A Dilemma for Essentialism in the Epistemology of Modality

Abstract

I analyze the viability of essentialist accounts in the epistemology of modality. I present a dilemma they face due to their commitment to the thesis of Finean Essentialism, according to which metaphysical necessities find their source in the essence of entities. According to this dilemma, either essences have a modal character, specifically, they are metaphysically necessary, or they have no modal character at all. In the first case, a problem arises when attempting to account for the metaphysical necessity of essences. In the second, it seems that essences, given their non-modal character, are not suitable for accounting for metaphysical necessities, as the thesis of Finean Essentialism intends. I examine some responses that have been offered to both horns of the dilemma.