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Title: Uncertainty, complexity, and Gamson's law: comparing coalition formation in Western Europe
Author: Falcó Gimeno, Albert
Indridason, Indridi H.
Keywords: Principi de proporcionalitat (Dret)
Europa occidental
Proportionality in law
Practical politics
Western Europe
Issue Date: 31-Jan-2013
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Abstract: According to Gamson's Law, the allocation of cabinet portfolios in parliamentary democracies is proportional to the government parties' legislative seat shares. However, portfolio allocation departs systematically from perfect proportionality. This paper proposes a theory of portfolio allocation that seeks to explain the variance in proportionality across different bargaining situations. It argues that the degree to which the coalition formation process is characterised by uncertainty and complexity influences portfolio allocation. In uncertain and complex bargaining situations, parties that otherwise would be in an advantageous bargaining position will have a difficult time exploiting their bargaining advantage. As a result, portfolio allocation in such circumstances will be closer to proportionality. These patterns are observed in data on coalition formation in 14 West European parliamentary systems in the period 1945-1999.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: West European Politics, 2013, vol. 36, num. 1, p. 221-247
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ISSN: 0140-2382
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Ciència Política, Dret Constitucional i Filosofia del Dret)

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