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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/119349
Title: | Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy |
Author: | Foremny, Dirk |
Keywords: | Política fiscal Dèficit públic Deute tributari Països de la Unió Europea Fiscal policy Budget deficits Tax debt European Union countries |
Issue Date: | Jun-2014 |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Abstract: | This paper empirically examines how fiscal rules and tax autonomy influence deficits of sub-national sectors across European countries. I use a new panel-data set to measure tax autonomy and the stringency of fiscal rules for EU15 regional and local government sectors over the period 1995 to 2008. I apply an instrumental variables approach to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of fiscal rules on deficits. I use political variables describing the central governments characteristics as instruments for fiscal rules at the sub-national level. The results show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and tax autonomy depends on the constitutional structure. Fiscal rules decrease deficits only in unitary countries. Deficits of sub-national sectors in federations can be avoided through tax autonomy. |
Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.01.003 |
It is part of: | European Journal of Political Economy, 2014, vol. 34, num. June, p. 86-110 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/119349 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.01.003 |
ISSN: | 0176-2680 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) |
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