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Title: A vision of Two-Sided Matching Markets
Author: Sastre Galmés, Maria Antònia
Director/Tutor: Jarque i Ribera, Xavier
Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
Keywords: Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Treballs de fi de grau
Teoria de jocs
Assignació de recursos
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Bachelor's theses
Game theory
Resource allocation
Issue Date: Jun-2021
Abstract: [en] In this thesis we study an implementation of auctions in assignment markets. First we lay the basis for understanding auctions of a single object with private valuations, both at first price and at second price. As a main result, we find the revenue equivalence principle concerning certain types of auction. We focus on multi-object auctions and their classes. Then, taking as a reference Shapley and Shubik (1971) [16], we explain the assignment market and its associated assignment game. We also present in detail the core and its lattice structure, as well as the buyers and the sellers optima. Finally, we put the two issues together through the writing of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) [4] - the article Multi-Item Auctions. To find the buyers-optimal core allocation we present two mechanisms. We only need the information about the valuations and the minimum price at which the seller is willing to give up the item.
Note: Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2021, Director: Xavier Jarque i Ribera i F. Javier Martínez de Albéniz
Appears in Collections:Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Administració i Direcció d’Empreses i Matemàtiques (Doble Grau)

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