Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/134422
Title: | Politics, risk, and white elephants in infrastructure PPPs |
Author: | Albalate, Daniel, 1980- Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963- Gragera Lladó, Albert |
Keywords: | Risc (Economia) Variables (Matemàtica) Tàctiques polítiques Risk Variables (Mathematics) Practical politics |
Issue Date: | Jun-2019 |
Publisher: | Elsevier Ltd |
Abstract: | Theoretical research on cooperation between public and private partners in infrastructure projects suggests that they can be a tool for preventing white elephants. However, various case studies suggest that actual outcomes are largely dependent on the effective transfer of operational risk to the private partner. This paper explores policy and planning dysfunction, and the idea that private entities that participate in public-private partnerships (PPPs) with no substantial risk transfer, and under heavily subsidized schemes, may engage in lobbying and exert pressure to develop white elephant projects. |
Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2019.05.001 |
It is part of: | Utilities Policy, 2019, vol. 58, num. June, p. 158-165 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/134422 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2019.05.001 |
ISSN: | 0957-1787 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada) |
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