Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690| Title: | An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets |
| Author: | Llerena Garrés, Francesc Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) Rafels, Carles |
| Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Teoria de conjunts Lògica matemàtica Presa de decisions Game theory Set theory Mathematical logic Decision making |
| Issue Date: | Feb-2015 |
| Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
| Abstract: | On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979) |
| Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0416-z |
| It is part of: | International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, num. 1, p. 1-15 |
| URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0416-z |
| ISSN: | 0020-7276 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 635163.pdf | 314.16 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.