Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370
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dc.contributor.authorAtay, Ata-
dc.contributor.authorSolymosi, Tamás-
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-16T11:56:08Z-
dc.date.available2023-06-16T11:56:08Z-
dc.date.issued2018-06-01-
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370-
dc.description.abstractWe study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).-
dc.format.extent5 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.-
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022-
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Letters, 2018, vol. 167, p. 99-103-
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022-
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)-
dc.subject.classificationNegociació-
dc.subject.classificationJocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocs-
dc.subject.otherNegotiation-
dc.subject.otherCooperative games (Mathematics)-
dc.subject.otherGame theory-
dc.titleOn bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec716841-
dc.date.updated2023-06-16T11:56:08Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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