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Title: | Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox |
Author: | Oms Sardans, Sergi |
Keywords: | Paradoxa Veritat i mentida Epistemologia genètica Metafísica Lògica Filosofia de la ment Paradox Truthfulness and falsehood Genetic epistemology Metaphysics Logic Philosophy of mind |
Issue Date: | 2023 |
Publisher: | Springer Nature |
Abstract: | [eng] This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00515-2 |
It is part of: | Acta Analytica, 2023, vol. 38, p. 211-228 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/213983 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00515-2 |
ISSN: | 0353-5150 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) |
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