Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Matching markets with farsighted couples
Author: Atay, Ata
Funck, Sylvain
Mauleon, Ana
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Keywords: Ensenyament de la medicina
Residents (Medicina)
Mercat de treball
Medicine education
Residents (Medicine)
Labor market
Issue Date: 2023
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco23/445]
Abstract: We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which match-ings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents become farsighted. Examples of farsighted stable sets containing multiple non-stable matchings are provided for markets with and without stable matchings. For couples markets where the farsighted sta-ble set does not exist, we propose the DEM farsighted stable set to predict the matchings that are stable when agents are farsighted.
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2023, E23/445
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
E23-445_Atay et al.pdf363.46 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons