0.128)	0.110 (0.119)	-0.096 (0.119)	-0.084 (0.052)
T4	0.015 (0.122)	-0.062 (0.056)	-0.229* (0.118)	-0.012 (0.113)	-0.068 (0.116)	0.154 (0.133)	-0.024 (0.120)	0.060 (0.125)	-0.059 (0.123)	-0.252** (0.120)	-0.130*** (0.049)
T1Xrich	-0.165 (0.191)	-0.185** (0.088)	-0.267 (0.184)	-0.190 (0.181)	0.105 (0.192)	-0.120 (0.193)	-0.248 (0.182)	0.250 (0.181)	-0.262 (0.188)	0.055 (0.190)	0.159** (0.078)
T2Xrich	-0.144 (0.193)	0.001 (0.088)	-0.083 (0.182)	-0.157 (0.178)	-0.143 (0.181)	-0.118 (0.187)	-0.061 (0.175)	-0.154 (0.185)	-0.220 (0.189)	0.215 (0.183)	0.146* (0.079)
T3Xrich	-0.031 (0.190)	-0.096 (0.088)	0.040 (0.179)	-0.157 (0.177)	0.011 (0.183)	-0.164 (0.194)	0.036 (0.182)	-0.098 (0.191)	-0.144 (0.184)	0.078 (0.190)	0.239*** (0.081)
T4Xrich	0.129 (0.196)	0.002 (0.089)	0.323* (0.186)	-0.092 (0.183)	0.140 (0.188)	-0.191 (0.197)	0.047 (0.180)	-0.185 (0.190)	0.045 (0.195)	0.103 (0.197)	0.177** (0.078)
T1Xmiddle	-0.082 (0.152)	-0.039 (0.071)	-0.033 (0.144)	-0.128 (0.154)	0.158 (0.157)	-0.127 (0.161)	-0.256* (0.154)	-0.217 (0.155)	-0.196 (0.153)	0.285* (0.156)	0.048 (0.066)
T2Xmiddle	-0.081 (0.153)	0.150** (0.072)	0.017 (0.145)	0.160 (0.149)	-0.025 (0.147)	-0.074 (0.157)	0.043 (0.149)	-0.034 (0.157)	0.081 (0.151)	0.240 (0.156)	0.045 (0.066)
T3Xmiddle	0.002 (0.155)	0.016 (0.072)	-0.017 (0.146)	-0.226 (0.152)	-0.068 (0.151)	-0.057 (0.158)	0.060 (0.155)	-0.384** (0.159)	-0.169 (0.153)	0.177 (0.154)	0.078 (0.066)
T4Xmiddle	-0.021 (0.153)	0.086 (0.071)	0.205 (0.149)	0.071 (0.145)	0.057 (0.147)	-0.132 (0.162)	-0.078 (0.149)	-0.152 (0.154)	0.033 (0.153)	0.295* (0.152)	0.123* (0.064)
rich	-0.209 (0.139)	0.036 (0.063)	-0.056 (0.132)	0.169 (0.128)	-0.203 (0.132)	-0.056 (0.139)	-0.071 (0.135)	0.213 (0.132)	-0.036 (0.132)	-0.319** (0.132)	-0.137** (0.057)
middle	-0.061 (0.109)	-0.000 (0.052)	-0.069 (0.106)	0.074 (0.109)	-0.193* (0.107)	0.047 (0.110)	0.020 (0.111)	0.249** (0.113)	0.017 (0.111)	-0.364*** (0.108)	-0.056 (0.049)
N	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.26: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Perceptions - INCOME SAMPLE

	Share of Wealth Top 10 (1)	Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2)	Share of Immigrants among poor (3)	Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4)	Incidence of poverty Italians (5)	Share of no-European Immigrants (6)	Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7)
T1	-0.104 (0.123)	-0.176 (0.125)	-0.073 (0.126)	-0.097 (0.125)	-0.046 (0.129)	0.111 (0.117)	0.082 (0.119)
T2	-0.223* (0.121)	-0.119 (0.131)	-0.069 (0.117)	-0.197* (0.116)	-0.176 (0.117)	0.093 (0.117)	0.107 (0.116)
T3	-0.065 (0.118)	-0.116 (0.127)	0.026 (0.116)	-0.168 (0.115)	-0.011 (0.120)	-0.102 (0.116)	0.227** (0.104)
T4	-0.224* (0.118)	-0.140 (0.131)	-0.090 (0.116)	-0.162 (0.109)	-0.120 (0.124)	-0.284** (0.119)	0.069 (0.112)
T1Xrich	-0.039 (0.179)	0.144 (0.184)	0.047 (0.195)	0.267 (0.190)	0.097 (0.183)	-0.148 (0.183)	-0.283 (0.178)
T2Xrich	-0.098 (0.179)	0.050 (0.185)	-0.050 (0.183)	-0.054 (0.172)	-0.034 (0.167)	0.182 (0.176)	-0.229 (0.175)
T3Xrich	-0.153 (0.176)	0.009 (0.184)	-0.127 (0.181)	0.176 (0.181)	0.047 (0.174)	0.014 (0.177)	-0.078 (0.156)
T4Xrich	0.242 (0.178)	-0.069 (0.185)	0.098 (0.188)	0.046 (0.173)	-0.041 (0.175)	0.115 (0.177)	0.062 (0.156)
T1Xmiddle	-0.023 (0.155)	0.069 (0.155)	-0.089 (0.158)	-0.044 (0.158)	0.229 (0.157)	-0.196 (0.150)	0.076 (0.149)
T2Xmiddle	0.034 (0.151)	0.125 (0.160)	-0.109 (0.147)	0.051 (0.146)	0.021 (0.146)	-0.118 (0.148)	-0.118 (0.150)
T3Xmiddle	-0.069 (0.149)	0.018 (0.160)	0.035 (0.150)	0.132 (0.150)	0.134 (0.150)	-0.047 (0.146)	-0.096 (0.137)
T4Xmiddle	0.072 (0.149)	-0.030 (0.161)	-0.101 (0.147)	-0.072 (0.140)	0.034 (0.150)	0.073 (0.146)	0.127 (0.142)
rich	-0.004 (0.133)	-0.292** (0.136)	-0.079 (0.135)	-0.105 (0.133)	-0.404*** (0.133)	0.052 (0.138)	0.248** (0.125)
middle	0.003 (0.113)	-0.192* (0.114)	0.038 (0.109)	-0.004 (0.109)	-0.280*** (0.106)	-0.008 (0.111)	0.056 (0.109)
N	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.27: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Feelings and Opinions - INCOME SAMPLE

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1)	Migrants Economic Threat (2)	Migrants Cultural Threat (3)	Problem: Low Education (4)	Problem: Income Differences (5)	Problem: Loss of Identity (6)	Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7)
T1	-0.319** (0.130)	-0.068 (0.129)	0.001 (0.121)	-0.068 (0.113)	0.114 (0.121)	0.124 (0.124)	0.141 (0.130)
T2	-0.177 (0.119)	0.011 (0.128)	-0.049 (0.118)	-0.008 (0.117)	0.177 (0.117)	-0.000 (0.117)	0.183 (0.127)
T3	-0.321*** (0.110)	0.024 (0.128)	0.021 (0.119)	-0.029 (0.111)	0.087 (0.122)	0.034 (0.111)	0.151 (0.123)
T4	-0.162 (0.116)	-0.066 (0.122)	-0.009 (0.118)	-0.026 (0.114)	0.126 (0.113)	0.084 (0.117)	0.166 (0.120)
T1Xrich	0.223 (0.178)	-0.141 (0.190)	-0.287 (0.182)	0.341* (0.175)	-0.003 (0.189)	-0.316 (0.198)	-0.051 (0.180)
T2Xrich	0.116 (0.163)	-0.091 (0.190)	-0.050 (0.182)	0.043 (0.179)	-0.058 (0.183)	0.161 (0.179)	0.078 (0.179)
T3Xrich	0.328** (0.164)	-0.216 (0.197)	-0.126 (0.188)	0.063 (0.178)	0.009 (0.193)	-0.103 (0.193)	0.248 (0.183)
T4Xrich	0.119 (0.165)	0.034 (0.201)	-0.012 (0.190)	0.098 (0.190)	0.152 (0.181)	-0.139 (0.202)	0.010 (0.180)
T1Xmiddle	0.159 (0.156)	0.104 (0.158)	0.084 (0.153)	-0.193 (0.148)	-0.083 (0.153)	-0.169 (0.155)	-0.083 (0.159)
T2Xmiddle	0.367** (0.143)	-0.057 (0.157)	0.020 (0.149)	-0.199 (0.149)	-0.201 (0.151)	-0.030 (0.150)	-0.153 (0.156)
T3Xmiddle	0.170 (0.135)	0.104 (0.159)	0.049 (0.151)	-0.256* (0.146)	0.020 (0.157)	-0.070 (0.150)	0.002 (0.154)
T4Xmiddle	0.183 (0.141)	0.076 (0.153)	-0.011 (0.151)	-0.175 (0.146)	0.071 (0.148)	-0.214 (0.148)	-0.073 (0.150)
rich	0.883*** (0.121)	0.175 (0.143)	0.144 (0.138)	0.091 (0.130)	-0.249* (0.136)	0.121 (0.142)	-0.263** (0.129)
middle	0.336*** (0.102)	-0.017 (0.117)	0.001 (0.113)	0.236** (0.106)	-0.058 (0.110)	0.092 (0.108)	-0.014 (0.111)
N	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489	2489

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (King et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.28: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on policy preferences - EDUCATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Poor	Spend Unempl.	Spend Educ.	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (lt.)	Exclusive
T1	0.053 (0.069)	0.046 (0.033)	0.067 (0.069)	0.044 (0.069)	0.061 (0.072)	0.095 (0.075)	-0.061 (0.070)	-0.102 (0.071)	0.065 (0.068)	0.008 (0.068)	-0.071** (0.031)
T2	0.027 (0.069)	0.006 (0.033)	0.064 (0.069)	0.087 (0.069)	0.019 (0.069)	0.100 (0.072)	0.007 (0.069)	-0.069 (0.071)	0.063 (0.069)	-0.097 (0.067)	-0.038 (0.031)
T3	0.017 (0.070)	0.048 (0.033)	0.097 (0.067)	0.024 (0.068)	0.106 (0.069)	0.079 (0.073)	-0.075 (0.071)	-0.017 (0.071)	0.085 (0.067)	-0.044 (0.068)	-0.039 (0.031)
T4	0.019 (0.070)	0.026 (0.033)	0.049 (0.070)	0.042 (0.068)	0.024 (0.070)	0.153** (0.075)	-0.055 (0.070)	-0.095 (0.070)	0.049 (0.070)	-0.113 (0.069)	-0.082*** (0.030)
T1Xhighed	-0.068 (0.119)	-0.059 (0.055)	-0.064 (0.116)	-0.025 (0.118)	-0.112 (0.121)	-0.212* (0.117)	-0.020 (0.112)	0.071 (0.118)	-0.142 (0.117)	-0.081 (0.122)	0.090* (0.049)
T2Xhighed	-0.132 (0.121)	-0.086 (0.057)	-0.140 (0.118)	-0.036 (0.116)	-0.243** (0.120)	-0.164 (0.120)	0.115 (0.113)	0.113 (0.121)	-0.171 (0.122)	-0.147 (0.124)	0.081 (0.050)
T3Xhighed	-0.056 (0.124)	-0.126** (0.057)	-0.232** (0.117)	-0.130 (0.118)	-0.114 (0.119)	-0.029 (0.123)	0.174 (0.119)	-0.167 (0.121)	-0.210* (0.123)	0.154 (0.123)	0.102** (0.051)
T4Xhighed	-0.109 (0.121)	-0.069 (0.056)	-0.197* (0.117)	-0.114 (0.115)	-0.160 (0.118)	-0.238* (0.123)	-0.033 (0.115)	-0.015 (0.120)	-0.259** (0.119)	-0.066 (0.123)	0.125** (0.049)
highed	-0.055 (0.085)	0.102** (0.040)	0.154* (0.084)	0.128 (0.084)	0.029 (0.084)	0.011 (0.083)	-0.165** (0.083)	0.233*** (0.083)	0.141* (0.084)	-0.275*** (0.087)	-0.127*** (0.035)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.29: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Perceptions - EDUCATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Share of Wealth Top 10	Share of Wealth Bottom 50	Share of Immigrants among poor	Incidence of poverty Immigrants	Incidence of poverty Italians	Share of no-European Immigrants	Share of no-Catholic Immigrants
T1	-0.234*** (0.071)	-0.041 (0.070)	-0.131* (0.071)	-0.057 (0.071)	0.078 (0.072)	0.115* (0.068)	0.133** (0.067)
T2	-0.221*** (0.069)	0.002 (0.072)	-0.178*** (0.067)	-0.163** (0.066)	-0.235*** (0.068)	0.081 (0.069)	0.064 (0.068)
T3	-0.151** (0.067)	-0.075 (0.073)	-0.130* (0.068)	-0.117* (0.069)	-0.007 (0.069)	-0.110* (0.066)	0.151** (0.065)
T4	-0.181*** (0.068)	-0.169** (0.072)	-0.196*** (0.068)	-0.166** (0.066)	-0.143** (0.070)	-0.208*** (0.067)	0.154** (0.063)
T1Xhighed	0.159 (0.116)	-0.084 (0.116)	0.144 (0.122)	-0.006 (0.120)	-0.174 (0.114)	-0.240** (0.120)	-0.080 (0.117)
T2Xhighed	-0.045 (0.118)	-0.098 (0.116)	0.008 (0.114)	-0.120 (0.110)	-0.019 (0.114)	0.084 (0.115)	-0.026 (0.120)
T3Xhighed	-0.072 (0.115)	-0.036 (0.118)	0.290** (0.118)	0.152 (0.119)	-0.008 (0.113)	0.028 (0.112)	0.063 (0.109)
T4Xhighed	0.025 (0.115)	0.038 (0.118)	0.220* (0.117)	-0.019 (0.110)	-0.056 (0.113)	-0.013 (0.110)	-0.062 (0.110)
highed	-0.000 (0.086)	-0.221*** (0.082)	-0.181** (0.086)	-0.011 (0.085)	-0.208*** (0.080)	-0.040 (0.084)	-0.062 (0.086)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.30: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Feelings and Opinions - EDUCATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Poor-rich Wealth Scale	Migrants Economic Threat	Migrants Cultural Threat	Problem: Low Education	Problem: Income Differences	Problem: Loss of Identity	Problem: Unconditional Welfare
T1	-0.195*** (0.071)	-0.048 (0.068)	-0.037 (0.067)	-0.017 (0.070)	0.039 (0.070)	-0.099 (0.068)	0.033 (0.072)
T2	0.033 (0.067)	-0.061 (0.068)	-0.040 (0.068)	-0.095 (0.069)	0.102 (0.069)	-0.023 (0.070)	0.013 (0.070)
T3	-0.088 (0.068)	0.075 (0.069)	0.032 (0.068)	-0.054 (0.068)	0.111 (0.070)	-0.009 (0.070)	0.124* (0.071)
T4	-0.043 (0.068)	-0.066 (0.069)	-0.079 (0.069)	-0.091 (0.069)	0.173*** (0.068)	-0.073 (0.069)	0.058 (0.071)
T1Xhighed	0.091 (0.119)	0.093 (0.118)	0.038 (0.115)	-0.089 (0.116)	0.040 (0.119)	0.188 (0.116)	0.020 (0.112)
T2Xhighed	0.082 (0.113)	0.123 (0.117)	-0.002 (0.113)	0.017 (0.115)	-0.034 (0.120)	0.072 (0.120)	0.198* (0.115)
T3Xhighed	-0.275** (0.116)	-0.024 (0.121)	-0.056 (0.117)	-0.098 (0.114)	-0.073 (0.125)	0.038 (0.121)	0.083 (0.112)
T4Xhighed	-0.012 (0.114)	0.031 (0.116)	0.059 (0.115)	0.074 (0.115)	-0.054 (0.118)	0.092 (0.120)	0.155 (0.113)
highed	0.395*** (0.082)	-0.246*** (0.084)	-0.265*** (0.084)	0.288*** (0.083)	-0.057 (0.086)	-0.139* (0.084)	-0.279*** (0.079)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.31: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Policy preferences - MERITOCRATS

	General Redistr. (1)	Tax Rich (2)	Wealth Tax (3)	Estate Tax (4)	Support Poor (all) (5)	Spent Poor (6)	Spent Unempl. (7)	Spent Educ. (8)	Index Redistr. (9)	Support Poor (It) (10)	Exclusive (11)
T1	0.034 (0.061)	0.056* (0.030)	0.096 (0.062)	0.071 (0.064)	0.004 (0.064)	0.041 (0.068)	-0.116* (0.064)	-0.083 (0.066)	0.042 (0.061)	-0.060 (0.065)	-0.051* (0.028)
T2	0.017 (0.062)	0.000 (0.031)	0.027 (0.065)	0.109* (0.064)	-0.014 (0.064)	0.098 (0.070)	0.028 (0.067)	-0.085 (0.069)	0.046 (0.063)	-0.144** (0.068)	-0.005 (0.029)
T3	0.089 (0.062)	0.032 (0.031)	0.080 (0.064)	0.021 (0.065)	0.089 (0.063)	0.126* (0.070)	-0.031 (0.067)	-0.046 (0.068)	0.101 (0.062)	0.007 (0.066)	-0.025 (0.029)
T4	0.001 (0.064)	0.005 (0.031)	0.008 (0.065)	0.020 (0.064)	-0.026 (0.064)	0.114 (0.071)	-0.069 (0.066)	-0.129* (0.066)	-0.019 (0.064)	-0.185*** (0.067)	-0.058** (0.028)
T1Xmeritocrat	-0.115 (0.141)	-0.141** (0.064)	-0.233* (0.136)	-0.189 (0.132)	0.018 (0.142)	-0.097 (0.130)	0.152 (0.123)	0.045 (0.132)	-0.183 (0.136)	0.138 (0.130)	0.041 (0.058)
T2Xmeritocrat	-0.081 (0.133)	-0.074 (0.062)	-0.028 (0.128)	-0.102 (0.125)	-0.136 (0.129)	-0.171 (0.122)	0.083 (0.116)	0.181 (0.122)	-0.105 (0.134)	0.006 (0.123)	-0.023 (0.054)
T3Xmeritocrat	-0.347*** (0.133)	-0.097 (0.062)	-0.223* (0.126)	-0.152 (0.126)	-0.079 (0.132)	-0.209 (0.128)	0.051 (0.124)	-0.102 (0.127)	-0.324** (0.130)	0.004 (0.129)	0.072 (0.057)
T4Xmeritocrat	-0.106 (0.131)	-0.010 (0.063)	-0.101 (0.131)	-0.077 (0.124)	-0.035 (0.130)	-0.165 (0.131)	-0.006 (0.121)	0.121 (0.127)	-0.100 (0.132)	0.188 (0.126)	0.069 (0.056)
meritocrat	-0.449*** (0.091)	-0.045 (0.044)	-0.056 (0.091)	-0.161* (0.089)	-0.347*** (0.092)	-0.078 (0.088)	-0.265*** (0.086)	0.077 (0.085)	-0.353*** (0.092)	-0.195** (0.089)	0.003 (0.039)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table C.32: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Perceptions - MERITOCRATS

	Share of Wealth Top 10 (1)	Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2)	Share of Immigrants among poor (3)	Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4)	Incidence of poverty Italians (5)	Share of no-European Immigrants (6)	Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7)
T1	-0.164** (0.065)	-0.088 (0.065)	-0.095 (0.066)	-0.072 (0.066)	0.003 (0.066)	0.048 (0.066)	0.123* (0.063)
T2	-0.234*** (0.066)	-0.028 (0.067)	-0.147** (0.064)	-0.162*** (0.062)	-0.187*** (0.066)	0.090 (0.066)	0.035 (0.066)
T3	-0.131** (0.063)	-0.081 (0.068)	-0.048 (0.065)	-0.063 (0.065)	-0.004 (0.065)	-0.115* (0.063)	0.155*** (0.060)
T4	-0.144** (0.063)	-0.144** (0.067)	-0.109* (0.065)	-0.184*** (0.061)	-0.118* (0.066)	-0.246*** (0.062)	0.110* (0.060)
T1Xmeritocrat	-0.064 (0.131)	0.077 (0.131)	0.038 (0.137)	0.044 (0.135)	0.026 (0.129)	-0.059 (0.127)	-0.062 (0.129)
T2Xmeritocrat	-0.005 (0.125)	-0.004 (0.128)	-0.101 (0.122)	-0.141 (0.118)	-0.170 (0.112)	0.059 (0.120)	0.065 (0.126)
T3Xmeritocrat	-0.166 (0.126)	-0.024 (0.127)	0.053 (0.125)	-0.012 (0.128)	-0.022 (0.119)	0.053 (0.119)	0.065 (0.119)
T4Xmeritocrat	-0.115 (0.127)	-0.050 (0.129)	-0.061 (0.126)	0.041 (0.122)	-0.184 (0.116)	0.142 (0.122)	0.101 (0.117)
meritocrat	0.006 (0.093)	-0.045 (0.091)	-0.061 (0.090)	-0.070 (0.090)	-0.189** (0.083)	0.085 (0.089)	0.079 (0.094)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.



Table C.33: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on Feelings and Opinions - MERITOCRATS

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1)	Migrants Economic Threat (2)	Migrants Cultural Threat (3)	Problem: Low Education (4)	Problem: Income Differences (5)	Problem: Loss of Identity (6)	Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7)
T1	-0.145** (0.066)	-0.068 (0.063)	-0.046 (0.063)	-0.075 (0.064)	-0.015 (0.063)	-0.020 (0.063)	0.020 (0.065)
T2	0.021 (0.064)	-0.015 (0.066)	-0.092 (0.065)	-0.129** (0.065)	0.105* (0.064)	-0.017 (0.065)	0.034 (0.067)
T3	-0.171** (0.064)	0.019 (0.065)	-0.043 (0.065)	-0.098 (0.063)	0.085 (0.065)	-0.016 (0.065)	0.116* (0.065)
T4	-0.079 (0.065)	-0.082 (0.064)	-0.085 (0.065)	-0.093 (0.064)	0.159** (0.062)	-0.033 (0.065)	0.090 (0.066)
T1Xmeritocrat	-0.070 (0.131)	0.267** (0.135)	0.126 (0.128)	0.132 (0.132)	0.192 (0.132)	-0.042 (0.133)	0.079 (0.129)
T2Xmeritocrat	0.135 (0.119)	-0.029 (0.123)	0.164 (0.117)	0.134 (0.124)	-0.004 (0.125)	0.051 (0.131)	0.155 (0.121)
T3Xmeritocrat	-0.034 (0.126)	0.182 (0.130)	0.212* (0.122)	0.042 (0.130)	0.002 (0.130)	0.075 (0.132)	0.129 (0.124)
T4Xmeritocrat	0.134 (0.123)	0.114 (0.127)	0.110 (0.122)	0.111 (0.129)	-0.053 (0.125)	-0.029 (0.132)	0.079 (0.125)
meritocrat	0.050 (0.086)	0.149 (0.091)	0.113 (0.088)	0.054 (0.090)	-0.547*** (0.091)	0.131 (0.092)	0.003 (0.085)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al. 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## D Donations

We provide here evidence of the treatment effects on preferences for donation. We ask individuals to donate part of a prize they might eventually receive through a lottery to three charities according to their aim: 1) Oxfam (organization fighting against inequality); 2) Caritas (organization supporting poor people living in Italy); 3) Arci (organization supporting the cultural and social integration of immigrants in Italy).

We find that information does not change preferences for donation as we can see in Table [D.1](#). We do not report here the heterogeneous treatment effects for space reasons. However, most of them are null except for meritocrats and rich: the former are more likely to increase their donation to Oxfam in T4 to Caritas in T1, T2 and T3; while the former are more likely to donate more to Arci in T1.

Despite the failure of finding evidence of treatment effects on the propensity to donate, we do not believe this should be necessarily interpreted as a stated preferences being a cheap talk. A recent work by [Mollerstrom, Strulov-Shlain and Taubinsky \(2021\)](#) shows that preferences for voluntary giving match preferences for redistribution only in very specific cases.

Table D.1: Treatment effects on Donation

	Oxfam	Caritas	Arci
	(1)	(2)	(3)
T1	0.062 (0.061)	-0.065 (0.055)	-0.043 (0.056)
T2	-0.000 (0.056)	0.036 (0.056)	-0.044 (0.052)
T3	0.078 (0.060)	-0.041 (0.055)	-0.002 (0.055)
T4	0.045 (0.058)	0.023 (0.055)	-0.054 (0.051)
N	3138	3138	3138

This table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the [Appendix B](#) and are standardized ([Kling et al. 2007](#)). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, left-wing, young, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## E Robustness

### E.1 Full sample - Robustness test

Table [E.1](#), [E.2](#) and [E.3](#) replicates results in Table [4](#), [5](#) and [6](#) using the full sample. In other words, we do not drop observations flagged as low quality answers as we did in the main analysis. The results suggest that our findings are not driven by our choice in the selection of the quality of answers.

Table E.1: Treatment effects on policy preferences - Full sample

	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Poor	Spend Unempl.	Spend Educ.	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (It)	Exclusive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
T1	0.030 (0.053)	0.022 (0.025)	0.060 (0.052)	0.047 (0.053)	0.033 (0.055)	0.072 (0.055)	-0.100* (0.051)	-0.039 (0.053)	0.038 (0.052)	-0.004 (0.053)	-0.023 (0.023)
T2	-0.009 (0.053)	-0.019 (0.026)	0.036 (0.053)	0.070 (0.052)	-0.037 (0.053)	0.056 (0.054)	0.006 (0.051)	0.046 (0.054)	0.033 (0.053)	-0.144*** (0.053)	-0.009 (0.023)
T3	0.005 (0.054)	0.010 (0.025)	0.036 (0.051)	-0.013 (0.052)	0.080 (0.053)	0.058 (0.054)	-0.068 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.053)	0.029 (0.053)	0.035 (0.053)	0.003 (0.023)
T4	0.011 (0.054)	0.011 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.053)	0.021 (0.052)	0.005 (0.053)	0.079 (0.056)	-0.098* (0.052)	-0.045 (0.054)	-0.002 (0.053)	-0.121** (0.054)	-0.039* (0.022)
N	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521

See notes to Table [4](#). Flagged respondents are now included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table E.2: Treatment effects on Perceptions - Full sample

	Share of Wealth Top 10	Share of Wealth Bottom 50	Share of Immigrants among poor	Incidence of poverty Immigrants	Incidence of poverty Italians	Share of European Immigrants	Share of Christian Immigrants
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T1	-0.153*** (0.053)	-0.094* (0.053)	-0.120** (0.055)	-0.070 (0.054)	-0.017 (0.053)	0.084 (0.052)	0.092* (0.052)
T2	-0.194*** (0.052)	-0.092* (0.052)	-0.225*** (0.052)	-0.222*** (0.050)	-0.294*** (0.051)	0.151*** (0.052)	0.068 (0.052)
T3	-0.160*** (0.051)	-0.137*** (0.053)	-0.063 (0.052)	-0.060 (0.053)	-0.054 (0.051)	-0.043 (0.050)	0.177*** (0.049)
T4	-0.136*** (0.051)	-0.197*** (0.053)	-0.161*** (0.053)	-0.191*** (0.050)	-0.212*** (0.052)	-0.136*** (0.050)	0.148*** (0.049)
N	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521

See notes to Table [5](#). Flagged respondents are now included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table E.3: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions - Full sample

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1)	Migrants Economic Threat (2)	Migrants Cultural Threat (3)	Problem: Low Education (4)	Problem: Income Differences (5)	Problem: Loss of Identity (6)	Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7)
T1	-0.208*** (0.054)	-0.024 (0.052)	-0.019 (0.051)	-0.058 (0.052)	0.083 (0.053)	-0.048 (0.052)	0.008 (0.052)
T2	0.024 (0.051)	-0.050 (0.052)	-0.063 (0.051)	-0.078 (0.052)	0.131** (0.053)	-0.030 (0.053)	0.044 (0.052)
T3	-0.194*** (0.052)	0.051 (0.053)	-0.002 (0.051)	-0.069 (0.051)	0.105* (0.054)	-0.011 (0.053)	0.102** (0.052)
T4	-0.084 (0.052)	-0.076 (0.052)	-0.068 (0.053)	-0.050 (0.052)	0.182*** (0.052)	-0.042 (0.053)	0.065 (0.052)
N	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521	3521

See notes to Table 6. Flagged respondents are now included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## E.2 Sample excluding respondents who think the survey was biased - Robustness test

As a second robustness check, we drop from the full sample respondents who felt that the survey was biased. Since at the end of the survey we asked respondents whether they thought that our survey was biased, we re-estimate the main tables dropping those who thought our survey was biased. These respondents account for 12.87% of our sample. The treatment effects estimated in this sample are slightly weaker but still significant in the second treatment.

Table E.4: Treatment effects on policy preferences - Sample no bias

	General Redistr. (1)	Tax Rich (2)	Wealth Tax (3)	Estate Tax (4)	Support Poor (all) (5)	Spend Poor (6)	Spend Unempl. (7)	Spend Educ. (8)	Index Redistr. (9)	Support Poor (It) (10)	Exclusive (11)
T1	0.040 (0.056)	0.034 (0.027)	0.082 (0.055)	0.038 (0.055)	0.059 (0.057)	0.070 (0.060)	-0.112** (0.055)	-0.026 (0.057)	0.057 (0.055)	0.056 (0.057)	-0.028 (0.024)
T2	-0.012 (0.055)	-0.020 (0.027)	0.037 (0.056)	0.065 (0.055)	-0.000 (0.056)	0.016 (0.058)	0.002 (0.055)	0.057 (0.057)	0.032 (0.056)	-0.112** (0.057)	-0.013 (0.025)
T3	0.035 (0.055)	0.009 (0.027)	0.038 (0.054)	-0.049 (0.055)	0.110** (0.055)	0.042 (0.058)	-0.055 (0.056)	0.010 (0.057)	0.038 (0.055)	0.054 (0.056)	-0.003 (0.025)
T4	0.064 (0.056)	0.012 (0.027)	0.017 (0.057)	0.012 (0.055)	0.036 (0.056)	0.068 (0.060)	-0.102* (0.055)	-0.030 (0.057)	0.023 (0.056)	-0.092 (0.057)	-0.050** (0.024)
N	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068

See notes to Table 4. Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table E.5: Treatment effects on Perceptions - Sample no bias

	Share of Wealth Top 10 (1)	Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2)	Share of Immigrants among poor (3)	Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4)	Incidence of poverty Italians (5)	Share of European Immigrants (6)	Share of Christian Immigrants (7)
T1	-0.175*** (0.057)	-0.045 (0.057)	-0.152*** (0.058)	-0.077 (0.058)	0.016 (0.056)	0.060 (0.056)	0.078 (0.055)
T2	-0.228*** (0.057)	-0.107* (0.056)	-0.236*** (0.055)	-0.240*** (0.054)	-0.293*** (0.054)	0.170*** (0.055)	0.086 (0.055)
T3	-0.148*** (0.054)	-0.139** (0.056)	-0.065 (0.056)	-0.082 (0.056)	-0.045 (0.053)	-0.041 (0.053)	0.198*** (0.051)
T4	-0.144*** (0.055)	-0.191*** (0.057)	-0.173*** (0.056)	-0.196*** (0.053)	-0.191*** (0.055)	-0.149*** (0.053)	0.157*** (0.052)
N	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068

See notes to Table 5. Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table E.6: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions - Sample no bias

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1)	Migrants Economic Threat (2)	Migrants Cultural Threat (3)	Problem: Low Education (4)	Problem: Income Differences (5)	Problem: Loss of Identity (6)	Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7)
T1	-0.251*** (0.056)	-0.004 (0.055)	-0.008 (0.054)	-0.036 (0.056)	0.084 (0.057)	-0.051 (0.056)	0.014 (0.055)
T2	0.000 (0.054)	-0.057 (0.054)	-0.050 (0.053)	-0.053 (0.056)	0.106* (0.056)	-0.063 (0.057)	0.049 (0.056)
T3	-0.215*** (0.054)	0.053 (0.055)	-0.002 (0.053)	-0.060 (0.055)	0.135** (0.057)	-0.034 (0.056)	0.119** (0.055)
T4	-0.104* (0.055)	-0.075 (0.055)	-0.069 (0.055)	-0.051 (0.056)	0.172*** (0.056)	-0.081 (0.056)	0.075 (0.056)
N	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068	3068

See notes to Table 6. Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

### E.3 Sample excluding extreme patterns - Robustness test

Similar to [Alesina et al. \(2022\)](#), we also compute the share of respondents who gave extreme answers, namely the first and the last option, on a set of 28 questions. We then drop respondents whose answers lie at least half of the times in one of the two extremes (1.11% of the sample) and we re-estimate the main results reported in Table [E.7](#), [E.8](#), and [E.9](#).

Table E.7: Treatment effects on policy preferences - Sample no extreme answers

	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Poor	Spend Unempl.	Spend Educ.	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (It)	Exclusive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
T1	0.024 (0.054)	0.020 (0.026)	0.060 (0.053)	0.041 (0.053)	0.018 (0.055)	0.127** (0.060)	-0.103** (0.049)	-0.034 (0.053)	0.046 (0.053)	-0.005 (0.054)	-0.029 (0.023)
T2	-0.017 (0.053)	-0.020 (0.026)	0.037 (0.053)	0.074 (0.053)	-0.050 (0.054)	0.073 (0.057)	-0.027 (0.048)	0.047 (0.055)	0.025 (0.054)	-0.147*** (0.054)	-0.012 (0.023)
T3	-0.002 (0.054)	0.006 (0.025)	0.037 (0.052)	-0.011 (0.053)	0.073 (0.054)	0.096* (0.058)	-0.065 (0.052)	0.006 (0.056)	0.038 (0.053)	0.044 (0.053)	-0.000 (0.023)
T4	0.009 (0.054)	0.011 (0.026)	0.005 (0.054)	0.027 (0.053)	-0.005 (0.054)	0.083 (0.057)	-0.088* (0.051)	0.007 (0.059)	0.016 (0.053)	-0.116** (0.054)	-0.039* (0.023)
N	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456

See notes to Table 4. Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table E.8: Treatment effects on Perceptions - Sample no extreme answers

	Share of Wealth Top 10	Share of Wealth Bottom 50	Share of Immigrants among poor	Incidence of poverty Immigrants	Incidence of poverty Italians	Share of European Immigrants	Share of Christian Immigrants
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T1	-0.161*** (0.053)	-0.105** (0.053)	-0.142*** (0.055)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.043 (0.053)	0.085 (0.053)	0.110** (0.052)
T2	-0.196*** (0.053)	-0.095* (0.053)	-0.226*** (0.052)	-0.223*** (0.051)	-0.305*** (0.051)	0.152*** (0.052)	0.082 (0.053)
T3	-0.162*** (0.052)	-0.135** (0.054)	-0.057 (0.053)	-0.062 (0.054)	-0.052 (0.051)	-0.052 (0.050)	0.184*** (0.049)
T4	-0.143*** (0.052)	-0.199*** (0.054)	-0.164*** (0.054)	-0.199*** (0.051)	-0.216*** (0.052)	-0.139*** (0.051)	0.167*** (0.050)
N	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456

See notes to Table 5. Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table E.9: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions - Sample no extreme answers

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale	Migrants Economic Threat	Migrants Cultural Threat	Problem: Low Education	Problem: Income Differences	Problem: Loss of Identity	Problem: Unconditional Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T1	-0.200*** (0.054)	-0.026 (0.053)	-0.009 (0.052)	-0.056 (0.053)	0.083 (0.054)	-0.050 (0.053)	0.001 (0.053)
T2	0.038 (0.051)	-0.046 (0.053)	-0.059 (0.051)	-0.074 (0.053)	0.137** (0.053)	-0.027 (0.054)	0.042 (0.053)
T3	-0.184*** (0.053)	0.059 (0.053)	0.006 (0.052)	-0.060 (0.051)	0.105* (0.055)	-0.005 (0.053)	0.107** (0.052)
T4	-0.078 (0.053)	-0.065 (0.053)	-0.057 (0.053)	-0.047 (0.053)	0.192*** (0.053)	-0.038 (0.054)	0.070 (0.053)
N	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456	3456

See notes to Table 6. Regression without probability weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## E.4 Main results unweighted - Robustness test

We finally investigate the role of probability weights that we have employed in the main analysis to correct for over and under sampling. Estimating our main results without probability weights leaves them literally unaffected.

Table E.10: Treatment effects on policy preferences without probability weights

	General Redistr.	Tax Rich	Wealth Tax	Estate Tax	Support Poor (all)	Spend Poor	Spend Unempl.	Spend Educ.	Index Redistr.	Support Poor (It)	Exclusive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
T1	0.031 (0.057)	0.026 (0.027)	0.047 (0.056)	0.036 (0.056)	0.023 (0.058)	0.024 (0.058)	-0.070 (0.055)	-0.074 (0.057)	0.018 (0.056)	-0.021 (0.056)	-0.042* (0.024)
T2	-0.019 (0.057)	-0.023 (0.027)	0.018 (0.056)	0.075 (0.055)	-0.064 (0.057)	0.047 (0.058)	0.044 (0.055)	-0.027 (0.057)	0.007 (0.057)	-0.149*** (0.056)	-0.012 (0.025)
T3	-0.002 (0.058)	0.006 (0.027)	0.022 (0.055)	-0.018 (0.056)	0.068 (0.056)	0.071 (0.059)	-0.016 (0.057)	-0.073 (0.058)	0.017 (0.056)	0.006 (0.057)	-0.007 (0.025)
T4	-0.015 (0.057)	0.004 (0.027)	-0.014 (0.056)	0.005 (0.055)	-0.028 (0.056)	0.075 (0.060)	-0.067 (0.056)	-0.099* (0.057)	-0.035 (0.057)	-0.135** (0.057)	-0.042* (0.024)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

See notes to Table 4. Regression without probability weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table E.11: Treatment effects on Perceptions without probability weights

	Share of Wealth Top 10	Share of Wealth Bottom 50	Share of Immigrants among poor	Incidence of poverty Immigrants	Incidence of poverty Italians	Share of European Immigrants	Share of Christian Immigrants
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T1	-0.177*** (0.056)	-0.070 (0.056)	-0.083 (0.058)	-0.059 (0.057)	0.017 (0.056)	0.028 (0.056)	0.102* (0.055)
T2	-0.233*** (0.056)	-0.032 (0.057)	-0.177*** (0.055)	-0.203*** (0.053)	-0.242*** (0.054)	0.108* (0.055)	0.053 (0.056)
T3	-0.175*** (0.054)	-0.086 (0.057)	-0.033 (0.056)	-0.067 (0.056)	-0.010 (0.055)	-0.103* (0.054)	0.171*** (0.052)
T4	-0.171*** (0.055)	-0.156*** (0.057)	-0.120** (0.055)	-0.171*** (0.053)	-0.159*** (0.055)	-0.214*** (0.053)	0.133** (0.052)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

See notes to Table 5. Regression without probability weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table E.12: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions without probability weights

	Poor-rich Wealth Scale	Migrants Economic Threat	Migrants Cultural Threat	Problem: Low Education	Problem: Income Differences	Problem: Loss of Identity	Problem: Unconditional Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T1	-0.162*** (0.057)	-0.018 (0.056)	-0.025 (0.055)	-0.049 (0.056)	0.053 (0.056)	-0.035 (0.055)	0.036 (0.056)
T2	0.061 (0.054)	-0.021 (0.056)	-0.043 (0.054)	-0.087 (0.055)	0.090 (0.057)	0.002 (0.057)	0.077 (0.056)
T3	-0.181*** (0.055)	0.065 (0.057)	0.012 (0.055)	-0.085 (0.054)	0.088 (0.058)	0.005 (0.057)	0.149*** (0.056)
T4	-0.049 (0.055)	-0.055 (0.056)	-0.060 (0.056)	-0.066 (0.055)	0.156*** (0.056)	-0.042 (0.057)	0.109* (0.056)
N	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138

See notes to Table [E.11](#). Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

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