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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/194353
Title: | Corruption and the case for safe-harbor regulation |
Author: | De Chiara, Alessandro Manna, Ester |
Keywords: | Corrupció Immunitat Seguretat jurídica Corruption Immunity Legal certainty |
Issue Date: | 1-Jul-2022 |
Publisher: | Elsevier B.V. |
Abstract: | We study whether the joint adoption of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability leads to a higher level of welfare in a setting in which firms invest resources to develop an innovative product that can have negative social repercussions. We allow for firm-regulator corruption and compare two alternative regulatory regimes: lenient authorization and strict authorization. Corruption favors strict authorization and strengthens the case for making firms immune from ex-post liability so as to encourage ex-ante investment. By contrast, when lenient authorization is adopted, firms should not be insulated from liability. Hence, liability should be more severe when corruption is less common. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110546 |
It is part of: | Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 216, num. 110546 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/194353 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110546 |
ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) |
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