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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/165620
Title: | Names, predicates, and the object–property distinction |
Author: | Martí, Genoveva |
Keywords: | Filosofia del llenguatge Noms propis Philosophy of language Proper names |
Issue Date: | Aug-2017 |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Abstract: | Proper names and predicates are different kinds of expressions, with different semantic functions. Names refer and predicates attribute properties or classify things into kinds. To some of us that is almost a platitude. Nevertheless, some philosophers contend that the difference is just apparent, and they have endorsed predicativist views advocating that names are really predicates and should be treated as such. The purpose of this paper is to argue against predicativism. However, the chapter will not engage the specific arguments offered by proponents of the view. Rather, it will argue that the proposal to treat proper names as predicates is wrong for semantic reasons that are grounded in metaphysical and conceptual considerations. |
Note: | Versió preprint del capítol de llibre publicat a: http://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198714217.001.0001 |
It is part of: | Capítol del llibre: María de Ponte and Kepa Korta. 2017. Reference and Representation in Thought and Language. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780198714217. ISBN-13: 9780198714217. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0002. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/165620 |
DOI: | https://dx.doi/10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0002 |
Appears in Collections: | Llibres / Capítols de llibre (Filosofia) |
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304981.pdf | 240.3 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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