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Title: Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision
Author: Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Keywords: Teoria del coneixement
Filosofia de la ment
Theory of knowledge
Philosophy of mind
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and their content to be nonconceptual. I show that that view, here dubbed 'the mutually entailing thesis', admits two different standard interpretations depending on how we understand the property of being nonconceptual corresponding to the distinction between the state and the content views of perceptual nonconceptualism. I first argue for the falsity of the state-nonconceptualist reading of the mutually entailing thesis, on the grounds that it mistakenly takes being nonconceptual to be a causal instead of a constitutive relationship. The content-nonconceptualist understanding of the thesis, I then argue, is disproved by plausible views regarding the content of experience. The mutually entailing thesis could only be true, I conclude, on a non-standard, causal interpretation of the notion of nonconceptual content. Yet, on that reading, the thesis would either be trivially true or would entirely fail to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual nonconceptualism.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Philosophical Psychology, 2014, vol. 27, num. 5, p. 621-642
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ISSN: 0951-5089
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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