Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/154368
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorPalmira, Michele-
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-30T11:18:47Z-
dc.date.available2020-03-30T11:18:47Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.issn1757-0522-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/154368-
dc.description.abstractThomas Kelly has argued that the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement is committed both to belief revision and to the Uniqueness Thesis, which claims that for any hypothesis H and a total body of evidence e, there is some one-doxastic attitude that is uniquely rational to adopt towards H. I rebut both theses and I also defend the view that in Kelly's case the Uniqueness Thesis doesn't require belief revision.-
dc.format.extent2 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherUniversity of Kent-
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: https://research.kent.ac.uk/reasoning/wp-content/uploads/sites/581/2019/06/TheReasoner-71-screen.pdf-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Reasoner, 2013, vol. 7, num. 1, p. 4-5-
dc.rights(c) Palmira, Michele, 2013-
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria del coneixement-
dc.subject.classificationCreença i dubte-
dc.subject.otherTheory of knowledge-
dc.subject.otherBelief and doubt-
dc.titleBelief Revision, Uniqueness and the Equal Weight View-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec686358-
dc.date.updated2020-03-30T11:18:47Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
686358.pdf94.07 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.