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dc.contributor.authorToribio Mateas, Josefa-
dc.description.abstractIt has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this argument to work vis-à-vis these empirical results and offer two ways in which the accessibilist could meet the challenge posed by implicit biases. Ultimately both strategies fail, but the way in which they do, I conclude, reveals something general and important about our epistemic obligations and about the intuitions that inform the role of implicit biases in accessibilist justification.-
dc.format.extent27 p.-
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag-
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a:
dc.relation.ispartofSynthese, 2021, Vol. 198, num. 7, p. 1529-1547-
dc.rights(c) Springer Verlag, 2021-
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria del coneixement-
dc.subject.classificationJustificació (Teoria del coneixement)-
dc.subject.otherTheory of knowledge-
dc.subject.otherJustification (Theory of Knowledge)-
dc.titleAccessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
Publicacions de projectes de recerca finançats per la UE

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