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Title: Subhastes de Vickrey i comptabilitat d'ncentius
Author: Martínez Canela, Marc
Director/Tutor: Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Keywords: Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Treballs de fi de grau
Presa de decisions (Estadística)
Models matemàtics
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Bachelor's theses
Statistical decision
Mathematical models
Issue Date: 24-Jan-2022
Abstract: [en] This monograph presents a type of auctions that have the property known as “incentive compatibility”, that meaning that no buyer has incentives to make a bid different than his or her real valuation for the object (or objects) on sale. In game theoretical terms we say that in the auction game, it is a dominant strategy for the buyers to report their true valuations. The simplest auction with this property is the sealed-bid second price auction of a single object. When there are several identical objects on sale, and also when the objects on sale are heterogeneous, the Vickrey auction generalizes the second price auction and is incentive compatible. These sealed-bid auctions also have a sequential or open format known as the English auction and the Ausubel Auction.
Note: Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2022, Director: Marina Núñez
Appears in Collections:Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques

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