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Title: Subhastes de múltiples objectes. Una aplicació al mercat elèctric espanyol
Author: Fernández Acacio, Vı́ctor
Director/Tutor: Jarque i Ribera, Xavier
Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
Keywords: Subhastes
Economia matemàtica
Jocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Treballs de fi de grau
Política energètica
Mathematical economics
Noncooperative games (Mathematics)
Bachelor's theses
Energy policy
Issue Date: Jun-2021
Abstract: [en] The multiple-object auctions have risen in interest, that is because of the growing interest since the nineties in economy. We are in the middle of a multiple-object auction when multiple identical units are being sold. Firstly, we study the auctions of an object with private values. After classifying the different formats of auctions, we analyse if they are efficient, in other words, if the auction winner is the one who values the object the most. Secondly, we analyse the multiple-object auctions with private values. We will classify the three formats of auction. Then, as we did in the first chapter, we analyse which of these formats are efficient. Lastly, we study the electricity market. In the first half we introduce the Spanish electricity market and in the end we study a model of that type of multiple-object auctions.
Note: Treballs Finals del Doble Grau d'Administració i Direcció d'Empreses i de Matemàtiques, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa i Facultat de Matemàtiques i Informàtica, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2020-2021 , Tutor: Xavier Jarque i Ribera i F. Javier Martínez de Albéniz
Appears in Collections:Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Administració i Direcció d’Empreses i Matemàtiques (Doble Grau)

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