Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/154486| Title: | Sneaky Assertions |
| Author: | García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| Keywords: | Filosofia del llenguatge Semàntica (Filosofia) Philosophy of language Semantics (Philosophy) |
| Issue Date: | 31-Dec-2018 |
| Publisher: | John Wiley & Sons |
| Abstract: | Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and others. This paper confronts and rejects three considerations that have been made: arguments based on the distinction between lying and misleading; arguments based on the ordinary concept of assertion; and arguments based on the testimonial knowledge that assertions provide. |
| Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12116 |
| It is part of: | Philosophical Perspectives, 2018, vol. 32, num. 1, p. 188-218 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/154486 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12116 |
| ISSN: | 1520-8583 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 683172.pdf | 361.07 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.