Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/106208
Title: | Visual experience: rich but impenetrable |
Author: | Toribio Mateas, Josefa |
Keywords: | Filosofia de l'art Philosophy of the art |
Issue Date: | 2018 |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
Abstract: | According to so-called 'thin' views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called 'rich' views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable. |
Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0889-8 |
It is part of: | Synthese, 2018, vol. 195, num. 8, p. 3389-3406 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/106208 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0889-8 |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) |
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