Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/188635
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dc.contributor.advisorVives i Santa Eulàlia, Josep, 1963--
dc.contributor.authorBatlle Masmiquel, Laura-
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-05T10:57:45Z-
dc.date.available2022-09-05T10:57:45Z-
dc.date.issued2022-06-13-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/188635-
dc.descriptionTreballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2022, Director: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàliaca
dc.description.abstract[en] In this work we introduce the sealed-bid auction theory, and we compute its equilibrium when values are private and affiliated. Then we compare the seller’s expected revenue of first and second price auctions under different scenarios. Finally, we simulate an auction and check that the Revenue equivalence holds when values are uniformly distributed on [0,1].ca
dc.format.extent45 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isocatca
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Laura Batlle Masmiquel, 2022-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceTreballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocsca
dc.subject.classificationTreballs de fi de grau-
dc.subject.classificationSubhastesca
dc.subject.classificationJocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica)ca
dc.subject.classificationMètodes de simulacióca
dc.subject.otherGame theoryen
dc.subject.otherBachelor's theses-
dc.subject.otherAuctionsen
dc.subject.otherNoncooperative games (Mathematics)en
dc.subject.otherSimulation methodsen
dc.titleJocs amb informació incompleta: jocs bayesians i subhastesca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
Appears in Collections:Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques

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