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Title: Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points [WP]
Author: Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
Rafels, Carles
Ybern, Neus
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Matemàtica financera
Models matemàtics
Assignació de recursos
Game theory
Business mathematics
Mathematical models
Resource allocation
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco19/395]
Abstract: We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2019, E19/395
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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