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Title: The case against semantic relativism
Author: Marques, Teresa
Keywords: Semàntica (Filosofia)
Semantics (Philosophy)
Issue Date: 6-Dec-2019
Publisher: Routledge
Abstract: This chapter presents reasons against semantic relativism. Semantic relativism is motivated by intuitions that are presumed to raise problems for traditional or contextualist semantics in contested domains of discourse. Intuition-based arguments are those based on competent speakers’ putative intuitions about seeming faultless disagreement, eavesdroppers, and retraction cases. I will organize the discussion in three parts. First, I shall provide a brief introduction to intuition-based arguments offered in favor of semantic relativism. Second, I shall indicate that there are ways for contextualism to explain the (appearance of) intuitions that support semantic relativism. Third, I shall review of experimental results and independent arguments that put into question the appeal of semantic relativism.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Capítol 53 del llibre: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Edited ByMartin Kusch, Routledge, London, 2019. ISBN: 9781351052306. 598 pp.
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Appears in Collections:Llibres / Capítols de llibre (Filosofia)
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