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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/213344
Title: | Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems |
Author: | Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier |
Keywords: | Responsabilitat per productes Subhastes Compravenda Products liability Auctions Sales |
Issue Date: | 2024 |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
Abstract: | We study the problem of allocating packages of different objects to a group of bidders. A rule is overbidding-proof if no bidder has incentives to bid above his actual valuations. We prove that if an efficient rule is overbidding-proof, then each winning bidder pays a price between his winning bid and what he would pay in a Vickrey auction for the same package. In counterpart, the set of rules that satisfy underbidding-proofness always charge a price below the corresponding Vickrey price. A new characterization of the Vickrey allocation rule is provided with a weak form of strategy-proofness. The Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, overbidding-proofness and underbidding-proofness. Our results are also valid on the domains of monotonic valuations and of single-minded bidders. Finally a family of overbidding rules is introduced that price the assigned packages at a fixed average of the Vickrey price and the pay-as-bid price. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01506-5 |
It is part of: | Social Choice and Welfare, 2024, vol. 62, p. 739-759 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/213344 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01506-5 |
ISSN: | 0176-1714 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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