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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/121263
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dc.contributor.authorCerrone, Claudia-
dc.contributor.authorManna, Ester-
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-04T15:45:30Z-
dc.date.available2019-12-31T06:10:12Z-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.issn1935-1682-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/121263-
dc.description.abstractHeterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives.-
dc.format.extent8 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherWalter de Gruyter-
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190-
dc.relation.ispartofThe BE Journal Of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018, vol. 18, num. 1, p. 1-8-
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190-
dc.rights(c) Walter de Gruyter, 2018-
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Economia)-
dc.subject.classificationMotivació del personal-
dc.subject.classificationIncentius laborals-
dc.subject.classificationSelecció de personal-
dc.subject.otherEmployee motivation-
dc.subject.otherIncentives in industry-
dc.subject.otherEmployee selection-
dc.titlePay for Performance with Motivated Employees-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec679723-
dc.date.updated2018-04-04T15:45:30Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

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