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Title: Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market [WP]
Author: Domènech i Gironell, Gerard
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Estadística matemàtica
Assignació de recursos
Mercat de treball
Game theory
Mathematical statistics
Resource allocation
Labor market
Issue Date: 2022
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco22/419]
Abstract: In the multiple-partners job market, introduced in (Sotomayor, 1992), each firm can hire several workers and each worker can be hired by several firms, up to a given quota. We show that, in contrast to what happens in the simple assignment game, in this extension, the firms-optimal stable rules are neither valuation monotonic nor pairwise monotonic. However, we show that the firms-optimal stable rules satisfy a weaker property, what we call firm covariance, and that this property characterizes these rules among all stable rules. This property allows us to shed some light on how firms can (and cannot) manipulate the firms-optimal stable rules. In particular, we show that firms cannot manipulate them by constantly over-reporting their valuations. Analogous results hold when focusing on the workers. Finally, we extend to the multiple-partners market a known characterization of the fair-division rules on the domain of simple assignment games.
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2022, E22/419
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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