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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/192490
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Domènech i Gironell, Gerard | - |
dc.contributor.author | Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-01-23T13:24:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-01-23T13:24:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022-11 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/192490 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In the multiple-partners job market, introduced in (Sotomayor, 1992), each firm can hire several workers and each worker can be hired by several firms, up to a given quota. We show that, in contrast to what happens in the simple assignment game, in this extension, the firms-optimal stable rules are neither valuation monotonic nor pairwise monotonic. However, we show that the firms-optimal stable rules satisfy a weaker property, what we call firm-covariance, and that this property characterizes these rules among all stable rules. This property allows us to shed some light on how firms can (and cannot) manipulate the firms-optimal stable rules. In particular, we show that firms cannot manipulate them by constantly over-reporting their valuations. Analogous results hold when focusing on the workers. Finally, we extend to the multiple-partners market a known characterization of the fair-division rules on the domain of simple assignment games. | - |
dc.format.extent | 16 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | - |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.005 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 136, num. 136, p. 469-484 | - |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.005 | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2022 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.source | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) | - |
dc.subject.classification | Teoria de jocs | - |
dc.subject.classification | Estadística matemàtica | - |
dc.subject.classification | Assignació de recursos | - |
dc.subject.classification | Mercat de treball | - |
dc.subject.other | Game theory | - |
dc.subject.other | Mathematical statistics | - |
dc.subject.other | Resource allocation | - |
dc.subject.other | Labor market | - |
dc.title | Axioms for optimal stable rules and fair division rules in a multiple-partners job market | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | - |
dc.identifier.idgrec | 728282 | - |
dc.date.updated | 2023-01-23T13:24:48Z | - |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | - |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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728282.pdf | 349.43 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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