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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700| Title: | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets |
| Author: | Atay, Ata Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) |
| Keywords: | Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics |
| Issue Date: | Mar-2019 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier B.V. |
| Abstract: | We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. |
| Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.12.002 |
| It is part of: | Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 98, num. March, p. 10-14 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.12.002 |
| ISSN: | 0165-4896 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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