Introduction

Following the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2, the aim of this chapter is to assess area-wide governance in the two largest Spanish metropolitan areas: Madrid and Barcelona. As examined in the first sections, both cases show different patterns of governance, even if they are embedded in a common political and territorial structure. In the following section of the chapter we analyse their specific characteristics in relation to the three dimensions of metropolitan demo- cracy: the tension of policy networks (openness/closeness), the legitimisation of local governments (input/output oriented) and the relationships between the state and civil society.

Madrid and Barcelona present different strategies in the development of their metropolitan characteristics, based on place-specific combinations of the three dimensions. Since 1983, the city of Madrid has had a metropolitan structure (the government of the Autonomous Community) that has coordinated the rela- tionships between actors and has legitimised the decision-making process and implementation of public policies in an orderly way. Barcelona, however, is characterised by metropolitan fragmentation and difficult relationships between governmental actors. Nevertheless, the coalition of several sectors of civil society (such as employers' organisations, chambers of commerce and representatives from the financial sector) with local and regional authorities has helped to avoid the 'joint decision trap' (Scharpf 1988) thanks to the challenge of hosting place-related events (specially the 1992 Olympic Games).

Madrid and Barcelona: metropolitan governance in the Spanish context

Spanish territorial structure and the metropolitan institutions

The Spanish case reflects some special features because its political system has recently changed to one of democracy after the Francoist dictatorship (1939–1975). The Spanish Constitution of 1978 changed the basic territorial structure. As in some other European countries, the decentralisation process has resulted in progressive rationalisation or the rise of stronger levels of sub-national government (Keating and Loughlin 1997). The territorial model adopted was the State of Autonomies, where seventeen Autonomous Communities (*Comunidades Autónomas*) have significant legislative and executive powers over a wide range of areas – housing, urban and regional planning, agriculture, transport, health, educa- tion, social welfare and culture – according to the terms of their individual autonomy statutes. The Autonomous Communities have progressively achieved more competences, demonstrated by trends in the distribution of public expenditure between central, regional and local governments.[1]

The treatment of local government in the 1978 Spanish Constitution was relatively brief, most of the articles being devoted to the new regions. The 1985 Local Government Law (LBRL) specified only general principles regarding the territory, internal organisation and functions of local government; the more concrete details were left to regional legislation. Spanish local government fits into the *Franco* group (Hesse and Sharpe 1991), its basic political entity being the municipality. The structure is based on two levels: 50 provinces (supra- municipal political bodies) and 8,108 municipalities, following the Napoleonic model.

Nowadays, Spain has 'an urban society in a preponderant rural territory' (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002b: 108). Of the population, 40.5 per cent lives in 57 municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (representing 0.7 per cent of the municipalities). Densely populated areas on the coast and in Madrid contrast with a pattern of low density in the central zones of the country. There are 12 cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants, whereas more than 85 per cent of the municipalities count less than 5,000 inhabitants (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002b).

This urban society developed in the main in two periods: 1960–1975 and 1975–1995. The first period, from 1960 to 1975, saw major urbanisation analogous to the economic development of the country. It brought rapid indus- trialisation, massive rural exodus and high levels of urban growth, specially in the metropolitan areas of Madrid (increasing from 2.3 to 4.05 million inhabi- tants) and Barcelona (2.5 to 4 million) (Nel lo 1997). The main cities and their metropolitan areas lacked the instruments for urban planning, suffering from deficits in essential public services and infrastructure in education, health, trans- port, housing and social welfare. The uniformity of the legal framework that set the conditions for the structure and functioning of the municipalities was not helpful for the management of big cities, which is why two special laws for Madrid and Barcelona were passed in 1960 and 1963. As we see, this tendency towards homogeneity is still a matter of debate between local and national authorities (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002b).

Prior to the 1960–1975 period, the approval of the General Urban Plan for Madrid (*Plan Bigador*, in 1946) and the creation of the Commission of Urban Planning brought about the amalgamation of thirteen municipalities close to Madrid,[2] its size growing from 66.2 to 607 km^2 in the period 1948–1954. The next step was to organise the area of influence around the capital. The General Plan of the Metropolitan Area of Madrid (*Plan General de Ordenación del Area Metropolitana*) was written in 1961 and approved in 1963. In 1964, the Metropolitan Area of Madrid was created, comprising twenty-three municipali- ties. The Plan established two main areas for expansion that transformed Madrid into one of the most important centres for economic development in Spain. In the north-west, it was planned to build a residential area and also a large univer- sity campus, whilst the south-east was devoted to the location of industry (mainly of the electronic and chemical sectors) (Bahamonde and Otero 1999).

The history of Barcelona and its metropolitan area can be understood in terms of the gap between the functional area and the administrative boundaries. While it was an important centre of the industrial revolution in Spain, the city remained within its fortified medieval boundary until the second half of the nineteenth century (with the implementation of the Cerdà Plan in 1859). The most recent change in administrative boundaries was in 1921, when the last nearby village (now 1 of the 10 districts) was amalgamated with the city. With the growth of the city and its area of influence, successive territorial plans were implemented, like the *Pla Comarcal* (1953) and *Pla Provincial* (1959), which embraced twenty-seven municipalities. The city of Barcelona obtained in 1960 a specific law (Municipal Charter), which resulted in the reform of municipal finances and the substitution of the previous Urban Development Commission with the Urban Development and Common Services Commission (adding collective responsibil- ities in transportation, water supply and waste collection in the twenty-seven municipalities). In 1966, a new Master Plan for the Metropolitan Area for 163 municipalities and more than 3,000 km^2 was designed, representing a change in perspective as it covered a much larger area. This plan was revised and approved in 1976 as the General Metropolitan Plan (for Urban Development), integrating 27 municipalities and 476 km^2 (López 2002).

The second phase goes from 1975 to 1995 and is characterised by a slower pace in the process of urbanisation, a decentralisation of the population and activities in the metropolitan areas, the decay of industry and the growth of the services sector. Central cities started losing population in favour of the newer rings of development, increasing the mobility of inhabitants and spreading the urban style of life around the territory. This process had significant impacts on the environment, such as the construction of transport infrastructures, a high level of land consumption and the enlargement of the ecological footprint of cities.

In this phase, the design of a new political scenario following forty years of dictatorship proved a good opportunity to face the challenge of the governance of metropolitan areas such as Madrid and Barcelona, as well as others such as Bilbao and Valencia. The political transition focused on the process of regional decentralisation, which left the responsibility for facing metropolitan governance to the Autonomous Communities. This is one of the factors that explains the different strategies in the two main metropolitan areas, Madrid and Barcelona.

For Madrid, there was a debate on the need to create a specific region, since the area did not have any special identity. It was suggested that the area could belong to the adjacent Autonomous Community of Castilla-La Mancha (but its leaders did not favour this idea) or that Madrid could be a federal district (which was thought to be too complicated). In 1983, the Spanish Parliament decided to create the Autonomous Community of Madrid,[3] with 5 million inhabitants and 179 municipalities, covering an area of 8,028 km^2 (García de Enterría 1983).

The creation of the Autonomous Community of Madrid had some legal and political consequences. First of all, the boundaries of the new region covered the same territory as the province of Madrid (second level of local govern- ment). Following constitutional law, the Provincial Council was absorbed by the Autonomous Community in order to avoid duplication and overlapping of institutions. The responsibilities of the province (such as the coordination of municipalities and the fire fighting service) were assumed by the regional government.[4]

Second, the regional government dissolved the Metropolitan Area created during the dictatorship, as happened in other big cities (Bilbao in 1980, Valencia in 1986 and Barcelona in 1987). The levels of government were reduced to two: the regional government (with an elected assembly, executive and president) and local government (with 179 municipalities). There are also 37 inter-municipal structures (*mancomunidades*), and the municipalities manage 70 agencies and 51 public sector companies (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002a: 111).

Fifty-four per cent of the population of the region of Madrid lives in the city of Madrid, which has a high density of population (data from 2001; see Table 4.1). However, this percentage has been decreasing in the last two decades of the twentieth century. In 1975, it represented 75 per cent of the population, and in 1981 the proportion was 67.4 per cent. The inhabitants of Madrid have been leaving the city in favour of the municipalities on the outskirts,[5] accelerating the process of decentralisation in the metropolitan area (Castillo and Casado 2000).

Similarly, the city of Barcelona had 1,745,000 inhabitants at the end of the 1970s, which progressively decreased as a result of moves to the periphery. However, as shown in Table 4.2, the city has a high density, and its metropolitan area represents almost 75 per cent of the Catalan population.[6]

Table 4.1 Basic data for Madrid and the Autonomous Community of Madrid (2001)

	Madrid (city)	*Autonomous Community*
Area (km^2)	607	8,028
Inhabitants	2,938,723	5,423,384
Density (population/km^2)	4,841	676

Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) (2001).

Table 4.2 Basic data for Barcelona, its metropolitan area, the province of Barcelona and

	Barcelona (city)	*Barcelona (metropolitan area)*[a]	*Barcelona (province)*	*Autonomous Community of Catalonia*
Area (km^2)	99	3,235.6	7,719.0	31,895.3
Inhabitants	1,503,884	4,390,390.0	4,805,927.0	6,343,110.0
Density (population/km^2)	15,175	1,356.9	622.6	198.8

the Autonomous Community of Catalonia (2001)

Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) (2001). Note

a This is the broad definition of the metropolitan area, with 164 municipalities and seven *comarques*.

In relation to the metropolitan institutions, the creation of the Municipal Metropolitan Entity of Barcelona (*Entitat Municipal Metropolitana de Barcelona*)[7] in 1974 was based on the area covered by twenty-seven municipalities. After the Franco dictatorship, its name became the Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation (*Corporació Metropolitana de Barcelona*, CMB). It consisted of a Metropolitan Council with important economic resources (drawn from the twenty-seven municipalities) and competences in urban planning (such as implementing the General Metropolitan Plan), public transportation, water supply and waste treat- ment. During the 1980s, the budget increased thanks to regional and state funds, and the CMB implemented several plans (such as those for the coastline and for Collserola's mountain) (Artal 2002).

The CMB suffered from two political problems. On the one hand, there was a conflict between the left-wing political parties that governed the municipalities of the metropolitan area. The communists rejected the predominant role of the socialist mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall, while the socialists accused the communists of not supporting the project. On the other hand, the regional government, run by the Catalan nationalists (*Convergència i Unió*) and headed by Jordi Pujol, feared the power of the CMB. Taking advantage of both the powers that the Spanish Constitution gave to the Autonomous Communities and the polit- ical majority in Parliament, the Catalan regional government abolished the Metropolitan Corporation in 1987, as part of a general reform of the territorial structure in Catalonia.

Four laws on territorial organisation (*Lleis d'Ordenació Territorial*) were implemented and set up the current administrative structure of the Catalan region: 4 provinces, 41 counties (*comarques*, a traditional supra-municipal division) and 946 municipalities. Moreover, there are multiple public sector companies and associations of municipalities to provide some services, as well as consortiums (of different levels of government and also between public bodies and private enterprise).

The CMB was replaced by two metropolitan bodies based on voluntary asso- ciation. The first metropolitan body is the Metropolitan Authority for Transport (*Entitat Metropolitana del Transport*), formed by eighteen municipalities. It provides joint public transport services for its area. Second, the Metropolitan Environmental Authority (*Entitat Metropolitana del Medi Ambient*) covers thirty-three municipalities and is responsible for water supply, sewage disposal and urban waste treatment. Finally, most of the municipalities governed by the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona created a third body in 1988: the Association of Municipalities of Barcelona (*Mancomunitat de Municipis de l'Àrea de Barcelona*), which brought together thirty municipalities and tries to encourage cooperation between municipalities (MMAMB 1995).

Then, in 1997 the Authority for Metropolitan Transport (ATM) was created. The function of the ATM (which is a public consortium) is to organise the public transportation system in the Metropolitan Region, covering 7

comarques, 164 municipalities, more than 3,000 km^2 and 4.5 million inhabitants. The integration of the system of transport fares has been its main achievement.

Metropolitan governance patterns in Madrid and Barcelona

In this section, we cover the differences and similarities in the building of governance in the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona. To do so, we analyse the significance of the three crucial factors identified by researchers of new regionalism (see Chapter 2). In a context of interdependence between a variety of actors and conflicts raised by their interaction, the combination of these three factors is argued to be place-specific. This offers an alternative approach to the traditional conceptions of metropolitan governance (the metropolitan reform tradition and the public choice school) (Hoffmann-Martinot 2002).

The first factor relates to cooperative behaviour between territorially relevant actors, basically political parties. In Madrid, cooperation seemed to be easier to achieve, given that the same political party has been governing more or less at the same time at both the municipal and regional levels (and also at the national level). From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a left-wing majority. More recently, it has shifted to the right, the Popular Party having governed at the national level since 1996, at the regional level since 1995 and at the local level since 1991 (not in all the 179 municipalities but in most, including Madrid).

However, there have been some political disagreements between the Autonomous Community and the city of Madrid. On the one hand, there have been different styles of leadership between the mayor of the city and the presi- dent of the regional government.[8] On the other hand, the distribution of competences between the two levels of government have resulted in disagree- ments. Being the capital of Spain, it is argued, the city of Madrid should have a special status (including more powers), as stated in the law of 1983. In spite of this, the recognition of the special status of the city has not been supported by either the Autonomous Community or the central government, showing that the distribution of powers and the model of national and sub-national decentralisation is partly independent of political convergence (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002b).

In Barcelona, political interests led to the dissolution of the metropolitan authority, as the ideological cleavage was a factor that structured the debate on metropolitan governance.[9] Recent changes in the political profile, with the socialist Pasqual Maragall as the president of the Catalan Autonomous Barcelona (since 1997), question the relevance of political disagreements as the main reason for the lack of cooperative behaviour by actors in the same territorial areas.

Like Madrid, the claim for a special status for the city of Barcelona (the Municipal Charter approved by the Catalan Parliament in 1999)[10] is an ongoing matter of debate. However, in this case the regional government supports the charter (in part because it does not deal with the metropolitan question) (Colomé and Tomàs 2002). The fight for specific legislation for big cities led in the beginning of the 1990s to a combined lobby by the seven biggest cities in Spain (G-7: Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Valencia, Seville, Zaragoza and Malaga). The activity of this network lessened in the mid-1990s, and the recent changes in legislation (*Proyecto de Ley de Medidas para la Modernización del Gobierno Local*, June 2003) have not satisfied the demands of the biggest cities (see Rodríguez Álvarez 2002b).

A second factor in relation to metropolitan governance building is the incen- tive structures set by higher level institutions. In both Madrid and Barcelona, regional governments (the level of government that has the relevant competence) abolished metropolitan structures. From a similar starting point, the history of the two cases has been significantly different. Madrid is an exception in the Spanish context, since the Autonomous Community has become the promoter and leader of the metropolitan region of Madrid, whose boundaries already correspond to those of the regional territory.[11] The regional government, with elected representatives, has a range of competences (enlarged since 1998) including territorial and urban planning, housing, transportation (the metro), economic development, social services, as well as fire fighting services and water management (the public agency Canal de Isabel II). Some scholars have referred to such a model as a 'meso-level type of metropolitan governance' (Jouve 2003), and it is exceptional due to its legitimacy, and its legal and financial autonomy (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002b).

For Barcelona, the abolition of the metropolitan authority resulted in a frag- mentation of the metropolitan area between different bodies. The only incentive structure set by the regional government has been the creation of the Authority for Metropolitan Transport. The revision of the General Metropolitan Plan of 1976, which is a regional government competence, is still on the agenda and is an obstacle for the urban planning of the large metropolitan area (Nel lo 1997).

Finally, political leadership is a crucial element for metropolitan governance capacity. In the case of Madrid, the regional government has played the role of a facilitative leader since 1983, with the former socialist president, Joaquín Leguina, from 1983 to 1995, followed by the next president, the conservative Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, from 1995 to 2003. If we adopt the two dimensions of urban governance developed by Le Galès (1998), it can be

argued that under the leadership of Leguina the internal dimension (or integrative capacity of urban governance) was emphasised, while Ruiz-Gallardón has also developed the external dimension (the strategy towards the external world). New strategies of city marketing, such as the candidature for the 2012 Olympic Games, demonstrate this approach.

In the case of Barcelona, political disagreements as well as the institutional fragmentation of the metropolitan area have been obstacles to building an inte- grated vision of the metropolitan area. However, the model of urban governance has succeeded in avoiding the 'joint decision trap' (Scharpf 1988) and has enhanced both internal and external dimensions.

In the internal dimension, political blockage on the metropolitan issue has been overcome under the leadership of the mayor of Barcelona and through the complicity of civil society (an important instrument has been strategic planning, discussed further in the next section). The need for collaboration is regularly renewed on the basis of a high-profile project, usually place-related events. This cooperative pattern was followed in a similar way in the past, when the EXPOs of 1888 and 1929 took place in Barcelona. In the democratic context after the era of Franco, the motor for the development of the metropolitan area was the 1992 Olympic Games.

The 'Barcelona model' for organising the Olympics was based on large urban projects combined with small operations in the neighbourhoods, the decentralisa- tion of the city into ten districts and the modernisation of public administration. At the same time, the need to collect funds encouraged the representatives of the city to negotiate with other levels of governments and different international organisations (such as the International Olympic Committee). In order to ensure the investment of private actors, the strategy adopted was focused on public– private partnerships (Borja 1995).

At present, the same model of cooperation is being repeated with a new place- related event, *Fòrum 2004*.[12] On this occasion, cooperation has been more problematic due to the uncertainty surrounding a new international event to be held for the first time in Barcelona. However, the alliance has been sustained through the leadership of the city, the support of the regional government and the main actors from civil society. They all believe that it represents another opportu- nity for the city to stimulate economic development and catch the attention of millions of potential visitors and investors (Négrier and Tomàs 2004).

The external dimension of urban governance has been enhanced since the 1992 Olympic Games. Barcelona has promoted its own foreign policy based on leadership and membership of pan-European urban networks (such as Eurocities and Metropolis). The use of strategic planning has also been an instrument for city marketing since it has been exported all over the world (Le Galès 2002), a practice followed by the mayor who followed Maragall (the socialist Joan Clos).

Comparing the three dimensions of metropolitan democracy

In this section, the democratic quality of the metropolitan governance of Madrid and Barcelona is analysed on the basis of the three dimensions proposed by
Kübler and Heinelt in Chapter 2.

Openness and closedness of policy networks
This dimension reflects the decision modes found in the four segments of interest intermediation described in Chapter 2: territorial, administrative, func- tional and civil society related. We see how the tension between openness and closedness of policy networks is different in the two cities.

As the capital of Spain, Madrid is the seat of the national administration and a wide range of different institutions and public agencies, that is a large number of actors from the administrative and the political segments. Moreover, the city not only contains several institutions belonging to the corporatist or functional segment (trade unions, chambers, professional associations, employers' organi- sations) but also the headquarters of associations from civil society, companies and financial groups. To this complexity can be added all the institutions and bodies of the regional and municipal levels of government.

Rodríguez Álvarez (2002a) has analysed the mode of interest mediation between the public and the private spheres in the Autonomous Community of Madrid. He argues that metropolitan governance in Madrid works on the basis of a regional neo-corporatist system that has been stable since 1983. Policy networks have been based on the territorial, administrative and corporate actors, being less open to members from civil society.

Among these actors, Rodríguez Álvarez emphasises the role of representatives from the Autonomous Community of Madrid, the Confederation of Enterprises of Madrid (Ceim) and the two main trade unions (*Unión General de Trabajadores*, UGT and *Comisiones Obreras*, CCOO). For instance, these actors have formal representation on the main consultative bodies at the regional level such as the Economic and Social Council (a consultative body that has influence on the economic development plans of the region) as well as on the main public agencies (related to

education, employment and public health). Another actor from the private sector, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Madrid (CCIM), runs the important Fair of Madrid (Ifema), and is also member of several institutions and assemblies representing different sectors (design, industry, transportation).

According to Rodríguez Álvarez (2002a), these corporate actors are content with this mode of metropolitan/regional governance, while other actors such as the professional associations (of economists, engineers, lawyers) are under- represented and want to play a larger part in the system of mediation. Other key actors (trade unions, Ceim) are less satisfied with their relationships with the city of Madrid, where policy networks (in their opinion) are more closed than at the regional level. They would like to see a real participative process of strategic planning and would like the city to try innovative initiatives.

In Barcelona, the model of cooperation between public and private actors is renewed on the basis of specific events. The use of strategic planning has become the instrument of creating a collective vision and designing the main guidelines for the city's development over a ten-year term. It works through cooperation between different commissions that analyse important sectors (economic development, housing, environment and urban planning, culture, education), and the way that they can contribute to the future of the city.

During the 1990s, three Strategic Plans were approved (1990, 1994, 1999) based on the city of Barcelona. These were successful, so following metropolitan dynamics, the city council decided to go one step further and started working on the first Strategic Metropolitan Plan (approved in March 2003).

In respect of territorial interest intermediation, the first Strategic Metropolitan Plan is different from the other plans because it includes representatives from thirty-six municipalities of the metropolitan area of Barcelona (628 km^2 and 3 million people). The leadership comes from the mayor of Barcelona (who is the president of the general council of the plan, which includes 300 represen- tatives from different sectors) and also from members of his team (who lead different commissions). This plan has also enabled the participation of other local leaders (and mayors from other political parties) for the first time. One of the collective demands that was supported by the majority was the need to simplify the institutions of the metropolitan area and create a new body to coor- dinate the thirty-six municipalities. Furthermore, this plan has provoked a reaction from municipalities in the metropolitan region that were not included. Seven medium-sized municipalities have argued for participation in the plan, raising the question as to whether the limits of the metropolitan area are too small (Colomé and Tomàs 2002).

In relation to the participation of other local and regional authorities, this plan integrates all the municipalities that belong to the three different metro- politan bodies created in the 1980s (Environment, Transport and Association of Municipalities). It also includes the bodies in charge of the port and the airport of Barcelona, as well as representatives from the two supra-local levels (counties and the province of Barcelona). The plan also has three commissions which work with the regional government (through meetings four times a year), with other big cities such as Madrid and Valencia (through meetings twice a year), and with other European cities that have expertise in strategic planning such as Lyon and Milan (through annual meetings). This plan has opened up the debate on the future of the metropolitan area to a larger number of actors from the administrative segment of interest mediation (Strategic Metropolitan Plan of Barcelona 2002).

The corporate actors are represented in several commissions such as those centred on tourism and economic development. They include the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Shipping, the Fair, the trade unions (CCOO and UGT, and also the unions of farmers, hospitals, metallurgic sector), employers' organi- sations (*Foment del Treball*), financial groups, hotel groups and the utility companies.

Finally, a wide variety of actors from civil society participate in the general council of the plan, including NGOs, private foundations, centres for research, universities, the mass media and several associations (ranging from arts, crafts and sports to automobiles). There are also some individuals who participate as experts on specific issues. To sum up, the representation of collective actors is quite substantial in the four segments of interest mediation, so we would conclude that there is some degree of openness in this process.

Input and output legitimisation: trends in Spanish local government

During the 1970s, there was a rise of highly organised protest movements in many of the large towns, mobilised around urban issues. Neighbourhood associ- ations, students, trade unionists and regionalist movements demanded both the restoration of democracy and an improvement in living conditions in cities. The first local democratic elections after the dictatorship took place in April 1979. The newly elected municipal councillors had difficulties meeting the demands of local residents because most of them were in debt and their internal organisation was in crisis. It was a period characterised by the active role of municipalities and local elites, whose objectives were focused on solving basic demands. In big cities such as Madrid and Barcelona in particular, there were neighbourhoods that needed a lot of investment in infrastructure (water, transport).

In spite of the lack of economic resources and expertise, towns experimented with important transformations that improved the living conditions of citizens. Barcelona tried to implement its policies more efficiently through decentralisation into ten districts associated with the idea of providing room for community involvement. One of its main achievements was the establishment of the Citizen Information Offices which were set up in each district not only to give information to the citizens but also to make it unnecessary for them to go to the city council for bureaucratic procedures such as the handing over of documents or making changes in the register. Madrid did this through the decentralisation of its municipal organi- sation into twenty-one districts, although they lacked the participatory dimension. To sum up, municipal legitimisation was mainly measured by output, whereas there was a progressive demobilisation of urban social movements, both because some of their leaders were co-opted for local, regional and national politics and because demands were being gradually met (Brugué and Gomà 1998).

During the 1990s, local government had to face different challenges as circumstances changed. First, whilst basic services had been covered, new demands concerning employment, environment and particularly immigration emerged, as well as other demands linked to a post-materialist society (such as leisure and culture). Second, the idea that local government was more than local administration started taking hold. The city councils tried to improve communi- cation with and involvement of the population in public affairs through some experiments to strengthen local democracy (consultative committees, strategic plans, citizen juries). Catalonia initiated the use of citizen juries, discussion forums and consultative citizen committees. The aim of these initiatives was to involve citizens in discussion on policy-relevant issues such as the Local Agenda 21 or public spaces. All these developments made local government rethink its role and its relationship with citizens, making input legitimisation the priority (Font 2002).

Madrid, which illustrates that democracy and efficiency are not two opposed concepts but complementary (Hoffmann-Martinot 2002). On the one hand, the discourse on the need to reinforce local democracy is present in both cities, although the city of Barcelona has gone further in practice. For instance, the New Regulatory Norms for the Organisation of the Districts and Citizen Participation were approved in November 2002. The new regulation allows more mechanisms for the participation of citizens (through the associations or individually), such as citizen juries or public meetings. On the other hand, the implementation of instruments of benchmarking, the externalisation of some services and the use of public–private partnerships have also been happening.

The new law approved in June 2003 by the Spanish Parliament (*Proyecto de Ley de Medidas para la Modernización del Gobierno Local*) reflects this duality. In relation to efficiency, two main reforms have been introduced. First, several elements characteristic of the New Public Management (such as instruments of benchmarking and evaluation) have been introduced. Second, it reinforces the role of the mayor and the executive committee by differentiating more clearly their functions and those of the assembly. At the same time, the new regulation introduces some measures to enhance the participation of citizens (such as popular initiatives and the use of new technologies). The law requires the creation of Social Councils in cities of over 250,000 inhabitants to represent economic, professional and neighbourhood groups that will make reports and be consulted on big urban projects. We can conclude, then, that both input and output orienta- tions are present in the metropolitan governance of Barcelona and Madrid (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002b).

State–society relationships

For Madrid, we have characterised the model of metropolitan governance as neo-corporatist, with active participation by corporate and administrative actors. The role of civil society organisations in the mobilisation and aggregation of indi- vidual demands and preferences is therefore less strong and active (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002a). However, the Autonomous Community of Madrid is a political structure with legal and financial autonomy, with a directly elected assembly and a president. This institutional structure offers more opportunities to citizens to have an influence on public decisions (essentially, through voting) and guarantees the accountability of elected members. Compared with the fragmentation and lack of opportunity for citizens to express their views in other metropolitan areas, in Madrid there has been an institutionalisation of state–society relationships based on metropolitan/regional government.

In Barcelona, we have seen that its model of governance is renewed on the basis of regular events that require the involvement of civil society. Challenges to organise place-related events such as the 1992 Olympic Games serve to reinforce the coalition of several sectors of society, confirming its 'vibrancy'. The instru- ment through which the interaction is organised has been strategic planning. Even if it is not a regular form of participation (since it depends on the will of the city councils) it is a mechanism to activate state–society relationships and give voice to the main actors of the four segments of interest mediation. However, it does not allow for the participation of 'ordinary' citizens.

To avoid this bias, the city council of Barcelona changed its arrangements for participation both at the municipal level (2002) and at the district level (2001). Among the new mechanisms, there are classic instruments such as consultative councils based on single issues (environment, economy) and cross-cutting groups (youth, old people, women). There are also innovative instruments such as citizen juries which combine representation by collective actors (associations) with individuals.[13] To sum up, it is an institutional arrangement limited to the municipality of Barcelona, but it can encourage new forms of dialogue between the municipality and civil society in the rest of the metropolitan area.

Conclusions

In the first section of this chapter we analysed the patterns of metropolitan governance in Madrid and in Barcelona. To understand how the modes of metro- politan governance work in a specific context we have taken into account the combination of three factors: actor behaviour, incentive structures and political leadership.

In the case of Madrid, the Autonomous Community (a sub-national authority with autonomy and legitimacy) governs roughly within the same boundaries as the metropolitan area of Madrid. With the leadership residing with the president at the regional level, as well as with strong cooperation between corporate actors, the mode of metropolitan governance has been quite stable since 1983 (when the regional level was created).

In contrast, Barcelona provides a more complicated and difficult scenario because of the administratively fragmented metropolitan area and political conflicts between levels of government. Nevertheless, the consensus reached between the major actors from the public and private sectors has been achieved through succes- sive commitments, encouraged by place-related events such as the 1992 Olympic Games. In this instance, leadership has naturally come from the mayor of the city of Barcelona, who has tried to encourage support through strategic planning.

In the second section of the chapter we assessed the quality of metropolitan democracy referring to the three dimensions of the 'cube of democratic metro- politan governance' (see Chapter 2). The first dimension refers to the openness and closedness of policy networks, which follow different patterns in the two cases. In Madrid, a stable alliance between the regional representatives and a few corporate actors has been the predominant model, while actors from the civic sphere (NGOs, professional associations) have been under-represented. Analysis of the first Strategic Metropolitan Plan of Barcelona showed a higher degree of openness due to the variety and large number of actors involved.

The second dimension relates to the legitimisation of local governments (input or output oriented). In both metropolitan areas, there is a combination of the two with efforts to enhance citizen participation. This particular state of affairs is understandable if we consider the evolution of local government in Spain after the dictatorship. We can identify an initial period during which municipalities had to resolve basic problems, and a second period during which the accent was put on the need to increase communication with citizens and provide them with more opportunities to encourage their involvement in public affairs.

Finally, the quality of metropolitan democracy is also measured by the strength of the civil society. The case of Madrid is atypical given that there is a political framework (the Autonomous Community) that allows citizens to participate in a formal institutionalised way. However, ways other than elections are less usual. In the case of Barcelona, different mechanisms for citizen participation have been put into practice to allow collective actors as well as individuals to get involved. At the metropolitan level, the means for orchestrating state–society relationships has been strategic planning, where civil society has proved its 'vibrancy'.

To sum up, we have identified two strategies of metropolitan governance that result from a combination of different factors. The examples of Madrid and Barcelona confirm the importance of space-specific and space-related aspects. In other words, this chapter reinforces the argument that an assessment of the 'democratic question' within metropolitan governance has to consider particular Political structures as well as place-specific actor constellations that play a role in funcional policy networks that operate beyond institutionally defined territorial limits.

Notes

1 In 1981, the distribution of public expenditure was, in percentages, 87 per cent by the
state, 3 per cent by the Autonomous Communities and 10 per cent by local government.
In 2000, the State spent 48 per cent of public expenditure, the Autonomous
Communities 36 per cent and local government 16 per cent (MAP 2000).
2 Madrid amalgamated thirteen nearby municipalities: Aravaca, Barajas, Canillas,
Canillejas, Chamartín de la Rosa, Fuencarral, Hortaleza, El Pardo, Vallecas, Vicálvaro,
Villaverde, Carabanchel Alto and Carabanchel Bajo.
3 Law of 25 February 1983.
4 Except for the fire services of the city of Madrid, which were the responsibility of the
municipality.
5 This is shown by the fact that 6 other municipalities have more than 100,000
inhabitants (Getafe, Fuenlabrada, Leganés, Móstoles, Parla and Alcalá de Henares).

6 The geographical delimitation of the metropolitan area of Barcelona is a controversial
issue: some take the first ring (twenty-seven municipalities), some consider 164
municipalities (as the area covered by the Authority for Metropolitan Transport and
the Territorial Plan of 1976) and, according to the Metropolitan and Regional Studies
Institute of Barcelona, the whole province of Barcelona could be seen as the
metropolitan region.

7 Law 5/1974 of 7 August.

8 Until May 2003, Alvarez del Manzano (who represents the most conservative wing of
the Popular Party) was the mayor of Madrid and Ruiz-Gallardón (who is more
liberal), the president of the Autonomous Community of Madrid. However, the new
scenario after the local and regional elections in 2003, with Ruiz-Gallardón as the new mayor of Madrid and Esperanza Aguirre
as the president of the Autonomous Community, may lead to new patterns of governance.

9 One example that illustrates the partisan influence on local politics is the existence of two different organisations of
municipalities according to the political party that runs the city council. The Catalan Association of Municipalities groups the
nationalist local governments, while the Federation of Municipalities of Catalonia represents the left-wing local governments.
In contrast, the Autonomous Community of Madrid has a single organisation for the municipalities, the Federation of
Municipalities of Madrid.

10 The Municipal Charter argues for more powers in urban planning, infrastructure, education, social services and culture,
as well as more financial resources. It also strengthens the control mechanisms of city management and emphasises the
delimita- tion of functions between the city council and the executive organs (Longo 1999).

11 Adding the corridors of Toledo and Gualadajara (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002b).

12 The 2004 Universal Forum of Cultures is a new international event that took place between April and September 2004. It
is conceived as a meeting to exchange ideas about peace, sustainable development and cultural diversity.

13 See   http://www.bcn.es/participacio/catala/pdf/normesparticipacio.pdf   (of   the   city)   and
http://www.bcn.es/participacio/catala/pdf/nrfd2001.pdf (of the districts).

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