Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/131242
Title: | Does electoral competition curb party favoritism? |
Author: | Curto Grau, Marta Solé Ollé, Albert Sorribas, Pilar |
Keywords: | Partits polítics Eleccions Representació proporcional Anàlisi de regressió Political parties Elections Proportional representation Regression analysis |
Issue Date: | Oct-2018 |
Publisher: | American Economic Association |
Abstract: | We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition's mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160618 |
It is part of: | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2018, vol. 10, num. 4, p. 378-407 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/131242 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160618 |
ISSN: | 1945-7782 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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678596.pdf | 839.23 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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