Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/147065
Title: | Defending Nonreductionism About Understanding |
Author: | Palmira, Michele |
Keywords: | Teoria del coneixement Semàntica (Filosofia) Filosofia de la ment Context (Lingüística) Theory of knowledge Semantics (Philosophy) Philosophy of mind Context (Linguistics) |
Issue Date: | 2019 |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Abstract: | In this note I defend nonreductionism about understanding by arguing that knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. To this end, I examine Paulina Sliwa's (2015, 2017) novel defence of knowledge‐based Reductionism (Reductionism for short). Sliwa claims that one understands why p if and only if one has a sufficient amount of knowledge why p. Sliwa contends that Reductionism is supported by intuitive verdicts about our uses of 'understanding why' and 'knowing why'. In reply, I first argue that Sliwa's Reductionism leads to a vicious infinite regress. Secondly, I defuse the motivation in favour of Reductionism by showing how the linguistic data can be accommodated within a Nonreductionist framework. |
Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.424 |
It is part of: | Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2019, vol. 8, num. 3, p. 222-231 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/147065 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.424 |
ISSN: | 2161-2234 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) Publicacions de projectes de recerca finançats per la UE |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
693997.pdf | 173.94 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.