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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | García-Carpintero, Manuel | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-04-25T15:25:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-04-25T15:25:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1130-4383 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/121878 | - |
dc.description.abstract | [spa] En els anys setanta del passat segle, i inspirats pel treball de Castañeda, Perry i Lewis van sostenir que els pensaments en primera persona («de se», aquells que expressaríem de manera natural mitjançant la primera persona) presenten característiques especials que reclamen un tractament distintiu, i van proposar explicacions rivals. La noció de pensament de se està relacionada amb una distinció traçada per Wittgenstein entre usos de «jo» com a subjecte i usos de «jo» com a objecte, i amb el fenomen relacionat introduït per Shoemaker, la immunitat a l'error per identificació incorrecta. En aquest treball presento aquesta discussió contemporània, i mostro com pot il·luminar debats filosòfics tradicionals, que involucren en particular a Descartes i a Hume, al voltant de la natura del jo: mentre que Descartes va sostenir sobre la base de consideracions epistèmiques que ha de ser immaterial, Hume va argüir sobre bases similars que és introbable. | - |
dc.description.abstract | [eng] In the late 1970’s, inspired by work by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that first-personal «de se» thoughts (those we would naturally express by using the first-person) have special features that call for a distinctive account, and suggested rival explanations. The notion of «de se» thoughts is related to a distinction that Wittgenstein made between uses of «I» as object and uses of «I» as subject and a related phenomenon that Shoemaker introduced, immunity to error through misidentification. In this paper, I introduce this contemporary discussion, and show how it can illuminate traditional philosophical debates involving in particular Descartes and Hume on the nature of the self: while Descartes argued on the basis of epistemic considerations that it must be immaterial, Hume argued on related bases that it is not to be found. | - |
dc.format.extent | 13 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | cat | - |
dc.publisher | Institut d'Estudis Catalans | - |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.2436/20.3001.01.28 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia, 2014, vol. XXV, p. 203-215 | - |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.2436/20.3001.01.28 | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2014 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es | - |
dc.source | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) | - |
dc.subject.classification | Subjecte (Filosofia) | - |
dc.subject.classification | Jo (Filosofia) | - |
dc.subject.other | Subject (Philosophy) | - |
dc.subject.other | Self (Philosophy) | - |
dc.subject.other | Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 | - |
dc.title | La Perspectiva del Subjecte, de Descartes a Wittgenstein | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | - |
dc.identifier.idgrec | 644677 | - |
dc.date.updated | 2018-04-25T15:25:18Z | - |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | - |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) |
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644677.pdf | 197.16 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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