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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240
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dc.contributor.authorIzquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria-
dc.contributor.authorRafels, Carles-
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-26T10:52:08Z-
dc.date.available2019-12-31T06:10:12Z-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240-
dc.description.abstractWithin the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modi ed Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997)-
dc.format.extent20 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag-
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8-
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, num. 1, p. 35-54-
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8-
dc.rights(c) Springer Verlag, 2018-
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocs-
dc.subject.classificationAssignació de recursos-
dc.subject.classificationFuncions convexes-
dc.subject.otherGame theory-
dc.subject.otherResource allocation-
dc.subject.otherConvex functions-
dc.titleThe core and the steady bargaining set for convex games-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec675399-
dc.date.updated2018-02-26T10:52:08Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
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